k e y w o r d s : keywords: keywords: 共模攻击
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import gmpy2
e1 = 65536
e2 = 270270
n = 122031686138696619599914690767764286094562842112088225311503826014006886039069083192974599712685027825111684852235230039182216245029714786480541087105081895339251403738703369399551593882931896392500832061070414483233029067117410952499655482160104027730462740497347212752269589526267504100262707367020244613503
c1 = 39449016403735405892343507200740098477581039605979603484774347714381635211925585924812727991400278031892391996192354880233130336052873275920425836986816735715003772614138146640312241166362203750473990403841789871473337067450727600486330723461100602952736232306602481565348834811292749547240619400084712149673
c2 = 43941404835820273964142098782061043522125350280729366116311943171108689108114444447295511969090107129530187119024651382804933594308335681000311125969011096172605146903018110328309963467134604392943061014968838406604211996322468276744714063735786505249416708394394169324315945145477883438003569372460172268277
_,s,t = gmpy2.gcdext(e1,e2)
print(s,t)
m = pow(c1,s,n) * pow(c2,t,n) % n
print(gmpy2.gcd(e1,e2))
print(bytes.decode(long_to_bytes(gmpy2.iroot(m,2)[0])))
k e y w o r d s : keywords: keywords: GGH
,embedded technique
解题细节思路请见paper,(20条消息) GGH非对称密码体制破解方法_M3ng@L的博客-CSDN博客
简单来说,使用embedded technique
方法将 C V P CVP CVP问题转换为 S V P SVP SVP问题,进而求得干扰向量 e e e的大小,减去 e e e再乘以公钥向量 B ′ B' B′的逆即可
from sage.modules.free_module_integer import IntegerLattice
c = e = [151991736758354,115130361237591,58905390613532,130965235357066,74614897867998,48099459442369,45894485782943,7933340009592,25794185638]
B = W = [[-10150241248,-11679953514,-8802490385,-12260198788,-10290571893,-334269043,-11669932300,-2158827458,-7021995],
[52255960212,48054224859,28230779201,43264260760,20836572799,8191198018,14000400181,4370731005,14251110],
[2274129180,-1678741826,-1009050115,1858488045,978763435,4717368685,-561197285,-1999440633,-6540190],
[45454841384,34351838833,19058600591,39744104894,21481706222,14785555279,13193105539,2306952916,7501297],
[-16804706629,-13041485360,-8292982763,-16801260566,-9211427035,-4808377155,-6530124040,-2572433293,-8393737],
[28223439540,19293284310,5217202426,27179839904,23182044384,10788207024,18495479452,4007452688,13046387],
[968256091,-1507028552,1677187853,8685590653,9696793863,2942265602,10534454095,2668834317,8694828],
[33556338459,26577210571,16558795385,28327066095,10684900266,9113388576,2446282316,-173705548,-577070],
[35404775180,32321129676,15071970630,24947264815,14402999486,5857384379,10620159241,2408185012,7841686]]
c = matrix(c)
B = matrix(B)
temp = B.stack(c).augment(vector([0]*B.ncols()+[1]))
e = IntegerLattice(temp).shortest_vector()[:-1]
m = B.solve_left(c - matrix(e))
print(m)
m = [ 877 619 919 977 541 941 947 1031 821]
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
import hashlib
c = 0x1070260d8986d5e3c4b7e672a6f1ef2c185c7fff682f99cc4a8e49cfce168aa0
m = [877,619,919,977,541,941,947,1031,821]
key = hashlib.sha256(str(m).encode()).digest()
aes = AES.new(key,AES.MODE_ECB)
flag = aes.decrypt(long_to_bytes(c))
print(flag)
hxp |伏尔加CTF 2016资格:crypto300"XXY"写
Mathematics of Public Key Cryptography (auckland.ac.nz)
GGH | 4XWi11的博客
Nguyen’s Attack:Intended Solution to GGH in GYCTF 2020 | Soreat_u’s Blog (soreatu.com)
k e y w o r d s : keywords: keywords: AES_CBC
,xor
,狸猫换太子
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
import os
from hashlib import sha256
import socketserver
import signal
import string
import random
table = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
BANNER = br'''
.d8888b. d8b 888 888
d88P Y88b Y8P 888 888
888 888 888 888
888 888 888 888 .d88b. 888888 .d8888b 8888b. 888888
888 888 888 888 d8P Y8b 888 d88P" "88b 888
888 888 888 Y88 88P 88888888 888 888 .d888888 888
Y88b d88P 888 Y8bd8P Y8b. Y88b. Y88b. 888 888 Y88b.
