Meanwhile, thanks to the wave of money printing that had followedthe demise of the gold standard, the economy and the stock market were soaring.Stockswere in again in 1972, and the fashion at the time was theNifty 50. This group of fifty stocks had fast and steady earnings growth and were widely believed to be a sure thing.
As hot as the stock market was, I was more interested in trading commodities, so that spring I begged the director of commodities at Merrill Lynch to give me a summer job. He was surprised because people from places like Harvard Business School weren’t typically interested in commodities, which were considered an obscure stepchild of the Wall Streetbrokerageindustry. Up until then, as far as I know, no Harvard Business School student had ever worked in commodity futures anywhere. Most Wall Street firms didn’t even have commodity futures divisions, and Merrill Lynch’s was small, tucked away on a side street, and furnished with basic metal desks.
A few months later, when I was back for my second year at HBS, the firstoil shockbegan, with prices quadrupling in a matter of months. The U.S. economy slowed, commodity pricessoared, and in 1973 the stock markettook a dive. Once again, I was blindsided—but in retrospect I could see that thedominoeshad fallen in a logical sequence.
In this case, thedebt-financedoverspending of the1960s had continued into the early 1970s. TheFedhadfundedthis spending witheasy-creditpolicies, but by paying back its debts with depreciated paper money instead of gold-backed dollars, the U.S. effectivelydefaulted. Naturally, with all this money printing the dollar plunged in value. That allowed for more easy credit, which led to even more spending. Theinflationarysurge that followed the breakdown of the currency system sent commodity prices even higher. In response, in 1973, the Fed tightened monetary policy, which is what central banks do when inflation and growth are too strong. This in turn caused the worst decline in stocks and the worst weakening of the economy since the Great Depression. The Nifty 50 were particularly affected, plunging severely.
The lesson? When everybody thinks the same thing—such as what asure betthe Nifty 50 is—it is almost certainly reflected in the price, and betting on it is probably going to be a mistake. I also learned that for every action (such aseasy moneyand credit) there is a consequence (in this case, higher inflation) roughly proportionate to that action, which causes an approximately equal and opposite reaction (tightening of money and credit) and market reversals.
I was beginning to see things happening over and over again, which led me to see that most everything is “another one of those”: Most everything has happened repeatedly before for logical cause-effect reasons. Of course, being able to both properly identify which ones of those are happening and to understand the cause-effect relationships behind them remained difficult. Though most everything seemed inevitable and logical in retrospect, nothing was nearly as clear in real time.
Because people chase what’s hot and avoid what’s not, stock investing fell out of favor after 1973 and commodity trading became the thing to do. With my background in commodities and my Harvard MBA, I became asought-afterproperty. Dominick & Dominick, a middle-sized, hundred-year-old brokerage firm, hired me asdirectorof commodities for $25,000 a year, which was near the top of what HBS graduate starting salaries were that year. My new boss paired me with an older, experienced guy who had lots of commodities brokerage experience, and we were assigned the task of setting up a commodities division. I was in wayover my head, though I was too arrogant to realize it at the time. I probably would have learned a lot of painful lessons had the job continued, but the bad stock market took Dominick & Dominick under before we’d made much progress.
As the economy unraveled, the Watergate scandal dominated the headlines and I saw again how politics and economics intertwine, usually with economics leading. This downwardspiralled people to become pessimistic, so they sold their stocks and the market continued to fall. Things couldn’t have gotten much worse but everyone was afraid they would. It was the mirror image of what I’d witnessed in 1966 when the market hit its top, and just as it was then, theconsensuswas wrong. When people are very pessimistic, they sell out, prices typically get very cheap, and action to improve conditions has to be taken. Sure enough, the Fed eased its monetary policy and stocks hit bottom in December 1974.
At the time, I was single and living in New York; I was having a great time partying with friends from HBS and dating a lot. My roommate was dating a Cuban woman and he set me up on a blind date with one of her friends, anexoticwoman from Spain named Barbara who could barely speak English. This wasn’t a problem, because we communicated in different ways. She thrilled me for nearly two years before we moved in together, got married, had four sons, and shared an amazing life together. She still thrills me but is too private a person for me to say more about her.
While I worked in the brokerage business, I also traded my own account. Though I had many more winning positions than losing ones, I can only recall the losing ones now. I remember one big one when I owned pork bellies. For several days the market for them waslimit down—meaning that the price had fallen so low that trading had to be stopped. I later described the impact of this experience to Jack Schwager, the author ofHedge FundMarket Wizards:
In those days, we had the big commodity boards, which clicked whenever prices changed. So each morning, on the opening, I would see and hear the market click down 200 points, the daily limit, stay unchanged at that price, and know that I had lost that much more, with the amount of potential additional losses still undefined. It was a very tactile experience . . . [and] it taught me the importance of risk controls, because I never wanted to experience that pain again. It enhanced my fear of being wrong and taught me to make sure that nosingle
bet, or even multiple bets, could cause me to lose more than an acceptable amount. In trading you have to be defensive and aggressive at the same time. If you are not aggressive, you are not going to make money, and if you are not defensive, you are not going to keep money. I believe that anyone who has made money in trading has had to experience horrendous pain at some point. Trading is like working with electricity; you can get an electric shock. With that pork belly trade and other trades, I felt the electric shock and the fear that comes with it.
