We Can't Subsidize The Banks Forever
Matthew Richardson / Nouriel Roubini美国政府对银行业进行的压力测试将在几天后公布结果。结果的公布并不会标志这场金融危机开始走向尾声。根据泄露出来的结果──如果我们愿意相信的话──一些地区性银行或许有点问题；如果情况继续恶化，花旗集团(Citigroup)和美国银行(Bank of America)或许需要更多的资本。但总的信息是，银行业整体上形势相当不错。Chad Crowe如果这些消息可靠，那将是个好消息。但国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund)刚刚发布了一项有关美国贷款和证券损失估计的研究。结果令人非常沮丧：估计损失为2.7万亿美元，是6个月前估计的两倍。我们在RGE Monitor的估计值甚至更高，达到3.6万亿美元，这意味着金融系统目前总体上已接近破产。美国的银行和证券经纪公司在这些损失中占到了一半以上，可以看出，这些估计的损失额与监管部门的结论之间有很大脱节。人们原本希望，压力测试将是一个过程的开始，这个过程将带来金融体系的清理。但是，如果在压力测试中采用一种以市场为基础的假设，与采用监管机构选择的不利假设相比，得出的结论本可能更糟。比如，一季度的失业率是8.1%，高于监管机构对这一时期假设的7.9%失业率的“最差情况”。按照美国目前的就业岗位减少速度计算，今年我们的失业率将超过10.3%，而这个数字是压力测试对2010年设定的最糟糕假设。压力测试在银行业的实际健康状况方面得出的结论过于乐观了，虽然它们的相对评估因为采用了一致的估值方法而更准确。不过，随着本周四将公布压力测试结果，如果出现人们一直怀疑的情况应该不足为奇。我们担心我们正在回到“救助炼狱”--我们找不到更好的词来描述。以下是关于如何解救我们的一些建议：首先，尽管财政部长盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)设立的针对购买金融机构资产的公私合作投资计划(PPIP)并不特别受欢迎，但我们仍希望政府不要放弃这个计划。的确，该计划向机构投资者提供低成本融资和自由的杠杆借贷，这将使投资者更愿意对资产给出偏高的价格。但它有助于鼓励价格发现和将这些不良资产从银行的资产负债表上清除，而这是银行业向前发展的必要条件。而为了将纳税人付出的代价降到最低，银行不应获准自行挑选哪些遗留资产可以出售。所有那些银行本不该持有的高风险贷款和证券都应列入待售类别。如果有足够多的投资者参与公私合作投资计划，资产价格应该会有竞争性，并且银行方面应该不会提出公正性的问题。其次，政府应该停止不带任何附加条件地提供资金贷款担保和融资的做法。银行应该理解这一点。在向处于困境的企业提供贷款的时候，银行通常对这些企业附加很多限制，通过契约规定企业可以做什么。这些契约一般会限制资产用途冒险行为和未来负债。如果政府能更多关注这方面的问题而不是对奖金问题念念不忘，那将会好得多。举例来说，政府向银行提供援助的同时，却没有限制它们的股息支付。Viral AcharyaIrvind Gujral和Hyun Song Shin三位学者近期的一项学术研究（参见www.voxeu.org）显示，危机前15个月各家银行只是略微削减了股息，在2007年和2008年支付了令人惊愕的4,000亿美元股息。尽管很多银行最近已经下调了股息，但政府给银行的救助资金几乎是一个门进一个门出。再想想近期银行的冒险之举。媒体最近报导，花旗集团(Citigroup)和美国银行(Bank of America)正在大举购买一些非优质抵押贷款支持证券的AAA评级部分。难道过去一年政府给花旗和美国银行提供担保的3,000亿美元和1,180亿美元的投资组合不正是这类产品吗？这些证券是金融危机之源，也是公私合作投资计划的核心所在。如果报导属实的话，这是个十分恶劣的举动──不可想象的是，政府居然没有对此进行限制。第三，抛开压力测试不谈，考虑到对累计损失的各种估计，一些大型银行很有可能会破产。政府必须拿出一个计划解决这些机构的问题，不能让这个计划成为吞食纳税人资金的无底洞。这意味着政府必须努力管理这些机构破产带来的系统性风险，然后再接手进行管理。但这也意味着将风险从纳税人转移给债权人。这很公平，打比方说，这些债权人就是在银行开车上路之前给它们灌酒的人。我们再也不想听到政府官员说什么“要是我们当时有权力采取措施就好了”之类的话。'2008年3月16日贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)崩溃的时候，这句话还引发了我们的同情；2008年9月15日和16日雷曼兄弟(Lehman)和美国国际集团(AIG)先后倒下的时候，我们的同情已经显著减少；七个月后，再听到这样的话我们只会被惹怒。难道在解决金融危机的时候，还有什么比制定一部法律（一部破产机制法）授权政府接手并处理复杂金融机构更为重要的吗？国会应当在政府的申请下迅速通过这一法律。仅是这部法律的威慑力就可能成为协调各种动机的强有力催化剂。由于接管的潜在成本相当高，很显然最优结果是银行在破产法庭外进行重组。直到最近，这还被视为是几乎不可能的。不过，2008年债转股的痛苦案例大幅增加。但从近期克莱斯勒(Chrysler)与债权人的谈判来看，这个过程可能面临着巨大障碍。考虑到大型银行资本结构的庞大规模及其复杂性，债转股谈判甚至会更加艰难，尤其是因为债权人希望得到完全救助，偿债条件和他们以前获得的类似。政府应当能够用破产法去促使各方进行合作。这会导致一场价值1万亿美元的懦夫博弈。但鉴于赌注的规模，以及如果不这么做纳税人还会继续买单的状况，这是最好的途径了。（编者按：Richardson和Roubini是纽约大学斯特恩商学院的两位教授。）（更新完成）相关阅读美国银行需筹集350亿美元资本 政府或成大股东 2009-05-06压力测试结果表明富国银行需要增资 2009-05-05压力测试给投资者的压力正在消退 2009-05-05美国将针对银行偿还救助资金设定条件 2009-05-06美国参议院否决有关放松TARP资金偿还要求的措施 2009-05-05 本文涉及股票或公司document.write (truthmeter('2009年05月06日12:26', 'BAC'));美国银行英文名称：Bank of America Co.总部地点：美国上市地点：纽约证交所股票代码：BAC
