Beijing's Antitrust Blunder
Patrick Chovanec中国政府上周以反垄断为由迅速否决了可口可乐公司(Coca-Cola Co.)出资24亿美元收购中国汇源果汁集团有限公司(China Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd., 简称：汇源果汁)的交易。这一决定给全球企业界带来一阵刺骨的寒意。由于这是中国依据新出台的《反垄断法》做出的首个重大裁定，但又没有具体说明所采用的标准，专家们纷纷紧盯这次的案例，想从中找出中国政府将会如何实施新法的线索。他们可以从一个方面开始着手，那就是将这一结果与欧美监管机构审查这一交易可能会出现什么情况进行比较。对于任何新提出的并购，美国和欧盟首先要做的都是利用赫芬达尔—赫希曼指数(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index，简称：HHI)来审查该交易是否会引起任何可能需要监管机构仔细审查的问题。HHI是每家竞争对手的市场占有率的平方和。（比如说，一个市场有100家竞争公司，每家市场份额为1%，那么HHI值就为100，而如果一个市场被两家公司均分，HHI值就为5,000。）HHI值越高，行业就越集中，规模庞大的市场参与者获得不利于竞争的定价权的机率就越高。欧美对并购交易的门槛是一样的：如果实现并购后的HHI值低于1,000，提出的交易就被假定为不会造成垄断方面的问题，通常会优先获得通过，无需进一步调查。就算并购后HHI值高于1,000，如果行业HHI值变化不大，交易仍有可能直接获批。没能符合这个门槛标准也并不意味着交易会遭否决，只是需要更彻底的评估。可口可乐－汇源交易在这样的初步审查之下命运会如何呢？经过我的计算，这桩交易的HHI值在美国和欧盟都会即刻得到不存在垄断问题的结果。利用Euromonitor最近发布的2008年市场份额数据，我计算了中国果蔬汁市场在可口可乐－汇源并购前后的HHI值。可口可乐旗下所有果汁品牌加起来在中国占据了11.8%的最大份额，汇源位居第二，占8.5%。我们假定二者在中国的地区市场完全重合，则并购后的HHI为552，高于并购前的352，但仍远远没有达到需要严格审查的门槛。中国媒体重点将汇源在中国纯果汁市场33%的份额作为行业集中的初步证据。但依据欧美监管机构所用的原则，纯果汁市场这个定义范畴太窄，因为许多种果汁产品都被消费者视为可能的替代品。负责审查这桩交易的中国商务部在一份声明中暗示，它关注的重点在于更大的市场而非小范围市场，并表示，担心可口可乐会利用在中国碳酸饮料市场的支配地位，对整个软饮料市场施加不利于竞争的影响。可口可乐占据碳酸饮料市场52.5%的份额。那我们就来看看Euromonitor提供的2008年软饮料市场数据。软饮料包括所有的不含酒精非乳制品品牌产品。可口可乐在软饮料市场占15.8%的份额，汇源的市场份额为2.0%。二者并购后的HHI为639，高于并购前的576，仍远远低于1,000的入门值。中国政府否决了在欧美连审查门槛都没达到的交易，这一事实说明中国要么会实行比欧美严格得多的标准，要么就是借反垄断之名达到政治性更强的目的。如果是前者，看看中国国内公司的并购是否也适用了同样的严格标准会是件很有意思的事，尤其是中国的国有企业。最近由政府主导的大规模整合模式表明不太可能实行了更严格的反垄断标准，比如中国网通与中国联通合并，或是上海汽车与南京汽车合并。后一个结论似乎更接近事实，即商务部是在进行更具政治意味的行动。商务部的声明揭示了其目的何在：声明中说，可口可乐的并购将挤压国内中小型果汁企业生存空间，给中国果汁饮料市场竞争格局造成不良影响。换言之，中国阻止该交易是为了保护国内生产商不受强大的外国竞争者挤压。这种情况早有先例。2005年，中国政府阻止了凯雷投资集团(Carlyle Group)提出收购徐工集团工程机械有限公司(Xugong Group Construction Machinery Co., 简称：徐工机械)的交易，这被普遍认为是阻止外资进入快速发展的工程机械领域的政治手段。不幸的是，可口可乐－汇源交易似乎传达了这样的信息，即中国政府现在有了新的法律工具，可以随心所欲地得到类似的结果。作为中国第一桩重大反垄断审查，可口可乐提出的交易给了商务部一个机会，可以设定可靠的理由充分的先例，为新的反垄断法建立可信度，然而中国政府拙劣地破坏了这个机会。中国在这个时候向其全球贸易伙伴发出了可能是最糟糕的信息。这桩交易失败的真正输家并非可口可乐，它仍有将自己的品牌引入中国并进行营销的资源。汇源这类中国公司的所有者员工和股东才是真正的输家。有了这样的先例，在食品服装电子产品及其他领域创建了富有活力的新品牌的那些人所获得的回报更小，能够让公司得以参与下一阶段的全球竞争的机会也更少了。中国最终将会成为输家。（编者按：本文作者为清华大学经济管理学院副教授。）相关阅读中国否认因保护主义否决汇源交易 2009-03-20汇源交易被否 影响波及南半球 2009-03-20中国拒绝可口可乐的理由很“商业” 2009-03-19汇源交易被否决 外资信心恐受挫 2009-03-19汇源判决：反垄断还是保护？ 2009-03-19 本文涉及股票或公司document.write (truthmeter('2009年03月23日12:16', '1886.HK'));中国汇源果汁集团有限公司（简称：汇源果汁）英文名称：China Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd.总部地点：中国大陆上市地点：香港交易所股票代码：1886document.write (truthmeter('2009年03月23日12:16', 'KO'));可口可乐公司英文名称：Coca-Cola Co.总部地点：美国上市地点：纽约证交所股票代码：KO
Patrick ChovanecThe Chinese government's summary rejection, on antitrust grounds, of Coca-Cola's $2.4 billion bid to buy Chinese juice-maker Huiyuan sent a sharp chill through the global business community when it was announced last week.Since this was China's first major ruling under its new competition law and China has not specified the criteria it's using, experts are poring over it for clues as to how Beijing will put the law into practice. One place to start is by comparing this outcome to what might have happened if regulators in the United States or European Union had vetted the deal.With any newly proposed merger, the first step in both the U.S. and EU is to use an economic measurement called the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) to screen for whether the deal poses any concern that might merit regulatory scrutiny. HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of each competitor. (For example, a market with 100 firms that each have a 1% market share would generate an HHI of 100, whereas a market divided 50-50 between two firms would produce a score of 5,000.) The higher the HHI, the more concentrated the industry, and the greater the chance a large player can exercise anti-competitive pricing power.The threshold test in both the U.S. and E.U. is similar: Proposed deals with a post-merger HHI of less than 1,000 are presumed not to pose any antitrust concerns, and generally receive preemptory approval without any further inquiry. Even mergers that generate HHI scores above 1,000 may receive immediate approval if they produce only modest changes in the industry's HHI. Failing the threshold test does not mean the deal is