"Y8888P" 888 Y88P "Y8888 "Y888 "Y8888P "Y888888 "Y888
.d888 8888888b. d8b
d88P" 888 Y88b Y8P
888 888 888
888888 .d88b. 888d888 888 d88P 888d888 888 88888b. .d8888b .d88b.
888 d88""88b 888P" 8888888P" 888P" 888 888 "88b d88P" d8P Y8b
888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 88888888
888 Y88..88P 888 888 888 888 888 888 Y88b. Y8b.
888 "Y88P" 888 888 888 888 888 888 "Y8888P "Y8888
'''
guard_menu = br'''
1.Tell the guard my name
2.Go away
'''
cat_menu = br'''1.getpermission
2.getmessage
3.say Goodbye
'''
def Pad(msg):
return msg + os.urandom((16 - len(msg) % 16) % 16)
class Task(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler):
def _recvall(self):
BUFF_SIZE = 2048
data = b''
while True:
part = self.request.recv(BUFF_SIZE)
data += part
if len(part) < BUFF_SIZE:
break
return data.strip()
def send(self, msg, newline=True):
try:
if newline:
msg += b'\n'
self.request.sendall(msg)
except:
pass
def recv(self, prompt=b'[-] '):
self.send(prompt, newline=False)
return self._recvall()
def proof_of_work(self):
proof = (''.join([random.choice(table) for _ in range(12)])).encode()
sha = sha256(proof).hexdigest().encode()
self.send(b"[+] sha256(XXXX+" + proof[4:] + b") == " + sha)
XXXX = self.recv(prompt=b'[+] Give Me XXXX :')
if len(XXXX) != 4 or sha256(XXXX + proof[4:]).hexdigest().encode() != sha:
return False
return True
def register(self):
self.send(b'')
username = self.recv()
return username
def getpermission(self, name, iv, key):
aes = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
plain = Pad(name)+b"a_cat_permission"
return aes.encrypt(plain)
def getmessage(self, iv, key, permission):
aes = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
return aes.decrypt(permission)
def handle(self):
signal.alarm(50)
if not self.proof_of_work():
return
self.send(BANNER, newline=False)
self.key = os.urandom(16)
self.iv = os.urandom(16)
self.send(b"I'm the guard, responsible for protecting the prince's safety.")
self.send(b"You shall not pass, unless you have the permission of the prince.")
self.send(b"You have two choices now. Tell me who you are or leave now!")
self.send(guard_menu, newline=False)
option = self.recv()
if option == b'1':
try:
self.name = self.register()
self.send(b"Hello " + self.name)
self.send(b"Nice to meet you. But I can't let you pass. I can give you a cat. She will play with you")
self.send(b'Miao~ ' + self.iv)
for i in range(3):
self.send(b"I'm a magic cat. What can I help you")
self.send(cat_menu, newline=False)
op = self.recv()
if op == b'1':
self.send(b"Looks like you want permission. Here you are~")
permission = self.getpermission(self.name, self.iv, self.key)
self.send(b"Permission:" + permission)
elif op == b'2':
self.send(b"Looks like you want to know something. Give me your permission:")
permission = self.recv()
self.send(b"Miao~ ")
iv = self.recv()
plain = self.getmessage(iv, self.key, permission)
self.send(b"The message is " + plain)
elif op == b'3':
self.send(b"I'm leaving. Bye~")
break
self.send(b"Oh, you're here again. Let me check your permission.")
self.send(b"Give me your permission:")
cipher = self.recv()
self.send(b"What's the cat tell you?")
iv = self.recv()
plain = self.getmessage(iv, self.key, cipher)
prs, uid = plain[16:],plain[:16]
if prs != b'Princepermission' or uid != self.name:
self.send(b"You don't have the Prince Permission. Go away!")
return
else:
self.send(b"Unbelievable! How did you get it!")
self.send(b"The prince asked me to tell you this:")
f = open('flag.txt', 'rb')
flag = f.read()
f.close()
self.send(flag)
except:
self.request.close()
if option == b'2':
self.send(b"Stay away from here!")