After Dominick & Dominick closed itsretailbusiness, I moved on to a bigger, more successful brokerage firm. During my short stay there, it took over numerous other firms and changed its name several times, eventually becoming Shearson, though Sandy Weill stayed in charge through it all.
Shearson put me in charge of its futureshedging business, which included both commodity futures and financial futures. I was the person helping clients who had price risks in their businesses manage them by using futures. I developed quite an expertise in the grain and livestock markets, which often led me down to West Texas and the agricultural areas of California. The Shearson brokers, cattle producers, and grain dealers I dealt with were great folks who brought me into their worlds, taking me to honky-tonks, dove hunts, and barbecues. We worked and had a blast together, and I built a second life with them that lasted several years—though my job at Shearson lasted only a bit more than a year.
Much as I loved the job and the people I worked with, I didn’t fit into the Shearson organization. I was too wild. For example, as a joke that now seems pretty stupid, I hired astripperto drop her cloak while I waslecturingat a whiteboard at the California Grain & Feed Association’s annual convention. I also punched my boss in the face. Not surprisingly, I was fired.
But the brokers, their clients, and even the ones who fired me liked me and wanted to keep getting my advice. Even better, they were willing to pay me for it, so in 1975 I started Bridgewater Associates 。
与此同时，货币印发的速度随着金本位的消亡而消退，经济和股票市场开始上扬。1972年资本开始回归股市，那时候的股市风向标是“漂亮50”。这个50只股票组成的团体有着快速且稳定的收益增长并得到广泛的认可。随着股市的火热，我愈加对商品交易感兴趣，所以在那个春天，我请求美林证券商品委员会董事给了我一份夏天的工作。他很奇怪因为通常来自哈佛商学院的人不会对大宗商品感兴趣，因为商品通常被认为是华尔街掮客行业的私生子。直到现在，据我所知，还没有哈佛商学院的学生在任何商品期货工作过。大多数华尔街公司甚至没有商品贸易的专属分支机构，美林证券的商品贸易机构非常小，龟缩在街的另一边，只有简单的金属桌椅。
几个月后，当我返校进行第二年的学习，第一次石油危机开始了，价格在几个月内翻了四番。美国的经济放缓，商品价格上扬，1973年股市跳水，再一次，我懵逼了，但是回过头我能明白股市已经像多米诺骨牌一样按逻辑顺序倒塌了。
这种情况下，1960年代的债务融资正在耗尽，而1970年代早期的还在继续。联邦政府已经采用以公债形式投资的放松信贷扩大信用政策。但是必须用贬值的纸币偿还债务而不是黄金支持的美元。美国实质上是违约了。很自然的，印刷货币造成美元价值下跌。超发货币带动了更多的放松信贷，当然导致了更多的消费开销。随着货币体系的崩溃带来的通货膨胀的大潮反而会推高商品价格。作为回应，1973年，联邦政府收紧货币政策，一般由中央银行在通胀和增速太强是进行。这接下来导致了股市的惨跌，自1929大萧条后的最低谷的经济萧条。表现最好的50只股票尤其受影响，猛烈下跌。
教训？大家都开始思考同一件事—诸如表现最好的50只股票还是不是套利的机会，--几乎可以肯定反应在价格上，继续押注可能是一个错误。我清楚每一个步骤（诸如快钱和放松信贷）都有一个规模相当后果（在这种情况下，通常是高通胀），而后果通常导致一个近似的相等和相反面的反作用力（收紧货币和信贷政策），市场反转。