rejected, just that a more thorough evaluation is required.How would the Coke-Huiyuan deal have fared under such initial scrutiny? By my calculations, the transaction produces HHI scores that would have resulted in a summary dismissal of antitrust concerns in either the U.S. or EU.Using recently released 2008 market share data from Euromonitor, I calculated the pre- and post-merger HHIs for the fruit- and vegetable juice market in China. Coca-Cola's company market share for all its juice brands was the largest in China at 11.8%, while Huiyuan's was second-largest at 8.5%. We will generously assume their geographical markets within China overlap each other entirely. The post-merger HHI works out to 552, up from 352 before the deal -- well shy of the threshold for pursuing even a serious inquiry.Chinese media has focused on Huiyuan's 33% share of China's pure juice market as prima facie evidence of industry concentration. Based on the principles applied by U.S. and EU regulators, however, pure juice is too narrow a market definition because many kinds of juice products are seen as potential substitutes by consumers.The Ministry of Commerce, which vetted the deal, implied in a statement that it was focused on the broader not the narrower market, expressing concern that Coca-Cola could leverage its commanding 52.5% share of China's soda market to exercise anticompetitive power over the soft drink market as a whole. So let's take a look at Euromonitor's 2008 data for the soft drink market, which includes all nonalcoholic, nondairy branded products. Coca-Cola has a 15.8% market share, while Huiyuan a 2.0% market share. The post-merger HHI comes in at 639, up from 576 before the transaction -- higher, but still way short of the threshold of 1,000.The fact that Beijing scuttled a deal that would not even qualify for investigation in the U.S. or EU suggests either that it will apply a significantly stricter standard than these two counterparts, or that antitrust enforcement is being used as a cover to enact a more political agenda. If the former is true, it will be interesting to see whether the same strict standards are applied to mergers among domestic Chinese companies, particularly state-owned firms. The recent pattern of large-scale, government-directed consolidations (such as China Netcom and China Unicom, or Shanghai Auto and Nanjing Auto) suggests this is rather unlikely.The latter conclusion, that the Ministry of Commerce is pursuing a more political agenda, appears closer to the truth. The ministry's statement reveals what that agenda was: Coke's acquisition, it explained, would 'threaten small and medium enterprises in the fruit juice sector, and create market conditions that have an adverse effect on China.' In other words, China blocked the deal to protect domestic producers from a capable foreign competitor.There is a precedent here. In 2005, Beijing blocked the Carlyle Group's bid to buy out construction equipment maker Xugong in what was widely viewed as a political play to keep foreigners out of a booming sector. Unfortunately, the message of the Coke-Huiyuan case seems to be that Beijing now has a new legal tool with which to impose similar results when it wants to.As China's first major antitrust review, the Coca-Cola bid was the ministry's chance to set a solid, well-reasoned precedent that would establish the credibility of its new competition law -- and it botched it, badly. Instead, China sent the worst message it possibly could send to its global trading partners at this moment.The real loser in this debacle won't be Coca-Cola, which has the resources to introduce and market its own brands in China. It will be the owners, employees and shareholders of Chinese companies like Huiyuan. With this precedent, the people who built these dynamic new brands -- in food, clothing, electronics and other sectors -- will reap a smaller reward for their efforts and enjoy fewer opportunities to take their firms to the next level of global competitiveness. China will be the loser. (Editor's Note: Mr. Chovanec is an Associate Professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management in Beijing.)