self.request.close()
class ThreadedServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
pass
class ForkedServer(socketserver.ForkingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
HOST, PORT = '0.0.0.0', 10005
print("HOST:POST " + HOST + ":" + str(PORT))
server = ForkedServer((HOST, PORT), Task)
server.allow_reuse_address = True
server.serve_forever()
首先是执行proof of work
函数,简单的爆破四个字符使得其连接上剩余已知字符的sha256
等于函数给出的sha256
值
然后进入正题,第一段守卫处没有有用信息,需要输入你的name
(之后称为m1
),然后在magic cat
处可以获得
getpermission()
得到对m1+b'a_cat_permission'
的AES_CBC加密之后得到的密文,其中iv
是系统生成的已知量,key
未知
def getpermission(self, name, iv, key):
aes = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
plain = Pad(name)+b"a_cat_permission"
return aes.encrypt(plain)
getmessage()
输入一段密文进行AES_CBC解密,其中iv
由我们给出,key
是之前使用的,得到解密之后给出的明文
def getmessage(self, iv, key, permission):
aes = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
return aes.decrypt(permission)
总共有三次询问的机会(循环次数为3),循环完成之后由守卫进行验证
提交给守卫某个密文
和自己给出的偏移量iv
,使得进行相同的key
的AES_CBC解密之后得到的明文是m1+b'Princeperimission'
self.send(b"Give me your permission:")
cipher = self.recv()
self.send(b"What's the cat tell you?")
iv = self.recv()
plain = self.getmessage(iv, self.key, cipher)
prs, uid = plain[16:],plain[:16]
if prs != b'Princepermission' or uid != self.name:
...
以上就是对题目代码的分析
简单来说,我们需要想办法把从magic cat
处得到的perimission = m1 + b'a_cat_perimission'
的密文换成m1 + b'Princepermission'
的密文
其中可以用到的是magic cat
会提供一次或两次解密
的机会(用自己给出的iv
)
显然没有办法知道key
进而直接求解,但是我们不需要老老实实地直接找 n e e d _ m 1 + n e e d _ m 2 need\_m_1+need\_m_2 need_m1+need_m2的密文,因为我们可以构造合适的iv
代入最后的AES_CBC解密
先令
m 1 = i n p u t _ n a m e m_1 = input\_name m1=input_name
m 2 = a _ c a t _ p e r m i s s i o n m_2 = a\_cat\_permission m2=a_cat_permission
n e e d _ m 1 = m 1 need\_m_1=m_1 need_m1=m1
n e e d _ m 2 = P r i n c e p e r m i s s i o n need\_m_2=Princepermission need_m2=Princepermission
由于AES_CBC加密是分块加密,而每一块的大小是128bits
也就是16字节
,而由于题目要求, m 1 m_1 m1和 m 2 m_2 m2以及 n e e d _ m 2 need\_m_2 need_m2都是16字节大小的
这就意味着加密得到的密文块会有特殊的性质
令 c 1 = p e r m i s s i o n [ : 16 ] c_1=permission[:16] c1=permission[:16], c 2 = p e r m i s s i o n [ 16 : ] c_2=permission[16:] c2=permission[16:];其中 p e r m i s s i o n permission permission是magic cat
通过getpermission()
给出的密文
通过图片明确一下AES_CBC加解密过程
加密过程是,先将明文按16字节
一分组拆开,然后进行如图加密(先进行异或,非明文分组1的异或对象是前一个密文分组或者是明文分组1的异或对象初始化向量iv
),再分别投入加密器,得到各个密文分组后拼接起来成为最后的密文
解密过程是,将密文按16字节
一分组拆开,然后分别投入解密器,得到的结果与前一个密文分组或者初始化向量进行异或,最后得到各个明文分组再直接拼接在一起组成最后的明文
其中加密器和解密器在本题算是黑盒,只需要知道进去的数据和原来是不一样的即可
我们构造的密文要先经过一次解密器,这就意味着非经过AES_CBC加密产生的密文(比如 c 1 , c 2 c_1,c_2 c1,c2)都会产生一个未知的数据;那么这时就需要用到magic cat
提供的解密
的机会
经过解密器之后会进行异或,那么这就是本题的关键之一了,异或的性质就是两个一样的数异或均为0,也就是说对其他一起的数不会有影响,利用这个性质我们构造
f a k e _ c 1 = c 1 ⊕ m 2 ⊕ n e e d _ m 2 fake\_c_1=c_1\oplus m_2\oplus need\_m_2 fake_c1=c1⊕m2⊕need_m2
使用系统给出的iv
代入magic cat
提供的一次解密的机会
先经过解密器得到 m 1 ⊕ i v ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ m 2 ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ n e e d _ m 2 m_1\oplus iv\oplus decrypted\_m_2\oplus decrypted\_need\_m_2 m1⊕iv⊕decrypted_m2⊕decrypted_need_m2
在与初始化向量iv
异或得到 m = m 1 ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ m 2 ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ n e e d _ m 2 m=m_1\oplus decrypted\_m_2\oplus decrypted\_need\_m_2 m=m1⊕decrypted_m2⊕decrypted_need_m2
