光环褪去——央行不是超级英雄
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光环褪去——央行不是超级英雄
本文导读：过去几年人们似乎“妖魔化”了全球各大央行行长的能力。的确，2008年全球经济从危机中走出得益于全球央行的货币宽松政策。然而，多年过去后大家发现，似乎货币宽松成为各大央行行长“魔法袋”中能够释放的唯一把戏。在全球各大发达国家进入负利率后，大家也在疑惑后面央行行长们还有啥“核武器”。日本就是一个有趣的负面例子。黑田行长在上台前曾诺了一系列的经济刺激政策，然而最终发现唯一有效的还是宽货币。在美联储今年开始要关紧水龙头后，留给各国央行行长的似乎只是无奈。
No heart is immune from the uplifting tale of the Little Engine That Could—that plucky optimist who, against the odds, saved the day by chugging a stranded train over a mountain. In the world of economics, our central bankers have become this storybook overachiever. Ever since the 2008 Wall Street meltdown, they have tried, tried, and tried again to pull the broken global economy into happier times, undaunted by setbacks, criticism, or the sheer weight of their burden. At times that unstinting effort has made them heroes, too. The now-legendary 2012 pledge by Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro quelled the market turbulence that threatened to tear apart Europe’s monetary union.
《勇敢的小火车头》实在振奋人心——故事中勇敢乐观的小火车头冲破层层阻碍，拖着故障的车身翻山越岭，化险为夷。而在经济学领域，各国央行俨然成为了这本故事书的模范践行者。自2008年金融危机以来，央行们披荆斩棘，试图将全球经济重新拖回往日的欢愉，即便遭遇挫折、批判或沉重的压力都不曾有懈怠。不懈的努力也曾经让央行铸就超级英雄的辉煌。例如如今已成为传奇的“超级马里奥”——欧洲中央银行主席马里奥德拉吉，曾在2012年宣布将不计代价拯救欧元，平息了原本可能分裂欧洲货币联盟的市场动荡。
Today, though, central banks look more and more like the Engines That Couldn’t. Despite all their tireless persistence, the world economy remains stuck on the tracks, short of its ultimate destination—a real recovery. The value of the often highly unorthodox methods central banks have employed along the route will be hotly contested by economists for years, even decades. What’s beyond question is that the institutions just don’t possess the horsepower to rescue the global economy.
然而现在，央行们的超级引擎丧失了往日风姿。尽管他们依然不懈坚持，世界经济却似乎是牢牢粘滞在了铁轨上，离最终目的地——经济的真正复苏——仍旧遥遥无期。央行采用的这类高度非正统方式的价值将在几年甚至几十年内都会饱受经济学家的诟病。毫无疑问，央行们的引擎已不具备足够马力，无法将世界经济拖出泥沼。
That hasn’t stopped economists and investors from pressing central banks to do even more. Draghi in early March dropped the ECB’s interest rates to record lows and expanded an unconventional bond-buying program—called quantitative easing, or QE—aimed at tamping down rates even further. The Bank of Japan is widely expected to take more measures to boost that slumbering economy. In the U.S., the December decision by Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen to raise the benchmark interest rate, after seven years near zero, has been criticized by some analysts as a mistake, and she’s recently signaled that interest rates would be raised more slowly than previously anticipated.
尽管现实令人无奈，经济学家和投资者们却希望央行有更多作为。德拉吉在三月初把欧洲央行的利率下调到了历史最低点，还推行了一项非常规债券购买计划——即量化宽松，旨在夯实新利率计划。根据普遍预测，日本央行也可能会采取更多措施来唤醒沉睡已久的经济。而美联储主席珍妮特·耶伦十二月决定提高七年来都接近于零的基准利率。一些分析师认为提高基准利率是一个错误的决定，珍妮特则表示，利率上调将是一个比预期缓慢的过程。
The pleas for more central bank action seem to make perfect sense. Markets in the U.S. have been in turmoil, and the economy, though stronger than most others in the developed world, is definitely not roaring. Europe and Japan, struggling to grow and combat deflation, are in far worse shape. Under such circumstances, central banks usually ease monetary policy, making money cheaper to stimulate economic growth and prices. In the case of Japan, Marcel Thieliant, senior Japan economist at research firm Capital Economics, insists that “more easing is surely needed.”
要央行有更多作为的请求倒也并不是无理取闹。美国市场长期以来都处于动荡之中，美国经济情况虽比大多数发达国家更好，但也不是扶摇直上。欧洲和日本仍在卯足力气成长并对抗通缩，情况更不乐观。在这种情况下，中央银行通常放松货币政策，让钱更不值钱，以刺激经济增长和价格上涨。Capital Economics研究所的日本市场资深经济专家Marcel Thieliant坚持认为，“肯定需要实施更加宽松的货币政策。”
Yet the fact that the world’s advanced economies are in such feeble condition argues that easier money won’t solve their problems. After all, central banks have already been gunning their engines at full throttle for seven years. Interest rates remain remarkably low—in Japan and the euro zone, they’re at zero. The ECB and BOJ have even resorted to negative interest rates, actually charging depositors for holding cash, in an attempt to force banks to lend and businesses to invest. And although the Fed wound down its six-year QE program, the ECB and BOJ continue to buy bonds on a massive scale.