The results of the government's stress tests on banks, to be released in a few days, will not mark the beginning of the end of the financial crisis. If we are to believe the leaks, the results will show that there might be a few problems at some of the regional banks and Citigroup and Bank of America may need some more capital if things get worse. But the overall message is that the sector is in pretty good shape.This would be good news if it were credible. But the International Monetary Fund has just released a study of estimated losses on U.S. loans and securities. It was very bleak -- $2.7 trillion, double the estimated losses of six months ago. Our estimates at RGE Monitor are even higher, at $3.6 trillion, implying that the financial system is currently near insolvency in the aggregate. With the U.S. banks and broker-dealers accounting for more than half these losses there is a huge disconnect between these estimated losses and the regulators' conclusions.The hope was that the stress tests would be the start of a process that would lead to a cleansing of the financial system. But using a market-based scenario in the stress tests would have given worse results than the adverse scenario chosen by the regulators. For example, the first quarter's unemployment rate of 8.1% is higher than the regulators' 'worst case' scenario of 7.9% for this same period. At the rate of job losses in the U.S. today, we will surpass a 10.3% unemployment rate this year -- the stress test's worst possible scenario for 2010.The stress tests' conclusions are too optimistic about the banks' absolute health, although their relative assessment is more precise, because consistent valuation methods were used. Still, with Thursday's announcement of the results, it shouldn't be a surprise when the usual suspects emerge. We fear that we are back to bailout purgatory, for lack of a better term. Here are some suggestions for how to extricate ourselves.First, while Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's public-private investment program (PPIP) to purchase financial firms' assets is not particularly popular, we hope the government doesn't give up on it. True, the program offers cheap financing and free leverage to institutional investors, which will lead to the investors overpaying for the assets. But it does promote price discovery and remove the assets from the bank's balance sheets -- necessary conditions to move forward.And to minimize the cost to taxpayers, banks must not be allowed to cherry-pick which legacy assets to sell. All the risky loans and securities banks were never meant to hold should be on the block. With enough investors participating in the PPIP program, the prices of the assets should be competitive, and there should be no issue of fairness raised by the banks.Second, the government should stop providing capital, loan guarantees and financing with no strings attached. Banks should understand this. When providing loans to troubled companies, they place numerous restrictions, called covenants, on what these firms can do. These covenants generally restrict the use of assets, risk-taking behavior, and future indebtedness. It would be much better if the government focused on this rather than on its headline obsession with bonuses.For example, consider the fact that the government, while providing aid to banks, did not restrict their dividend payments. A recent academic study by Viral Acharya, Irvind Gujral and Hyun Song Shin (www.voxeu.org) notes that banks only marginally reduced