Patrick ChovanecThe Chinese government's summary rejection, on antitrust grounds, of Coca-Cola's $2.4 billion bid to buy Chinese juice-maker Huiyuan sent a sharp chill through the global business community when it was announced last week.Since this was China's first major ruling under its new competition law and China has not specified the criteria it's using, experts are poring over it for clues as to how Beijing will put the law into practice. One place to start is by comparing this outcome to what might have happened if regulators in the United States or European Union had vetted the deal.With any newly proposed merger, the first step in both the U.S. and EU is to use an economic measurement called the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) to screen for whether the deal poses any concern that might merit regulatory scrutiny. HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of each competitor. (For example, a market with 100 firms that each have a 1% market share would generate an HHI of 100, whereas a market divided 50-50 between two firms would produce a score of 5,000.) The higher the HHI, the more concentrated the industry, and the greater the chance a large player can exercise anti-competitive pricing power.The threshold test in both the U.S. and E.U. is similar: Proposed deals with a post-merger HHI of less than 1,000 are presumed not to pose any antitrust concerns, and generally receive preemptory approval without any further inquiry. Even mergers that generate HHI scores above 1,000 may receive immediate approval if they produce only modest changes in the industry's HHI. Failing the threshold test does not mean the deal is rejected, just that a more thorough evaluation is required.How would the Coke-Huiyuan deal have fared under such initial scrutiny? By my calculations, the transaction produces HHI scores that would have resulted in a summary dismissal of antitrust concerns in either the U.S. or EU.Using recently released 2008 market share data from Euromonitor, I calculated the pre- and post-merger HHIs for the fruit- and vegetable juice market in China. Coca-Cola's company market share for all its juice brands was the largest in China at 11.8%, while Huiyuan's was second-largest at 8.5%. We will generously assume their geographical markets within China overlap each other entirely. The post-merger HHI works out to 552, up from 352 before the deal -- well shy of the threshold for pursuing even a serious inquiry.Chinese media has focused on Huiyuan's 33% share of China's pure juice market as prima facie evidence of industry concentration. Based on the principles applied by U.S. and EU regulators, however, pure juice is too narrow a market definition because many kinds of juice products are seen as potential substitutes by consumers.The Ministry of Commerce, which vetted the deal, implied in a statement that it was focused on the broader not the narrower market, expressing concern that Coca-Cola could leverage its commanding 52.5% share of China's soda market to exercise anticompetitive power over the soft drink market as a whole. So let's take a look at Euromonitor's 2008 data for the soft drink market, which includes all nonalcoholic, nondairy branded products. Coca-Cola has a 15.8% market share, while Huiyuan a 2.0% market share. The post-merger HHI comes in at 639, up from 576 before the transaction -- higher, but still way short of the threshold of 1,000.The fact that Beijing scuttled a deal that would not even qualify for investigation in the U.S. or EU suggests either that it will apply a significantly stricter standard than these two counterparts, or that antitrust enforcement is being used as a cover to enact a more political agenda. If the former is true, it will be interesting to see whether the same strict standards are applied to mergers among domestic Chinese companies, particularly state-owned firms. The recent pattern of large-scale, government-directed consolidations (such as China Netcom and China Unicom, or Shanghai Auto and Nanjing Auto) suggests this is rather unlikely.The latter conclusion, that the Ministry of Commerce is pursuing a more political agenda, appears closer to the truth. The ministry's statement reveals what that agenda was: Coke's acquisition, it explained, would 'threaten small and medium enterprises in the fruit juice sector, and create market conditions that have an adverse effect on China.' In other words, China blocked the deal to protect domestic producers from a capable foreign competitor.There is a precedent here. In 2005, Beijing blocked the Carlyle Group's bid to buy out construction equipment maker Xugong in what was widely viewed as a political play to keep foreigners out of a booming sector. Unfortunately, the message of the Coke-Huiyuan case seems to be that Beijing now has a new legal tool with which to impose similar results when it wants to.As China's first major antitrust review, the Coca-Cola bid was the ministry's chance to set a solid, well-reasoned precedent that would establish the credibility of its new competition law -- and it botched it, badly. Instead, China sent the worst message it possibly could send to its global trading partners at this moment.The real loser in this debacle won't be Coca-Cola, which has the resources to introduce and market its own brands in China. It will be the owners, employees and shareholders of Chinese companies like Huiyuan. With this precedent, the people who built these dynamic new brands -- in food, clothing, electronics and other sectors -- will reap a smaller reward for their efforts and enjoy fewer opportunities to take their firms to the next level of global competitiveness. China will be the loser. (Editor's Note: Mr. Chovanec is an Associate Professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management in Beijing.)