唧唧堂：SMJ 战略管理杂志2020年2月刊论文摘要
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解析文章首发于唧唧堂网站www.jijitang.com 解析作者 | 唧唧堂心理学研究小组：CRYSTAL；审校编辑 |悠悠1.车轮上的齿轮：企业调整活动中的资源释放和相互依赖范围
研究摘要：
本研究描述和测试了企业活动中用于调整资源和实施变革的相互依赖性。由于每个活动都只产生部分结果，并且依赖其他活动来完成预期的更改，因此约束一个活动可能会造成捕获多个其他活动的瓶颈。在我的实证分析中，我利用就业保护法的交错采用，旨在限制对一种特定资源进行具体调整：解雇员工。然而，这种限制不仅影响收缩，而且影响到劳动力的扩张以及资本投资、收购、剥离、CEO更替和其他调整，并增加（缩短）负（正）绩效的持续性。广泛的相互依赖性对于理解企业刚性和弹性、实施失败以及公司绩效的持久性至关重要。
管理概要：
这项研究表明，即使是看似简单的改进，也需要将一系列相互依赖的企业战略活动拼凑在一起。因此，仅对一个约束就足以挫败成功的企业响应。通过修改就业法，我发现公司解雇员工的能力不仅会影响解雇，还会影响招聘、资本投资、收购、剥离和CEO更替，并增加（缩短）消极（积极）绩效的持续性。低估这些活动的复杂性和相互依赖性会导致行动偏差，并导致实施失败，如成本超支、进度延误，以及合并后整合过程未能实现预期协同效应。
Research Summary
This study characterizes and tests interdependencies in corporate activities used to adjust resources and implement change. Because each activity contributes only a partial result and depends on others to complete an intended change, constraining one can create a bottleneck that traps multiple other activities. For my empirical analysis, I leverage the staggered adoptions of employment protection laws intended to constrain one specific adjustment to one specific resource: dismissing employees. The constraint, however, not only affects the contraction but also the expansion in labor as well as capital investments, acquisition, divestiture, CEO turnover, and other adjustments, and increases (shortens) the persistence of negative (positive) performance. The expansive interdependencies are critical to understanding firm rigidity and resilience, implementation failures, and the persistence of firm performance.
Managerial Summary
This study shows how executing even a seemingly straightforward improvement requires piecing together a series of interdependent corporate strategic activities. As a result, a constraint on just one is sufficient to foil a successful firm response. Using changes in employment laws, I show that a firm's ability to dismiss employees not only affects firing, but also hiring, capital investments, acquisition, divestiture, and CEO turnover, and increases (shortens) the persistence of negative (positive) performance. Underestimating the complex and interdependent nature of these activities can lead to bias‐for‐action and contribute to implementation failures, such as cost overruns, schedule delays, and a post‐merger integration process that fails to realize expected synergies.
论文原文：Dongil D. Keum. Cog in the wheel: Resource release and the scope of interdependencies in corporate adjustment activities. Strategic Management Journal.2020,41(2),175-197. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3093.
2.模仿策略的权变视角：“标杆管理”何时失效？
研究摘要：
模仿无处不在，但模仿策略的相对有效性却知之甚少。一种流行的模仿策略，有时被称为标杆管理，是领先企业常见的“混合和匹配”做法。使用计算模型，我们将标杆管理与“复制最佳”模仿策略（复制表现最佳的公司实践的子集）进行比较。我们发现，在异构环境中，标杆管理更为有效，在这种环境中，对一个集团的公司（如地理子市场）有利的做法可能对另一个集团中的公司不利。使用混合匹配的公司倾向于模仿其集团内竞争对手的做法，不太可能从其他集团中复制不当做法。然而，在同质环境中，“复制最佳”战略更为优越，因为企业更可能超越自己的集团，从其他集团的竞争对手那里模仿新的良好做法。
管理概要:
混合和匹配模仿，俗称标杆管理，被认为是提高公司绩效的有效手段。大众媒体上充斥着经理们的指导手册。然而，我们的结果表明，在某些行业条件下，这种观点可能是错误的，特别是在这样的情况下：对一个集团中的公司（例如，地理子市场）有利的做法也对另一个集团的公司有利。标杆管理的有效性可能会被过分强调领先公司常见做法的风尚、时尚和潮流削弱。我们的研究强调，在这些条件下，模仿常规做法容易传播不良做法，而普遍的做法可能并不总是良好做法。
Research Summary
Imitation is ubiquitous, yet the comparative efficacy of imitation strategies is poorly understood. A popular imitation strategy, sometimes called benchmarking, “mixes‐and‐matches” practices common to leading firms. Using computational models, we compare benchmarking with the “copy‐the‐best” imitation strategy of copying a subset of the best‐performing firm's practices. We find that benchmarking is more effective in heterogeneous environments, where practices that are good for firms in one group (e.g., geographic submarket) may be bad for firms in another. Firms using mix‐and‐match tend to imitate practices of rivals within their group, less likely copying inappropriate practices from other groups. In homogeneous environments, however, the “copy‐the‐best” strategy is superior because firms are more likely to go beyond their group and copy novel good practices from rivals in other groups.
Managerial Summary
Mix‐and‐match imitation, popularly known as benchmarking, is believed to be an effective means of enhancing firm performance. The popular press is replete with how‐to books for managers. However, our results suggest that this belief may be wrong under some industry conditions, in particular, where practices that are good for firms in one group (e.g., geographic submarket) are also good for firms in another. The efficacy of benchmarking is likely to be undermined by fads, fashions, and bandwagons that overemphasize practices common to leading firms. Our study highlights the possibility that, under these conditions, imitating common practices is prone to propagate bad practices and widespread practices may not always be good practices.