dividends in the first 15 months of the crisis, paying out a staggering $400 billion in 2007 and 2008. While many banks have been reducing their dividends more recently, bank bailout money had been literally going in one door and out the other.Consider also recent bank risk-taking. The media has recently reported that Citigroup and Bank of America were buying up some of the AAA-tranches of nonprime mortgage-backed securities. Didn't the government provide insurance on portfolios of $300 billion and $118 billion on the very same stuff for Citi and BofA this past year? These securities are at the heart of the financial crisis and the core of the PPIP. If true, this is egregious behavior -- and it's incredible that there are no restrictions against it.Third, stress tests aside, it is highly likely that some of these large banks will be insolvent, given the various estimates of aggregate losses. The government has got to come up with a plan to deal with these institutions that does not involve a bottomless pit of taxpayer money. This means it will have the unenviable tasks of managing the systemic risk resulting from the failure of these institutions and then managing it in receivership. But it will also mean transferring risk from taxpayers to creditors. This is fair: Metaphorically speaking, these are the guys who served alcohol to the banks just before they took off down the highway.And we shouldn't hear one more time from a government official, 'if only we had the authority to act . . .'We were sympathetic to this argument on March 16, 2008 when Bear Stearns ran aground; much less sympathetic on Sept. 15 and 16, 2008 when Lehman and A.I.G. collapsed; and now downright irritated seven months later. Is there anything more important in solving the financial crisis than creating a law (an 'insolvency regime law') that empowers the government to handle complex financial institutions in receivership? Congress should pass such legislation -- as requested by the administration -- on a fast-track basis.The mere threat of this law could be a powerful catalyst in aligning incentives. As the potential costs of receivership are quite high, it would obviously be optimal if the bank's liabilities could be restructured outside of bankruptcy. Until recently, this would have been considered near impossible. However, in 2008 there was a surge in distressed exchanges of debt for equity or preferred equity.Still, the recent negotiations with Chrysler's creditors suggest large obstacles. The size and complexity of large banks' capital structures make debt-for-equity exchanges an even taller task, particularly because creditors will want to hold out for a full bailout along the lines they have been receiving.The government should be able to dangle an insolvency law as an incentive to cooperate. This will result in a $1 trillion game of chicken. But given the size of the stakes, and the alternative of the taxpayers continuing to foot the bill, it's the best way forward.Matthew Richardson / Nouriel Roubini(Editor's Note: Messrs. Richardson and Roubini are professors at New York University's Stern School of Business.)
