Trojan Horses In The Banks
美国政府对银行的注资就像藏在各家大银行里伪装得很蹩脚的特洛伊木马。它们要到什么时候会被动用起来控制这些银行？通过问题资产救助计划(Troubled Asset Relief Program)，布什政府去年向银行业注入了2,000多亿美元，其中大部分购买了优先股。这些注资提高了银行的法定资本金水平，但也有其不足之处。由于购买的是优先股，纳税人并不能对银行实施正式控制，因为优先股没有投票权。而且，股权投资人对大量的优先股开始警觉起来，因为银行要给这些优先股支付可观的股息，而且在资本结构上优先股的地位高于普通股。所以，财政部长盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)设想政府如果进一步注资将采用不同的方式也就不奇怪了。他在金融稳定计划(Financial Stability Plan)中设想，政府将购买可转为普通股的优先股。可采用一种渐进的办法来实现这种注资，比如，如果经过测试认为某家银行的资本金可能会降至某个水平之下，政府就增持可转换股份。银行的有形普通股权益比是投资者非常关注的一个指标。要想提高银行的这项指标，一个更快捷的做法是将政府已有的优先股转为普通股。这样做有几个好处。政府不需要再先期拿出更多资金。尽管法定资本金比例没有变化，但资本缓冲的质量改善了，因为普通股是真正的股权，相比之下，优先股有点像债权。而且，如果注资确实加强了银行的稳定，那么一旦银行股价回升，政府也能分享成果。这里有一个两难的问题：可转换股份能让政府在任何一家优先股超过其市值的银行获得多数股份，这一点恐怕管理层会竭力反对。以花旗(Citigroup)和美国银行(Bank of America)为例。政府在这两家银行分别持有450亿美元的优先股。如果将这些股份转为普通股，则纳税人将分别在花旗和美国银行持有大约四分之三和三分之二的普通股。现在这两家银行的股价已经低到极点，这或许反映了市场对这样一个结果的担心。而问题还不仅是股权稀释，政府持有多数股后或许会开始出于政治考虑对银行指手画脚，不能恰当地实施银行的重组。美国国际集团(American International Group)现在处于地狱般境地，这就是政府控制可能导致瘫痪而不是改善的一个生动案例。现在，政府似乎更倾向于渐进的方式，也就是在必要的时候增持可转换股份。但如果投资者觉得这充其量只是为奄奄一息的银行打点滴的话，这样的举动结果可能适得其反。财政部可能希望它进行的压力测试显示不会出现这样的结果，从而一劳永逸地确定一家银行到底需要多少资本金。不过，为加强市场的信心，财政部一定愿意接手那些资本金不足的银行，并迅速对它们进行重组，即使它们规模很大。Peter Eavis相关阅读奥巴马公布大规模住房救助计划 2009-02-19白宫称住房计划或使至多900万人获益 2009-02-19原声视频：美国经济刺激方案款额再增(中文字幕) 2009-02-19白宫：刺激计划将为加州拯救39.6万个就业岗位 2009-02-18白宫：奥巴马和日本首相将讨论应对金融危机的措施 2009-02-18奥巴马签署经济刺激法案，警告称经济复苏道阻且长 2009-02-18
Government capital injections sit like ill-disguised Trojan horses in the nation's largest banks. How long before they're used to take control of certain lenders?Through the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Bush administration last year plowed over $200 billion into banks, mostly in return for preferred stock. The injections beefed up regulatory capital measures, but they had their drawbacks. The tax payer got no official control over lenders with their preferred shares, since these don't have voting rights.What's more, equity investors became wary of the mountain of preferreds, because these pay substantial dividends and come ahead of common stock in the capital structure.No surprise, then, that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is thinking of a different structure if the government injects more cash. His Financial Stability Plan envisions the government taking preferred equity that converts into common stock. The approach could be gradual, with the government adding convertibles if, after a stress-test, a bank's capital is expected to drop below a certain level.But a quicker way to build a bank's tangible common equity ratio, closely-watched by investors, would be to swap the government's existing preferreds for common shares. That would have several plusses. The government wouldn't need to spend more money upfront. While the regulatory capital ratio doesn't change, the quality of the capital buffer improves, since common shares are true equity, whereas preferreds have some debt-like characteristics.Also the government would participate in any share price recovery if the move helped stabilize the bank.One dilemma: conversion could give the government a majority stake in any bank where the preferred stake is bigger than the market capitalization -something that might be fiercely opposed by management.Take Citigroup and Bank of America, each with $45 billion of government preferred. Turning that into common shares, would give the taxpayer roughly three-quarters of Citi's common stock and around two-thirds of Bank of America's.The extreme weakness of both banks' stock prices suggests the market fears of such an outcome. And not only dilution; a government with a majority stake may start to manage a bank for political ends, and fail to carry out a proper restructuring.American International Group's limbo-like existence is a stark example of how government control can lead to paralysis, not improvement.For now, the government appears to favor a gradualist approach - adding convertible equity as-needed. But this could backfire if investors think it's nothing more than a drip-feed to keep banks on life support.The Treasury will hope that its stress-tests prevent that scenario, determining once and for all how much capital a bank really needs. To underpin confidence for the strong, however, it must be willing to take over undercapitalized institutions and restructure them quickly - even if they are huge.Peter Eavis
Government capital injections sit like ill-disguised Trojan horses in the nation's largest banks. How long before they're used to take control of certain lenders?Through the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Bush administration last year plowed over $200 billion into banks, mostly in return for preferred stock. The injections beefed up regulatory capital measures, but they had their drawbacks. The tax payer got no official control over lenders with their preferred shares, since these don't have voting rights.What's more, equity investors became wary of the mountain of preferreds, because these pay substantial dividends and come ahead of common stock in the capital structure.No surprise, then, that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is thinking of a different structure if the government injects more cash. His Financial Stability Plan envisions the government taking preferred equity that converts into common stock. The approach could be gradual, with the government adding convertibles if, after a stress-test, a bank's capital is expected to drop below a certain level.But a quicker way to build a bank's tangible common equity ratio, closely-watched by investors, would be to swap the government's existing preferreds for common shares. That would have several plusses. The government wouldn't need to spend more money upfront. While the regulatory capital ratio doesn't change, the quality of the capital buffer improves, since common shares are true equity, whereas preferreds have some debt-like characteristics.Also the government would participate in any share price recovery if the move helped stabilize the bank.One dilemma: conversion could give the government a majority stake in any bank where the preferred stake is bigger than the market capitalization -something that might be fiercely opposed by management.Take Citigroup and Bank of America, each with $45 billion of government preferred. Turning that into common shares, would give the taxpayer roughly three-quarters of Citi's common stock and around two-thirds of Bank of America's.The extreme weakness of both banks' stock prices suggests the market fears of such an outcome. And not only dilution; a government with a majority stake may start to manage a bank for political ends, and fail to carry out a proper restructuring.American International Group's limbo-like existence is a stark example of how government control can lead to paralysis, not improvement.For now, the government appears to favor a gradualist approach - adding convertible equity as-needed. But this could backfire if investors think it's nothing more than a drip-feed to keep banks on life support.The Treasury will hope that its stress-tests prevent that scenario, determining once and for all how much capital a bank really needs. To underpin confidence for the strong, however, it must be willing to take over undercapitalized institutions and restructure them quickly - even if they are huge.Peter Eavis