斯坦福博弈论笔记整理活动的任务已重新划分，望周知

参与方式：https://github.com/apachecn/stanford-game-theory-notes-zh/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md

整体进度：https://github.com/apachecn/stanford-game-theory-notes-zh/issues/1

项目仓库：https://github.com/apachecn/stanford-game-theory-notes-zh

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贡献指南

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课程视频：

• 斯坦福博弈论课程官网
• Cousera 博弈论 1
• Cousera 博弈论 2

负责人：

• viviwong

章节列表

• 博弈论 I
  • 1-1 Game Theory Intro - TCP Backoff
  • 1-2 Self-Interested Agents and Utility Theory
  • 1-3 Defining Games
  • 1-4 Examples of Games
  • 1-5 Nash Equilibrium Intro
  • 1-6 Strategic Reasoning
  • 1-7 Best Response and Nash Equilibrium
  • 1-8 Nash Equilibrium of Example Games
  • 1-9 Dominant Strategies
  • 1-10 Pareto Optimality
  • 2-1 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium (I)
  • 2-2 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium (II)
  • 2-3 Computing Mixed Nash Equilibrium
  • 2-4 Hardness Beyond 2x2 Games - Basic
  • 2-4 Hardness Beyond 2x2 Games - Advanced
  • 2-5 Example: Mixed Strategy Nash
  • 2-6 Data: Professional Sports and Mixed Strategies
  • 3-1 Beyond the Nash Equilibrium
  • 3-2 Strictly Dominated Strategies & Iterative Removal
  • 3-3 Dominated Strategies & Iterative Removal: An Application
  • 3-4 Maxmin Strategies
  • 3-4 Maxmin Strategies - Advanced
  • 3-5 Correlated Equilibrium: Intuition
  • 4-1 Perfect Information Extensive Form: Taste
  • 4-2 Formalizing Perfect Information Extensive Form Games
  • 4-3 Perfect Information Extensive Form: Strategies, BR, NE
  • 4-4 Subgame Perfection
  • 4-5 Backward Induction
  • 4-6 Subgame Perfect Application: Ultimatum Bargaining
  • 4-7 Imperfect Information Extensive Form: Poker
  • 4-8 Imperfect Information Extensive Form: Definition, Strategies
  • 4-9 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies
  • 4-10 Incomplete Information in the Extensive Form: Beyond Subgame Perfection
• 博弈论 II
  • 1.1 Social Choice: Taste
  • 1.2 Social Choice: Voting Scheme
  • 1.3 Paradoxical Outcomes
  • 1.4 Impossibility of Non-Paradoxical Social Welfare Functions
  • 1.5 Arrow's Theorem
  • 1.6 Impossibility of Non-Pardoxical Social Choice Functions
  • 1.7 Single-Peaked Preferences
  • 2.1 Mechanism Design: Taste
  • 2.2 Implementation
  • 2.3 Mechanism Design: Examples
  • 2.4 Revelation Principle
  • 2.5 Revelation Principle: Examples
  • 2.6 Impossibility of General Dominant-Strategy Implementation
  • 2.7 Transferable Utility
  • 2.8 Transferable Utility Example
  • 2.9 Mechanism Design as an Optimization Problem
  • 3.1 VCG: Taste
  • 3.2 VCG: Definitions
  • 3.3 VCG: Examples
  • 3.4 VCG: Limitations
  • 3.5 VCG: Individual Rationality and Budget Balance in VCG
  • 3.6 VCG: The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem
  • 4.1 Auctions: Taste
  • 4.2 Auctions: Taxonomy
  • 4.3 Bidding in Second-Price Auctions
  • 4.4 Bidding in First-Price Auctions
  • 4.5 Revenue Equivalence
  • 4.6 Optimal Auctions
  • 4.7 More Advanced Auctions

流程

一、认领

首先查看整体进度，确认没有人认领了你想认领的章节。

然后回复 ISSUE，注明“章节 + QQ 号”。

二、整理笔记

• 翻译 Coursera 课程页面的字幕（可以利用谷歌翻译，但一定要把它变得可读）
• 排版成段落，并添加视频截图

三、提交

• fork Github 项目
• 将文档（Markdown 格式）放在docs中。
• push
• pull request

请见 Github 入门指南。