股东信来源
THE GENERAL STOCK MARKET IN 1958
A friend who run a medium-sized investment trust recently wrote:"The mercurial temperament, characteristic of the American people, produced a major transformation in 1958 and 'exuberant' would be the proper word for the stock market, at least".
一个运作中等规模的信托机构的朋友最近写到：“美国民众反复无常的性情造就了1958年市场情绪有了明显的转变，当前的股票市场至少可以用‘热情洋溢/欣欣向荣’来形容 ”。
I think this summarizes the change in psychology dominating the stock market in 1958 at both the amateur and professional levels. During the past year, almost any reason has been seized upon to justify "investing" in the market. There are undoubtedly more mercurially-tempered people in the stock market now than for a good many years and and the duration of their stay will be limited to how long they think profits can be make quickly and effortlessly. While it is impossible to determine how long they will continue to add numbers to their ranks and thereby stimulate rising prices I believe it is valid to say that the longer their visit, the grater the reaction from it.
我想以上的文字正好体现了目前（1958年）股票市场上无论业余爱好者或者专业投资者当前的主流心理状态的改变。过去一年，任何事情都可以变成投资到股票市场的理由。毫无疑问较往年相比目前市场里有更多头脑发热的投资者，这些狂热投资者往往会一直留在市场里直到他们认为无法再快速，轻而易举地获得收益。同时我们也无从得知他们会如何持续地增加投资从而推高价格。不过我相信这种情况越持久最终的带来的后果会越强烈。
I make no attempt to forecast the general market - my efforts are devoted to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the inevitability of profited from investment in stock will lead to eventual trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected.
我无意预测市场，主要致力于寻找低估的资产。然而我相信目前这种人人都想从股票市场分一杯羹的现象最终会带来大麻烦。当这种情况出现，即便是目前低估的资产价格（不是其固有价值）也必将受到影响。
RESULTS IN 1958
1958年投资表现
In my letter of last year, I wrote:
在去年的信中我写到：
"Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages".
"相对而言，我们在熊市中投资表现往往要好于牛市，据此来看我们今年的表现，其实做的还不错。在整个市场都收益可观的时候，能做到平均水准我就很满意了“。
The latter sentence describes the type of year we had in 1958 and my forecast worked out. The Dow-Jones industrial average advanced from 435 to 583 which, after adding back dividends of about 20 points, gave an overall gain of 38.5% from the Dow-Jones unit. The five partnerships that operated throughout the entire year obtained results averaging slightly better than this 38.5%. Based on market values at the end of both years, their gains ranged from 36.7% to 46.2%. Considering the fact that substantial portion of assets has been and still is invested in securities, which benefit very little from a fast-rising market. I believe these results are reasonably good. I will continue to forecast that our results will be above average in a declining or level market, but it will be all we can do to keep pace with a rising market.
第二句话描述的就是我们在1958年的情形，而且印证了我的预见。道琼工业指数从435点涨到583点（在加权20点股利之后），总体上涨了38.5%。五个合伙人公司一整年的运作结果仅仅比这个38.5%的结果好一点点。对比年初和年末的市场价格，他们的涨幅从36.7% 到 46.2%不等。考虑到大部分的资产都已经投资到证券市场（虽然在快速上升的市场中帮助有限？）。我想这个表现还是不错的。我仍坚持相信我们的投资表现会在衰退或者平静的市场中优于平均水平，不过在快速上涨的环境下只求跟随不求超越。
A TIPICAL SITUATION
一个典型的案例
So that you may better understand our method of operation, I think it would be well to review a specific activity of 1958. Last year I referred to our largest holding which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. I pointed out that it was to our interest to have this stock decline or remain relatively steady, so that we could acquire an even larger position and that for this reason such a security would hold back our comparative performance in a bull market.
为了让您更好的了解我们的操作方法，我想最好一起来回顾发生在1958年的一个特定案例（操作？活动？）。去年有提到占我们所有资产10%-20%的最大持仓。我当时也指出这只股票的价格下跌或者维持稳定是对我们有利的，这样就可以获得更多的仓位，同时也是由于这个原因，我们在牛市中的表现也收到影响。
This stock was the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey. At the time we started to purchase the stock, it had an intrinsic value of $125 per share computed on a conservative basis. However, for good reasons, it paid no cash dividend at all despite earnings of about $10 per share, which was largely responsible for a depressed price of about $50 per share. So here we have a very well managed bank with substantial earning power selling at a large discount from intrinsic value. Manager was friendly to us as new stockholders and risk of any ultimate loss seem minimal.
这只股票叫做新泽西州联合市联邦信托有限公司。在我们开始购买这只股票时，这只股票的固有价值保守估计有每股125刀。然而，虽然这只股票有充分理由在每股盈利10美元的情况下不发一毛钱股利，但是这却直接造成了股价下跌到了50刀一股。现在我们有一个管理得很好有持续盈利能力的上市银行在打骨折促销。管理层对于我们这个新股东非常友善，而且这个投资损失风险非常小。
Commonwalth was 25 1/2% owned by a larger bank (Commonwalth has assets of about $50 million -- about half the size of the First National or U.S. National in Omaha), which had desired a merger for many years. Such a merger was prevented for personal reasons, but there was evidence that this situation would not continue indefinitely. Thus we had a combination of :(1) Very strong defensive characteristics; (2) Good solid value building up at a satisfactory pace and; (3) Evidence to the effect that eventually this value would be unlocked although it might be one year or ten years. If the latter were true, the value would presumably have been built up to a considerably larger figure, say, $250 per share.