我开始看着事情一再的重复发生，让我明白大多数事情都只是“重复过去而已”：大多数事情都是在遵循因果关系在重复发生。当然，能够觉知那些事情在发生和其后的因果关系任然很困难。尽管大多数事情看起来不可避免和逻辑参照的，几乎没有什么是实时的。
因为人们总是追逐热点和回避非热，股票投资1973年后退烧，商品交易开始回到主流。因为我的商品期货和哈佛商学院mba学历，我成了一名炙手可热的经理人。多米尼克 *多米尼克是一家中等规模，有着一百多年历史的经纪公司，用每年25000美金雇佣我做商品期货经理人，这几乎是哪一年哈佛商学院毕业生的顶薪了。我的新老板给我配了一个年老经验丰富的家伙做搭档，这家伙有着大量的商品经纪经验，我们签署了任务书负责建立商品交易分部。我头都大了，尽管那时我因为太骄傲而没有意识到这一点。我本该随着工作的进展经历大量的惨痛教训，但多米尼克*多米尼克公司却在这前停止了该业务。
随着经济溃散，水门事件主导了报纸头条，我再一次看到政策和经济纠缠在一起，但通常是经济挂帅。经济螺旋下行导致人们开始悲观，所以人们开始抛售股票，市场继续下跌。情况不能再糟糕了，可人们任然恐惧会更糟。这就像是1966年我看到的镜像图片一样，市场在那一年升到最高点，就像过去一样，民意是错的，当人们开始悲观，他们卖出，价格自然非常低廉，必须采取措施改变局面了。不出所料，联邦政府方宽送货币政策，股市在1974年探底。
那时候，我单独一人居住在纽约；我有大把的时间和哈佛商学院的朋友聚会，约会。我的室友和一位古巴女孩约会，他介绍古巴女孩的一位朋友和我来了一次初次约会。一位充满异国情调的西班牙女孩芭芭拉，她几乎不会讲英语。这根本不是问题，因为我们可以用不同的方式沟通。她让我心情激动了几乎两年时间，直到我们住在一起，结婚，并有了四个孩子，彼此分享炫目的生活。她任让我着迷但是因为私人隐私我不能说的太多了。
在我经纪行业工作的同时，我也在处理自己的业务。尽管我有者超过失败多得多的胜利案例，但我现在只能回忆起那些失败的例子。我记得最大的一个那时我还在经营自己的猪肉生意。几天来猪肉市场已经跌停了-从价格上就能反应出来。
价格已经低到不值得交易。我后来向杰克*斯科温格描述了这一幕震惊的体验，《对冲基金-市场奇才》的作者。
那些日子我们拥有巨大的商品舞台，不论什么时候价格变动都会引发市场激发。所以每个早上，一开市，我就能看到和听到市场下跌200点（每日的限额，价格会停留不动），我就知道我已经损失了多少，连带潜在的附加税损失依旧不明。这真是一种非常伸手可及的感受。。。他教会我风险控制的重要性，因为我再也不想体验那种痛苦了。这次经历大大加强了我对错误的恐惧并教会我确定没有单方赌注，或者多方投注，这可能导致超过能接受的数目更多的损失。进行交易你必须谨慎防御同时充满侵略性。如果不具备侵略性，你不可能赚钱，如果你不小心防御你不可能守住钱。我相信任何在交易中赚钱的人同时也不得不经历可怕的痛苦。交易就像带电工作；你能得到一次电击。经历过那次猪肉交易和其他的一些，我体会到了电击的感觉并害怕随之而来的痛苦。
在多米尼克*多米尼克关闭它的零售业务，我到了一家更大更成功的经纪公司。在我短期任职期间，先后经历了数家公司，先后数次更改了公司名称，最后定为希尔森证券公司，尽管森地威尔一直在变化当中。
希尔森证券让我负责期货买卖业务，包括商品期货和金融期货。我负责使用期货帮助那些有在商业管理中存在价格风险的客户。我在谷物和家畜市场发展了一套专家技能，这样就需要我经常去田纳西西部和加州的农业区。和我交易的希尔森的经纪人，家畜生产商，谷物交易人都是大人物，他们带我进入他们的世界，低级酒吧，狩猎鸽子，烧烤宴会。我们工作并一起聚会，我形成了第二种生活并持续了几年—尽管我在希尔森的工作只维持了一年多。
不论我多么热爱工作和工作伙伴，我还是没有融入希尔森证券。我太疯狂了，举例，就像一个现在看起来很愚蠢的笑话，当我在加州谷物和家畜协会的年会上做演讲时我雇佣了一个一个脱衣女郎脱掉外套。我也打过我的老板，不奇怪，我被激怒了。
但是作为一个经纪人，他们的客户，甚至于解雇我的人也喜欢我，想要继续获得我的建议。甚至他们愿意为此付给我钱，所以在1975年我开创了桥水基金"。
我是007李小军，以上是我自己的翻译，也许不会太准确，我能保证也不会偏离作者的意思太远，不至于误导各位，谢谢观看。
本段描述作者在经纪公司工作并最终创建桥水基金的这一段经历。
1、 作者在多米尼克公司经纪人生涯：谷物和牲畜交易，石油危机 ，水门事件等，放松信贷、放宽货币政策---收紧信贷和货币政策，往复循环，经纪在1974年开始复苏。
2、作者加入希尔森证券（雷曼兄弟的前身）继续负责商品期货，并积累了大量的人脉和知识、经验。
3、作者遇到的他的妻子：一位西班牙女孩，并一起生了四个孩子。
4、在经历以上的这些之后，作者终于积累了足够的人脉，知识，资本，开始建立自己的桥水基金。一个伟大公司的篇章开始了，作者本人的辉煌人生开始了。
-------依旧有很多金融术语---------------------------------------------------------------------
oil shock--石油危机
inflationary -通货膨胀
sure bet --套利机会
easy money--快钱 容易赚的钱
sought-after--炙手可热
over my head--过头，懵逼
consensus--民意
limit down --跌停
Hedge Fund --对冲基金
single bet --单方加注 ，一般是散客，庄家可以多方加注，保证不败。
007-4478李小军
2018-6-6
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