Mr. Geithner's Private Gamble
银行业的公私合作并没有过辉煌的历史。尽管如此，预计财政部长盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)将在周二阐述他的金融业复兴计划时鼓动市场与政府进行合作。尤其是，政府可能宣布成立一个由私人投资者提供部分资金的所谓集合银行(aggregator bank)，用以购买银行业的问题资产。为了吸引投资者的兴趣，政府可能会限制亏损，并提供具有吸引力的融资条件。另外，盖特纳可能还会扩大美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve)现有的项目──定期资产支持证券贷款工具(Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility)，为投资者提供融资，使其能够购买以贷款支持的新证券。对这两个计划的共识是，在市场信心普遍下滑的形势下，政府的帮助是让投资者不再继续观望所必需的。这主要取决于两项计划是如何设计的。首先，如果要投资者持有一个他们无法控制的实体中的少数股份，集合银行可能难以推销出去。为解决这个问题，投资者可以在集合银行中出资设立单独的帐户，并自己管理购买行为。对集合银行设想的一个优势是，私营部门能够在定价不良资产中发挥作用。但是，政府提供的损失共担金额和融资成本将极大影响到价格。如果政府提供了慷慨的条件，投资者可能进入，并提供一个银行愿意出售问题资产的价格。但是，这对纳税人可能意味着巨大的风险，并可能扭曲市场对这一资产的定价。如果政府竭力讨价还价，私人资本可能发现这种交易缺乏吸引力，银行也因担心资本遭受损失而不会出售，市场就会再次出现僵局。一个头痛的问题可能来自银行资产负债表中对不同资产进行估值的方式。打包贷款证券是按照市价估值的，这意味着损失通常已经在资本中被剔除了。相比之下，在资产负债表中持有至到期的单纯贷款可能已经彻底违约，但却没有重新估值。银行只是随着时间推移提取准备金。财政部所讨论的对所有银行进行压力测试的计划可能给单纯贷款组合带来更大的损失，尤其是如果这些贷款要出售给集合银行的话。与此同时，近年来影子银行体系对建立信贷的重要程度不亚于银行。但是，证券化仍然死气沉沉，即便是对优质贷款也是如此。美国政府可以将定期资产支持证券贷款工具最初的适用范围扩大到更多形式的消费信贷和评级低于AAA的证券上，以让其资金获得更大的效果。鉴于国会对将更多资金投入银行的兴趣不大，有必要引进私人投资者。但是，如果不提供非常慷慨的条款，让他们参与进来并非易事。Peter Eavis相关阅读奥巴马正告反对者不要拖后腿 2009-02-10盖特纳的银行业救助方案基本没有改动 2009-02-10美国政府考虑联手私营部门收购坏资产 2009-02-09美限薪规定存漏洞 效果可能大打折扣 2009-02-06 本文涉及股票或公司document.write (truthmeter('2009年02月10日16:53', 'WYE'));Wyeth总部地点：美国上市地点：纽约证交所股票代码：WYEdocument.write (truthmeter('2009年02月10日16:53', 'PFE'));辉瑞制药有限公司（简称：辉瑞公司)英文名称：Pfizer Inc.总部地点：美国上市地点：纽约证交所股票代码：PFE
Private-public partnerships in banking don't have a great history.Even so, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is expected to advocate markets and governments working together when he lays out his financial-sector revival plan Tuesday.In particular, the government could announce a so-called aggregator bank that is partly funded by private capital and buys troubled bank assets. To whet investor appetites, the government could somehow cap losses and provide attractive financing.Separately, Mr. Geithner may expand an existing Federal Reserve program -- the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF -- that provides financing to investors so they can buy new securities backed by loans.In both plans, there is a belief that, during a systemic drop in confidence, the government's help is needed to lure investors off the sidelines.Much depends on how both are structured.First, the aggregator bank may be a tough sell if investors are expected to take minority equity stakes in an entity they can't control. To get around that, investors could fund separate accounts within the aggregator bank -- and manage their own purchases.One supposed advantage of the aggregator bank is that the private sector plays a role in pricing bad assets. But the amount of loss-sharing offered by the government, and the cost of funding, would heavily influence price. If the government provides generous terms, investors might step up -- and offer a price banks are willing to sell troubled assets at. But that could mean big risks for the taxpayer -- and possibly distort pricing in the market for that asset.If the government drives a harder bargain, private capital mightn't find it attractive, banks mightn't sell -- fearing hits to capital -- and the market stalemate sets in again.One headache could come from the way different assets are valued on bank balance sheets. Securities of packaged loans are marked to market, meaning losses have typically already been taken through capital. In contrast, single loans, held to maturity on balance sheets, are defaulting fast, yet they are not marked. Instead banks reserve for them over time.The Treasury's discussed plan to stress-test all banks could force bigger losses on those single loan portfolios, especially if they are to be sold into the aggregator bank.Meanwhile, the shadow banking system was as important for credit creation as banks in recent years. But securitization remains moribund, even for high-quality loans. The government, to get a bigger bang for its buck, could widen the TALF's original remit, to include more forms of consumer credit and securities rated below triple-A.Given Congress's limited appetite to throw more money at the banks, it makes sense to bring in private investors. But getting them to play along, without making the terms too generous, will be no easy task.Peter Eavis
Private-public partnerships in banking don't have a great history.Even so, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is expected to advocate markets and governments working together when he lays out his financial-sector revival plan Tuesday.In particular, the government could announce a so-called aggregator bank that is partly funded by private capital and buys troubled bank assets. To whet investor appetites, the government could somehow cap losses and provide attractive financing.Separately, Mr. Geithner may expand an existing Federal Reserve program -- the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF -- that provides financing to investors so they can buy new securities backed by loans.In both plans, there is a belief that, during a systemic drop in confidence, the government's help is needed to lure investors off the sidelines.Much depends on how both are structured.First, the aggregator bank may be a tough sell if investors are expected to take minority equity stakes in an entity they can't control. To get around that, investors could fund separate accounts within the aggregator bank -- and manage their own purchases.One supposed advantage of the aggregator bank is that the private sector plays a role in pricing bad assets. But the amount of loss-sharing offered by the government, and the cost of funding, would heavily influence price. If the government provides generous terms, investors might step up -- and offer a price banks are willing to sell troubled assets at. But that could mean big risks for the taxpayer -- and possibly distort pricing in the market for that asset.If the government drives a harder bargain, private capital mightn't find it attractive, banks mightn't sell -- fearing hits to capital -- and the market stalemate sets in again.One headache could come from the way different assets are valued on bank balance sheets. Securities of packaged loans are marked to market, meaning losses have typically already been taken through capital. In contrast, single loans, held to maturity on balance sheets, are defaulting fast, yet they are not marked. Instead banks reserve for them over time.The Treasury's discussed plan to stress-test all banks could force bigger losses on those single loan portfolios, especially if they are to be sold into the aggregator bank.Meanwhile, the shadow banking system was as important for credit creation as banks in recent years. But securitization remains moribund, even for high-quality loans. The government, to get a bigger bang for its buck, could widen the TALF's original remit, to include more forms of consumer credit and securities rated below triple-A.Given Congress's limited appetite to throw more money at the banks, it makes sense to bring in private investors. But getting them to play along, without making the terms too generous, will be no easy task.Peter Eavis