python演化博弈仿真_演化博弈应用：例子与思路

演化博弈应用：例子与思路

Game theory is the study of

mathematical models of strategic interaction between rational

decision-makers.

Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is the

application of game theory to evolving populations in biology. It

defines a framework of contests, strategies, and analytics into

which Darwinian competition can be modelled. It originated in 1973

with John Maynard Smith and George R. Price's formalisation of

contests, analysed as strategies, and the mathematical criteria

that can be used to predict the results of competing

strategies.

Evolutionary game theory differs from classical game theory in

focusing more on the dynamics of strategy change. This is

influenced by the frequency of the competing strategies in the

population.

Evolutionary game theory has helped to explain the basis of

altruistic behaviours in Darwinian evolution. It has in turn become

of interest to economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and

philosophers.

(Ref: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_game_theory)

用一个例子说明此类文章的体例与思路。

Using evolutionary game theory to study governments and

manufacturers’ behavioral strategies under various carbon taxes and

subsidies, in Journal of Cleaner Production 2018,

201:123-141.

Abstract

Governments of both developed and developing countries are

monitoring the growing problems of environmental pollution,

resource consumption, and energy shortages. They use carbon taxes

to discourage manufacturing that is not eco-friendly, and

subsidizes to encourage low-carbon production methods. In this

research, the evolutionary game theory is applied to examine the

behavioral strategies of the manufacturers in response to various

combinations of carbon taxes and subsidies considering that the

manufactured products have no distinctly low-carbon

characteristics. First, we developed an evolutionary game theory

model of the interaction between governments and manufacturers

based on static carbon taxes and subsidies. Then we examined the

evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the governments and

manufacturers under different constraints. Second, we analyzed the

evolutionary behaviors of the governments and manufacturers under

three additional models: dynamic taxes and static subsidies, static

taxes and dynamic subsidies, and dynamic taxes and dynamic

subsidies. Finally, we used a simulation to compare the results of

all the models to determine the optimal carbon tax and subsidy

mechanism. The results showed that the static carbon tax and

subsidy mechanism implemented by the governments cannot provide the

needed positive impact on manufacturers decision-making. Of the

three dynamic carbon tax and subsidy mechanisms, the bilateral

dynamic tax and subsidy mechanism is more effective, and it

provides more incentives for manufacturers to adopt low-carbon

manufacturing. The carbon taxes levied by governments are proved

more effective to encourage low-carbon manufacturing than

governments subsidize the low-carbon technology. Manufacturers’

behavioral strategy is influenced mainly by the governmental

policies, to which governments also need to make some dynamic

strategy adjustments in response.

Keywords

Outline

1. Introduction

2. Literature review

2.1. Influence of carbon emission reduction policies on

enterprise decision-making

2.2. Use of general game to study government and enterprise

behavior under carbon emission reduction policies

2.3. Use of evolutionary game to study government and

enterprise behavior under carbon emission reduction policies

2.4. Incremental contributions to literature

3. Problem description and assumptions

3.1. Problem description

3.2. Model assumptions

4. Basic model of carbon taxes and subsidies: description and

analysis

4.1. Static carbon tax and static subsidy model

5. Dynamic model of carbon taxes and subsidies: described and

analyzed

5.1. Establishment and analysis of the dynamic carbon tax

and

static subsidy model

5.2. Establishment and analysis of the static carbon tax

and

dynamic subsidy model

5.3. Establishment and analysis of the dynamic carbon tax

and

dynamic subsidy model

6. Case and simulation analysis

6.1. A case study

6.2. Simulation

7. Discussions

8. Conclusions

Acknowledgements

Appendix.

References