然而，世界上最发达的经济体如今都陷入了如此疲软的境地，让人不得不怀疑宽松货币政策到底能否解决问题。毕竟，央行已经已经踩足油门整整七年了。日本和欧元区但利率一直出奇地低，几乎是零利率。欧洲央行和日本央行甚至祭出负利率，反而收取储户的钱，企图迫使银行放贷和企业投资。虽然美联储正逐渐缩减其6年的量化宽松政策规模，欧洲央行和日本央行继续大规模地购买债券。
Just pumping money into an economy is useless if companies and consumers don’t spend it.
如果企业和消费者不花钱，实施宽松政策不停往市场倾倒货币就显得毫无意义。
There’s no consensus on how much these cash-injecting maneuvers have aided the real economy—or helped at all. Supporters of Fed policy, for instance, insist that its easy-money strategy successfully shepherded the U.S. through the Great Recession and into a period of stable growth with near full employment. At worst, they contend, the Fed prevented the economy from tumbling into an even deeper downturn. Detractors, however, blame the Fed for causing a litany of ills—exacerbating income inequality, encouraging a spendthrift government, inflating a stock market bubble, roiling emerging economies—while contributing little to the American revival. Even Fed officials don’t agree about the effectiveness of their own policies. One 2015 study, by researchers at the Federal Reserve Board, figures that the Fed’s program made a significant contribution to reducing joblessness, while another, penned by Stephen Williamson, vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, asserted that “there is no work, to my knowledge, that establishes a link from QE to the ultimate goals of the Fed—inflation and real economic activity.”
关于这些倾倒货币的策略到底对实体经济有多大作用，或者到底有没有用，一直没有明确共识。美联储政策的支持者，坚称其宽松货币政策引领了美国一路劈波斩浪，顺利走出大衰退而进入一段增长稳定、就业充分的黄金时期。他们争辩说至少美联储也防止了美国经济跌入更深的衰退低谷。但是，反对派指责美联储的政策反而造成了一连串弊病——加剧收入不平等、鼓励败家子政府，搅出了股市泡沫，惹恼了新兴经济体，却对美国经济复兴毫无贡献。连美联储官员对自家政策有效性都各执一词。美国联邦储备委员会2015年的研报表示，美联储的计划对降低失业率有显著作用；而在另一篇由圣路易斯联邦储备银行副行长Stephen Williamson执笔的报告中则显示，“据我所知，量化宽松政策和美联储关于通胀和实体经济活动的最终目标毫无关联。”
The limits of central banking are more apparent in Japan. In 2013 newly installed BOJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda embarked on a gargantuan stimulus program aimed at smashing endemic deflation, encouraging borrowing and spending, and restarting growth in an economy that’s stagnated for more than two decades. But no matter how quickly Kuroda has run his printing presses, the impact on Japan’s outlook has been negligible. The economy tumbled into recession in 2014, and gross domestic product has contracted for two of the past three quarters. Prices, by one commonly used measure, didn’t change at all in February from a year earlier.
在日本，央行的无能为力尤为明显。2013年新上任的日本央行行长黑田东彦开始推行一项庞大的经济刺激计划，旨在消除地域性通缩、鼓励借贷和支出，唤醒停滞近二十年的经济增长。但无论黑田东彦如何宣传，这项计划对日本经济前景的影响可以忽略不计。在日本经济迂回衰退的2014年，过去三个季度中有两季的GDP都在下降。而价格，这个常用的指标，较去年同期却毫无改变。
The ECB hasn’t fared much better. In early 2015, Draghi caught up with his peers and began his own QE program to ward off a Japan-style deflationary spiral. But prices in the euro zone receded 0.2 percent in February. The zone’s GDP expanded an uninspiring 1.6 percent in 2015, and the outlook for this year isn’t expected to be any better, while unemployment is stubbornly high at 10 percent.
欧洲央行也并没技高一筹。2015年初，德拉吉效法他的同行，开始实行自己的量化宽松计划，以防止欧洲陷入日本式的通缩死循环，但是当年二月价格反而同比下降了0.2%。2015年欧元区GDP增长率仅为令人失望的1.6%，而今年（2016年）的增长状况没有改善的迹象，同时失业率仍旧维持在10%的高位。
Meanwhile, there are indications that central banks have already gone too far. In Japan, the BOJ’s policies have so distorted prices that on March 1 the government sold benchmark 10-year bonds at a negative yield for the first time. Yes, investors made the otherwise illogical decision to lend the government their money and pay for the privilege of doing so. In turn, that alleviates the urgency for the Japanese government—the most indebted in the developed world—to rein in its budget deficits. Lawmakers and economists fear that the use of negative rates in Japan and Europe will damage consumer sentiment and the health of banks. Even other central bankers are raising concerns about their compatriots’ decisions. At a conference in Shanghai in February, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney complained that negative interest rates can weaken currencies, helping countries to benefit at the expense of others.