The results of the government's stress tests on banks, to be released in a few days, will not mark the beginning of the end of the financial crisis. If we are to believe the leaks, the results will show that there might be a few problems at some of the regional banks and Citigroup and Bank of America may need some more capital if things get worse. But the overall message is that the sector is in pretty good shape.This would be good news if it were credible. But the International Monetary Fund has just released a study of estimated losses on U.S. loans and securities. It was very bleak -- $2.7 trillion, double the estimated losses of six months ago. Our estimates at RGE Monitor are even higher, at $3.6 trillion, implying that the financial system is currently near insolvency in the aggregate. With the U.S. banks and broker-dealers accounting for more than half these losses there is a huge disconnect between these estimated losses and the regulators' conclusions.The hope was that the stress tests would be the start of a process that would lead to a cleansing of the financial system. But using a market-based scenario in the stress tests would have given worse results than the adverse scenario chosen by the regulators. For example, the first quarter's unemployment rate of 8.1% is higher than the regulators' 'worst case' scenario of 7.9% for this same period. At the rate of job losses in the U.S. today, we will surpass a 10.3% unemployment rate this year -- the stress test's worst possible scenario for 2010.The stress tests' conclusions are too optimistic about the banks' absolute health, although their relative assessment is more precise, because consistent valuation methods were used. Still, with Thursday's announcement of the results, it shouldn't be a surprise when the usual suspects emerge. We fear that we are back to bailout purgatory, for lack of a better term. Here are some suggestions for how to extricate ourselves.First, while Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's public-private investment program (PPIP) to purchase financial firms' assets is not particularly popular, we hope the government doesn't give up on it. True, the program offers cheap financing and free leverage to institutional investors, which will lead to the investors overpaying for the assets. But it does promote price discovery and remove the assets from the bank's balance sheets -- necessary conditions to move forward.And to minimize the cost to taxpayers, banks must not be allowed to cherry-pick which legacy assets to sell. All the risky loans and securities banks were never meant to hold should be on the block. With enough investors participating in the PPIP program, the prices of the assets should be competitive, and there should be no issue of fairness raised by the banks.Second, the government should stop providing capital, loan guarantees and financing with no strings attached. Banks should understand this. When providing loans to troubled companies, they place numerous restrictions, called covenants, on what these firms can do. These covenants generally restrict the use of assets, risk-taking behavior, and future indebtedness. It would be much better if the government focused on this rather than on its headline obsession with bonuses.For example, consider the fact that the government, while providing aid to banks, did not restrict their dividend payments. A recent academic study by Viral Acharya, Irvind Gujral and Hyun Song Shin (www.voxeu.org) notes that banks only marginally reduced dividends in the first 15 months of the crisis, paying out a staggering $400 billion in 2007 and 2008. While many banks have been reducing their dividends more recently, bank bailout money had been literally going in one door and out the other.Consider also recent bank risk-taking. The media has recently reported that Citigroup and Bank of America were buying up some of the AAA-tranches of nonprime mortgage-backed securities. Didn't the government provide insurance on portfolios of $300 billion and $118 billion on the very same stuff for Citi and BofA this past year? These securities are at the heart of the financial crisis and the core of the PPIP. If true, this is egregious behavior -- and it's incredible that there are no restrictions against it.Third, stress tests aside, it is highly likely that some of these large banks will be insolvent, given the various estimates of aggregate losses. The government has got to come up with a plan to deal with these institutions that does not involve a bottomless pit of taxpayer money. This means it will have the unenviable tasks of managing the systemic risk resulting from the failure of these institutions and then managing it in receivership. But it will also mean transferring risk from taxpayers to creditors. This is fair: Metaphorically speaking, these are the guys who served alcohol to the banks just before they took off down the highway.And we shouldn't hear one more time from a government official, 'if only we had the authority to act . . .'We were sympathetic to this argument on March 16, 2008 when Bear Stearns ran aground; much less sympathetic on Sept. 15 and 16, 2008 when Lehman and A.I.G. collapsed; and now downright irritated seven months later. Is there anything more important in solving the financial crisis than creating a law (an 'insolvency regime law') that empowers the government to handle complex financial institutions in receivership? Congress should pass such legislation -- as requested by the administration -- on a fast-track basis.The mere threat of this law could be a powerful catalyst in aligning incentives. As the potential costs of receivership are quite high, it would obviously be optimal if the bank's liabilities could be restructured outside of bankruptcy. Until recently, this would have been considered near impossible. However, in 2008 there was a surge in distressed exchanges of debt for equity or preferred equity.Still, the recent negotiations with Chrysler's creditors suggest large obstacles. The size and complexity of large banks' capital structures make debt-for-equity exchanges an even taller task, particularly because creditors will want to hold out for a full bailout along the lines they have been receiving.The government should be able to dangle an insolvency law as an incentive to cooperate. This will result in a $1 trillion game of chicken. But given the size of the stakes, and the alternative of the taxpayers continuing to foot the bill, it's the best way forward.Matthew Richardson / Nouriel Roubini(Editor's Note: Messrs. Richardson and Roubini are professors at New York University's Stern School of Business.)