接着构造
f a k e _ i v = m ⊕ m 1 ⊕ i v = d e c r y p t e d _ m 2 ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ n e e d _ m 2 ⊕ i v fake\_iv=m\oplus m_1\oplus iv=decrypted\_m_2\oplus decrypted\_need\_m_2\oplus iv fake_iv=m⊕m1⊕iv=decrypted_m2⊕decrypted_need_m2⊕iv
那么最后传入的密文是 f a k e _ c 1 + c 2 fake\_c_1+c_2 fake_c1+c2,传入的iv
也就是 f a k e _ i v fake\_iv fake_iv
推导一下最后的解密过程,(AES_CBC是分块解密的)
f a k e _ c 1 fake\_c_1 fake_c1单独进行解密得到 m 1 ⊕ i v ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ m 2 ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ n e e d _ m 2 m_1\oplus iv\oplus decrypted\_m_2\oplus decrypted\_need\_m_2 m1⊕iv⊕decrypted_m2⊕decrypted_need_m2
然后再与 f a k e _ i v fake\_iv fake_iv异或得到
m 1 ⊕ i v ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ m 2 ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ n e e d _ m 2 ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ m 2 ⊕ d e c r y p t e d _ n e e d _ m 2 ⊕ i v m_1\oplus iv\oplus decrypted\_m_2\oplus decrypted\_need\_m_2\oplus decrypted\_m_2\oplus decrypted\_need\_m_2\oplus iv m1⊕iv⊕decrypted_m2⊕decrypted_need_m2⊕decrypted_m2⊕decrypted_need_m2⊕iv
= m 1 =m_1 =m1
得到明文分组1,符合最后的判断条件
然后 c 2 c_2 c2单独进行解密,得到 c 1 ⊕ m 2 c_1\oplus m_2 c1⊕m2
再与 f a k e _ c 1 fake\_c_1 fake_c1进行异或得到 c 1 ⊕ m 2 ⊕ n e e d _ m 2 ⊕ c 1 ⊕ m 2 = n e e d _ m 2 c_1\oplus m_2\oplus need\_m_2 \oplus c_1\oplus m_2=need\_m_2 c1⊕m2⊕need_m2⊕c1⊕m2=need_m2
这就是明文分组2,符合最后的判断条件
from re import L
from pwn import *
import hashlib,string,random
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
io = remote("node4.buuoj.cn","27370")
temp = io.recvline()
# print(temp)
temp1 = temp.split(b"==")
# print(temp1)
part_proof = bytes.decode(temp1[0].split(b"XXXX")[1])[1:-2]
sha = bytes.decode(temp1[1]).strip()
table = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
while True:
XXXX = "".join([random.choice(table)for _ in range(4)])
temp_proof = XXXX + part_proof
temp_sha = hashlib.sha256(temp_proof.encode()).hexdigest()
if sha == temp_sha:
io.recvuntil(b"[+] Give Me XXXX :")
io.sendline(XXXX.encode())
break
io.recvuntil(b"[-] ")
io.sendline(b"1")
io.sendline(b"1" * 16)
io.recvuntil(b'Miao~ ')
iv = io.recvuntil(b"\n")[:-1]
# print(iv)
io.recvuntil(b'[-]')
io.sendline(b'1')
io.recvuntil(b'Permission:')
cat_permission = io.recvline()[:-1]
# print(cat_permission)
io.recvuntil(b"[-]")
io.sendline(b'2')
io.recvuntil(b"Looks like you want to know something. Give me your permission:")
m2 = b"a_cat_permission"
m1 = b'1' * 16 # your name,直接16字节,不会进行pad()函数,如果那样的话,m1也会成为一个未知量
need_m2 = b"Princepermission"
need_m1 = m1
c1 = cat_permission[:16]
c2 = cat_permission[16:]
fake_c1 = xor(xor(c1,m2),need_m2)
io.sendline(fake_c1)
io.recvuntil(b"Miao~ ")
io.sendline(iv)
io.recvuntil(b"The message is ")
m = io.recvuntil(b"\n")[:-1]
# print(plain)
io.recvuntil(b"[-]")
io.sendline(b'3')
io.recvuntil(b"Give me your permission:")
fake_permission = fake_c1 + c2
fake_iv = xor(xor(m,m1),iv)
io.sendline(fake_permission)
io.recvuntil(b"What's the cat tell you?")
io.sendline(fake_iv)
io.interactive()
完美起航-20211107陇原战疫Crypto方向WP (okgoes.cn)
(11条消息) CBC模式解读_实践求真知-CSDN博客_cbc模式