该文章有关养老金缺口
America’s public pensions have been underfunded for decades. The crunch point is coming soon
美国公共养老金已经亏损了几十年，他们即将到达危机的临界点。
MANY WORKERS in the private sector no longer have them. But most public-sector employees in America are still entitled to a valuable benefit: a pension linked to their final salary. A long-standing problem is that states and cities, which fund their plans differently from the federal government, have been lax about putting aside enough money to cover these promises.
在私营企业工作的人，很多已经领不到养老金了，但那些在国营部门的员工任然享受着不菲的养老金待遇：与他们最终工资水平挂钩。美国一个长期存在的问题就是各个州和不同城市养老储备金不同于联邦政府，其他地区对待这些承诺态度随意，并不在意有没有足够的养老金用来支出。
The resulting black hole is becoming ever more alarming (see Finance section). Although the American stockmarket has been hitting record highs, the average public-sector pension fund has a bigger deficit in percentage terms than it did in either 2000, or the start of this decade. In some states and cities schemes are less than 50% funded; Illinois has six of the worst.
由此产生的庞大养老储备金空缺是引起了政府空前的担忧。虽然美国股市不断创新高，但基本上所有国营部门的养老储备金都出现了赤字，就比例而言还大于2000或2010年初的规模。美国一些州和城市养老储备金的收入只有不到50%，伊利诺斯州更是倒数六个州之一。
The cost of pension promises has risen because people are living longer, so they end up taking more out of the pot.
人们寿命更长，领的养老金更多，从而增加了养老成本。
Some states and cities have responded by trying to wriggle out of their obligations and cut the benefits retirees get, but courts have often decided against them, ruling that a contract is a contract.
一些州政府和市政府设法逃避责任，用削减退休人员福利的方法来缓解养老金赤字的问题，但法庭一般不会通过这样的政策，合约不可破坏。
As a result states, cities and other public bodies are being forced to funnel ever more into pension schemes. Having chipped in the equivalent of 5.3% of their ordinary payroll bills in 2001, public-sector employers now pay in, on average, 16.5% a year.
因此这些政府和公共部门被迫挤出更多资金投入到养老计划中。国营部门的员工在2001年就已交出相当于个人收入5.3%的高额养老保险，如今，平均每年缴付的养老保险占到了16.5%。
Even those contributions have not been enough. Politicians have often failed to pay in as much as the actuaries recommend. In 2009 the actuaries for the Illinois Teachers scheme asked the state to cough up $2.1bn; it paid just $1.6bn. By 2018 the annual bill had risen to $7.1bn but the state paid only $4.2bn. The hole in the pension scheme deepened to $75bn in 2018, or about $6,000 for every citizen in the state. And that is just for teachers.
即使集体和个人已经被压榨到最低，对于巨大的空缺来说也是远远不够的。政府资金收入往往达不到精算师建议的额度。2009年精算师要求州政府付出21亿美元履行伊利诺斯州教师计划，最后只缴付了16亿。2018年，当年账单变成了71亿，州政府依然只能缴付42亿。2018年养老计划的资金空洞扩大到了750亿，也就该州平均每人6000美元的债务。而这，仅仅是教师一个行业的养老保险金。
The problem could yet worsen. Pension schemes are vulnerable to a market downturn and many were left reeling after the global financial crisis of 2008-09. Even if markets do not tumble, they would suffer in a long period of sluggish returns. That looks plausible given that 30-year Treasury bond yields are just 2.4% and American equity valuations are stretched relative to their historical average.
这个问题还会继续恶化。养老计划在市场低迷时期尤其脆弱，大部分在经历了2008至2009年的全球经济危机之后几近崩溃边缘。就算市场稳定，该类计划也会经历一个长期的缓慢恢复。30年的长期国债收益仅为2.4%，美国资产评估仅勉强达到平均水平。
Some schemes are betting on “alternative assets” like hedge funds and private equity to fill the gap. But hedge-fund returns have been disappointing over the past decade, and the private-equity industry is not large enough to absorb $4trn of public-sector pension assets.
一些计划指望着如对冲基金和私有债券等“替代资产”来填补这个空缺，但整个私有债券行业也无法负担公共部门四万亿养老资产的债务。
And there is a final problem: the schemes’ accounting. When working out how much they need to put aside today, all funded schemes must calculate how much they are likely to pay out in future. This means using a rate to discount the cost of tomorrow’s pension payments. The higher the rate used, the lower the cost seems to be. Public-sector pension schemes are allowed to use the assumed rate of investment return as their discount rate, even though they will still have to pay pensions whether they earn that return or not. This has naturally led to a degree of optimism about future returns: many assume 7-7.5% a year.
最后还有一个问题：养老保险资金的缺口会越来越大。当政府为眼前应该支付的养老金而疲于奔命，所有计划未来将要支付的金额还在不断上涨。假设用更高的投资收益率来计算，成本似乎就会越低。政府养老计划事实上是用预期的投资收益利率作为他们的贴现率，而无论投资收益是否符合预期，他们都要出这个钱。这就让政府自然而然地对未来收益抱有一定程度的乐观：因为他们预期的收益率在每年7%到7.5%之间。
In the private sector, a pension promise is seen as a debt and has to be discounted at corporate-bond yields, which are at historically low levels. This makes pensions look more expensive and explains why many companies have closed their final-salary schemes. If the public sector had to use the same approach, its average funding ratio would be a lot lower than today’s 72% and the resulting hole, currently $1.6bn in total would be a lot bigger.
私营部门把养老承诺金看作是一笔债务，当企业债券收益率创历史新低的时候，必定要大打折扣的。企业收益降低，养老金相较之下则越来越高，这就是为什么很多公司已经终止了最终薪资计划。如果政府选择用同样的方式来应对，其平均提存比会低于目前的72%，而养老金的缺口也会比现在的16亿更大。
Public bodies are going to have to boost their contributions even further. A study by the Centre for Retirement Research found that in the worst-affected states—Connecticut, Illinois and New Jersey—pension costs in 2014 were already 15% of total revenues. That will trigger a squeeze on the public finances, as other spending has to be cut or taxes have to be cranked up. Either will be especially hard on younger people and workers in the private sector, who do not get the same benefits.
国家必须要实施更大程度的激励政策，退休研究中心一份报告显示，在收入不景气的州，如康涅狄格州、伊利诺斯州和新泽西州，2014年养老支出已经占到总收入的15%了。养老成本继续增大，将会使公共财政紧缩，政府不得不削减其他方面的支出或者强行提高税收。无论是哪种途径，对于私营企业的年轻人和员工来说都不是好事，因为他们已经享受不到同等的福利待遇了。
The pensions crisis has been rumbling on for years, but some states and cities will soon enter a downward spiral, in which pension costs lead to bad public services or tax rises, in turn encouraging workers and firms to move out, which then shrinks the tax base, making promises even less affordable. When that happens some states and cities will tumble into a black hole.
长久以来对于养老问题的抱怨就没有停止过，但一些州市即将卷入下沉漩涡，养老金成本增加导致公共服务水平下降或者税收上升，从而导致员工和公司迁移到其他地区，那么就会降低该州市的基础税收，养老支出更是难以为继。假如这种情况继续下去，这些州市将陷入一个无底洞中。