论文原文：Hart E. Posen, Sangyoon Yi, Jeho Lee. A contingency perspective on imitation strategies: When is “benchmarking” ineffective? Strategic Management Journal.2020,41(2),198-221. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3101.
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3.关系范围在维持企业间网络中的关系契约的作用
研究摘要：
对许多公司来说，一个关键的战略决策是他们与合作伙伴的关系范围。现有的关系范围理论是有限的，因为他们忽视了以下事实：（a）大多数公司在多个伙伴网络内进行交易，（b）这些伙伴关系往往涉及双重道德风险。我们提出了企业间网络中的合作范围理论来解决这些不足。我们展示了如何通过扩大其与合作伙伴的业务范围，企业可以减少它们之间的外部性，从而维持双方合作关系的自我执行交换关系（“关系契约”），在这种关系中，双方重复地合作并最大化所创造的价值。我们讨论了我们模型应用的众多环境，包括特许经营、供应链和基于平台的生态系统。
管理概要：
对于许多公司来说，一个关键的战略决策是他们与特定供应商、业务客户或销售互补产品或服务的公司进行的交易或活动的数量。我们提供的理论可以解释为什么公司往往更喜欢范围更广的关系。其他理论是建立在利用合作伙伴知识或廉价监管的能力的基础上，而我们的理论基于"关系契约"的概念上，在这个概念中，公司及其合作伙伴根据他们之间的非正式协议反复合作。我们发现，在关系契约下，更广泛范围的关系比狭义范围的关系更能鼓励相互合作，从而最大化它们所创造的价值。我们讨论我们的模型如何适用于特许经营、供应链和基于平台的生态系统。
Research summary
A key strategic decision for many firms is the scope of their relationships with partners. Existing theories of relationship scope are limited in that they disregard the facts that: (a) most firms transact within networks of multiple partners, and (b) these partnerships often involve two‐sided moral hazard. We develop a theory of partnership scope in interfirm networks that addresses these deficiencies. We show how, by broadening the scope of business it conducts with its partners, a firm can reduce externalities between them, and thereby sustain self‐enforcing exchange relationships (“relational contracts”) in which both parties cooperate with each other repeatedly and maximize the value created. We discuss numerous settings in which our model applies, including franchising, supply chains, and platform‐based ecosystems.
Managerial summary
A key strategic decision for many firms is the number of transactions or activities they conduct with a given supplier, business customer, or company that sells complementary products or services. We offer a theory to explain why firms often prefer relationships with broader scope. Whereas other theories are based on the ability to leverage partner knowledge or cheaper supervision, our theory is based on the concept of a “relational contract”, in which a firm and its partner cooperate with each other repeatedly according to an informal agreement between them. We show that under relational contracting, broader scope relationships encourage better mutual cooperation than narrow scope relationships, thereby maximizing the value created by them. We discuss how our model applies to franchising, supply chains, and platform‐based ecosystems.
论文原文：Nicholas Argyres, Janet Bercovitz, Giorgio Zanarone. The role of relationship scope in sustaining relational contracts in interfirm networks. Strategic Management Journal.2020,41(2),222-245. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3095.
4.多市场接触对技术合作伙伴选择的影响
研究摘要：
我们研究了潜在合作伙伴之间的多市场接触如何影响其技术合作伙伴的选择。借鉴多市场竞争文献，我们认为，多市场接触通过在整个共享市场上对机会主义进行广泛的报复，从而产生对机会主义的相互容忍。因此，潜在合作伙伴之间的多市场接触使它们更愿意彼此作为技术合作伙伴。我们还认为，当合作伙伴之间有互惠关系而不是非互惠关系时，多市场接触对合作协议形成的积极影响更为明显。
管理概要：
本文解释了为什么竞争对手可以成为技术合作的良好合作伙伴之一。管理者可能会猜测，企业往往会避免与竞争对手合作进行研发，因为它们可能比那些没有产品市场重叠的企业更具机会主义。然而，我们的理论提出了一个反直觉的论点，即合作伙伴之间的市场重叠反而会阻止他们参与机会主义行为，因为市场重叠使他们能够在整个共享产品市场上对此类行为进行广泛的报复。根据这一观点，我们的实证结果表明，全球前200家生物制药公司在共享更多产品市场的同时，更有可能选择彼此进行技术合作，而当它们的重要市场不同时，这一趋势会得到加强。
Research summary
We investigate how multimarket contact between prospective partners affects their partner selection for technology cooperation. Drawing on the multimarket competition literature, we argue that multimarket contact generates mutual forbearance from opportunism by enabling broad retaliation across the shared markets against opportunism. As a result, multimarket contact between potential partners makes them prefer each other as partners for technology cooperation. We also claim that this positive effect of multimarket contact on the formation of cooperative agreements is more pronounced when the partners have reciprocal contacts rather than nonreciprocal ones.
Managerial summary
This article explains one of the reasons why rival firms can be good partners to each other for technology cooperation. Managers might conjecture that firms tend to avoid partnering with rival firms for R&D because they may be more opportunistic than those without product market overlap. However, our theory suggests a counter‐intuitive argument that market overlap between partners rather deters them from engaging in opportunistic behaviors because market overlap enables them to broadly retaliate against such behaviors across the shared product markets. Consistent with this idea, our empirical results show that global top 200 biopharmaceutical companies are more likely to choose each other for technology cooperation as they share more product markets and this tendency is reinforced when their important markets are different.
论文原文：Wonsang Ryu, Jeffrey J. Reuer, Thomas H. Brush.The effects of multimarket contact on partner selection for technology cooperation. Strategic Management Journal.2020,41(2),267-289. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3106.