与此同时，许多迹象表明央行们似乎有些走火入魔。在日本，央行的政策对价格的干扰已经使得日本政府在3月1日有史以来第一次以负收益率出售10年期基准国债。是的，日本投资者们不合常理地决定花钱购买借钱给他们的政府的特权。这种状况相应地缓解了日本政府——发达国家中债务负担最重的政府——约束它的财政赤字的紧迫性。议员和经济学家们担心日本与欧洲的负利率政策会损害消费者的信念和银行系统的健康。其他央行也开始担心他们的同行的决定。在二月的上海会议中，英格兰银行行长Mark Carney指责负利率政策会弱化本币，让负利率国家损人利己。
In the desperate quest to revive the global economy, it seems we’ve all forgotten what we learned in college economics. Monetary policy is and always will be an indirect science. Central banks can pump money into an economy, but unless investors, companies, and consumers use it to build factories, start enterprises, or buy cars, the flood of cash won’t boost growth. In the end, it’s the demand for money that counts as much as the supply.
为了让全球经济复苏，我们似乎已经不择手段，将我们在大学经济课上学过的东西弃诸脑后。货币政策是、并将一直是间接地起作用的。央行可以向经济中泵入钞票，但是除非投资者、企业和消费者们花钱去兴建工厂、创办企业、添置汽车，否则钞票洪流并不能提振增长。毕竟，对货币的需求和货币供给一样重要。
That’s exactly what’s gone wrong in Japan. Deflation isn’t just a cause of the economy’s paralysis but also a symptom of deeper constraints on growth. Japanese companies are too burdened by high costs, wrapped up in red tape, and wedded to outdated business practices to take advantage of cheap cash. That shows printing money is no substitute for real economic reform. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has leaned on Kuroda to solve economic problems he’s been politically unwilling to tackle. The reform arm of his policy platform, known as Abenomics, did make some progress, joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade agreement, for instance, and bolstering corporate governance rules. But it hasn’t seriously addressed major flaws that hamper growth and welfare, such as a dual-track labor market that condemns too many workers to temporary jobs with little training or opportunity to advance.
这正是日本的症结所在。通缩不仅导致了经济瘫痪，还在更深层次上遏制了经济的复苏。日本企业为高成本与繁杂的监管法规所困，并采用过时的商业策略来从便宜的流动性中获益。这种状况表明，印钞票是不能替代真正的经济改革的。安倍晋三首相依赖黑田行长来解决他由于政治原因不愿意插手的经济问题。他实施经济改革的政策路线——安倍经济学——确实取得了一些成果，例如加入TPP自由贸易协定、增强企业治理等等；但他并没有认真地解决阻碍经济增长的主要问题，例如实行双轨制、使得太多的劳动者只能从事临时工作而无法获得培训与升职机会的劳动市场。
The same has happened in Europe. Draghi’s exertions were never matched by the euro zone’s complacent political leaders. The austerity-obsessed approach to debt crisis, imposed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, wasn’t offset by growth-enhancing reforms at the European level, such as removing remaining barriers within the common market. Individual nations, from Germany to Greece, haven’t done enough to fix their own economies. In the U.S., Yellen could have benefited from a helping hand from Washington, but Congress has been too gridlocked by, among other things, the ideological stubbornness of the Tea Party wing of the GOP to take measures that could boost the nation’s competitiveness.
欧洲的情况半斤八两。德拉吉的努力从来没有获得欧元区那些小富即安的政治领袖的全力配合。德国总理Angela Merkel热衷的、用于对付债务危机的紧缩性政策并没有被欧洲层面的刺激性政策——例如消除共同市场内的剩余壁垒——所抵消。欧元区成员国，从德国到希腊，并没有采取充分的措施来整治他们的经济。同样的，在美国，耶伦本可以获得来自华盛顿的更大支持，但国会却在提升国家竞争力上无所作为，部分由于受到来自共和党内泛茶党势力的顽固意识形态的压力。
So to be fair to Yellen, Draghi, and Kuroda, we’ve expected too much from them. Central bankers simply can’t solve our economic problems on their own, no matter how hard they try. Ultimately, the poor post-crisis recovery was the fault of political leadership. Central banks had the power and will to step into the breach, and they heroically took up the burden. But it proved too heavy. Their engines have just run out of steam.
所以公允地讲，我们对耶伦、德拉吉和黑田期望过高了。无论它们有多努力，央行都不能独立解决我们经济的问题。归根到底，危机后孱弱的复苏应该归咎于政治领导人。央行们能够并且愿意来救场，它们也确实英雄般地承担了这个责任——但这担子太重了。他们已经用光了发动机里的蒸汽。