联邦信托有25.5%的股权由一个大银行持有 ，（联邦信托大概有$5000万的资产，大概是奥马哈第一国家银行规模的一半）该大银行也有意收购但由于一些私人原因收购迟迟未付诸行动，不过有证据表明这种情况不会一直持续下去。那么我们有： 1）很宽的安全边际；2）资产价值在以一个令人满意的速度慢慢增值；3）并且这些资产的价值会最终释放出来，也许一年，也许十年。如果是后者，想必该资产的价值也会有可观的增长，也许有$250每股。
Over a period of a year or so, we were successful in obtaining about 12% of the bank at a price averaging about $51 per share. Obviously it was defintely to our advantage to have the stock remain dormanting price. Our block of stock increased in value as its size grew, particully after we became the second largest stockholder with sufficient voting power to warrant consultation on any merger proposal.
通过大概一年的时间，我们成功获得了这家银行大概12%的股权，均价在$51。显然股价维持不变对我们有利。在获得这些股票的同时，我们自己的每股价值同样也在增加。尤其是当我们成为第二大股东从而拥有足够的投票权来保证可以得知（参与到）任何收购提案。
Commonwealth only had about 200 sotckholders and probably averaged two trades or so per month, so you can understand why I say that the activity of the stock market generally has very little effect on the price movements of some of our holdings.
联邦信托只有大概200个股东，平均每个月只有两笔交易，所以你知道为什么我说市场的热情对我们的股价几乎没有影响。
Unfortunately we did run into some competition on buying, which raised the price to about $65 where we were neither buyers nor sellers. Very small buying orders can create price changes of this magnitude in an inactive stock, which explains the importance of not having any "Leakage" regarding our portfolio holdings.
很不幸我们在购买股票的时候的确遇到过竞价，一度把股价提高到$65每股这个不过这笔交易我们没有参与。对于一只不活跃的股票股票来说，很少的交易量也会带来股价的剧烈波动。这也是为什么对于我们的持仓保密很重要。
Late in the year we were successful in finding a special situation where we could become the largest holders at a attactive price, so we sold our block of Commonwealth, obtaining $80 pershare although the quote market wat about 20% lower at the time.
在年末的时候我们遇到了一笔特殊交易，可以使我们在一个诱人的价格成为最大的股东，因此我们以每股$80的价格卖出了联邦信托的股票，虽然当时股票市价要低20%。
It is obvious that we could still be sitting with a $50 stock patiently buying in dribs and drabs, and I would be quite happy with such a program although our performance relative to the market last year would have looked poor. The year when a situation such as Commonwealth results in a realized profit is, to a great extent, fortuitous. Thus, our performance for any single year has serious limitations as a basis for estimating long term results. However, I believe that a program of investing in such undervalued well protected securities offers the surest means of long term profits in securities.
显而易见我们可以继续以每股$50的价格一点一滴耐心地收集股票，同时我也非常喜欢这笔交易然我们去年总体的投资表现相对于市场看起来很差。而且我们也很大程度上无从得知像联邦信托这样的资产何时能释放出它的真正价值从而使股东大受其益。因此以任意一年的投资回报来长期回报率是很不准确的。不过我相信像投资这种被低估的收到良好保护的证券资产必然会带来可观的长期回报。
I might mention that the buyer of the stock at $80 can expect to do quite well over the years. However, the relative undervaluation at $80 with intrinsic value of $135 is quite different from a price of $50 with an intrinsic value of $125, and it seemed to me that our capital could better be employed in the situation which replaced it. This new situation is somewhat larger than Commonwealth and represents about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. While the degree of undervaluation is no greater than in many other securities we own (or even less than some) we are the largest stockholder and this has substantial advantage many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation. In this particular holding we are virtually assured of performance better than that of the Dow-Jones for the period we hold.
我必须说那位$80的买家若干年后同样会有不错的投资收益。不过80对于135肯定远不如50对于125的低估程度，而且对于我来说既然有机会可以更有效的利用资产，我们就进行了交易。这个新案例之后联邦信托在我们整个合伙企业的资产比重达到了将近25%，这个比重由点高。虽然这个标的的低估程度并不高于我们拥有的其他股票（甚至比有一些更“贵”），但是由于我们这个最大的股东的身份可以让我们很大程度上来决定估值修正的时间长度（前面不是说是第二大股东吗？）。因此我确信在持有这个标的的期间我们的投资回报率会优于同时期的道琼斯指数。
THE CURRENT SITUATION
现况
The higher the level of the market, the fewer the undervalued security and I am finding some difficulty in securing an adequate number of attractive investments. I would prefer to increase the percentage of assets in work-outs, but these are very difficult to find on the right terms.
市场越疯狂低估的股票就越少，我感觉找到足够数量能吸引我的投资有点困难了。我宁愿把一部分资产来做套利，不过找到很好的标的来做也不容易。
To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast -- an above average performance in a bear market or neutral market, and a normal performance in a bull market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged. If you have any questions, feel free to ask them.
因此我开始尽可能的尝试通过创建自己的套利来获得更多若干被低估的股票。（sell-put?）这种策略应该会保证我早先的预期--在熊市或者一般的市场环境下优于平均水平，同时在牛市中不掉队。我希望大家都以这个为基础来评判我的表现。如果有任何问题请尽管发问。
Warren E.Buffett
后记：开始从1958年的巴菲特致股东信开始，依年逐段中英对照翻译。早期没有找到电子版的原文，根据PDF文件手打。如有勘误或者翻译不当的地方，请留言我会及时改正。自学用途
从股东信中可以大致估计当时巴菲特的资产大约=$5000万*12%/25%=$2400万