原文：
COVID-19andfinance:Agendasforfutureresearch（节选）
John W. Goodell
1. Introduction
We are all now tragically familiar with the ongoing enormous costs in lives of the COVID-19 pandemic. We are all additionally fearful of the eventual economic impact of the crisis, including the impact on financial markets. At the time of writing this article this pandemic is ongoing, with the eventual scale of the disaster still unknown. However, it is reasonable to expect a great deal of interest in the very near future on the role of pandemics in finance.
This brief article is anticipatory, sketching the scant research, yet, on pandemics and finance, as well as suggesting partial parallels with other more-explored areas of financial economics research. Recent academic articles, along with assessing the impacts of past epidemics and pandemics, also eerily prognosticate large-scale events such as COVID-19, and its economic consequences. A consideration of possible impacts of COVID-19 on financial markets and institutions, either directly or indirectly, is briefly outlined by drawing on a variety of literatures. Examining what research suggests have been the impacts of past events that in some ways roughly parallel COVID-19, alongside a consideration of how COVID-19 may be different, suggests avenues of future investigation
2. Economic impact of pandemics
An obvious way that pandemics can impact financial systems is through their enormous economic costs. There have been a number of articles that address the costs of pandemics, both in terms of the costs of past pandemics such as the HIV/AIDS crisis or estimates of the cost of future pandemics. Articles on these costs often regard ex post the costs of pandemics and epidemics. For instance, Haacker (2004) discusses the economic costs of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, while Santaeulalia-Llopis (2008) focuses on the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on development. Yach, Stuckler, and Brownell (2006) discusses the costs of global growth of obesity and diabetes.
Other papers, many much more closely related to the COVID-19 crisis, have warned us to anticipate the economic costs of possible future pandemics and epidemics. Particularly prescient is Bloom, Cadarette, and Sevilla (2018). They closely delineate the economic concerns that are now in the forefront with COVID-19: costs to the health system, both public and private, of medical treatment of the infected and of outbreak control; the strain to health systems of being unable to concomitantly deal with more routine health issues during outbreaks; loss to employment productivity; social distancing disrupting economic activity; impact of tourism; impact on foreign direct investment.
This concern is echoed by Fan, Jamison, and Summers (2018). They note very recently “an unmet need for greater investment in preparedness against major epidemics and pandemics.” They estimate the expected annual losses from pandemic risk to be annually approximately 500 billion US dollars, or 0.6% of global income. In light of the costs of COVID-19, this seemingly large sum now seems greatly underestimated.1 Other works that highlight the need for economic risk management vis-à-vis the potential likelihood of future pandemics include Bloom and Canning (2004); Lewis (2001); Madhav et al. (2017); Tam, Khan, and Legido-Quigley (2016);Yach, Stuckler, and Brownell (2006) and many others.
We should also note articles that observe the number of “close calls,” in which contagious disease outbreaks have occurred that were contained to a level far less than their potentiality. Particularly interesting is Thomas (2018), who describes the recent lethal outbreak of the highly contagious respiratory disease Nipah in the Kerala area of India. In this case, a larger global health issue was averted by a remarkably fast response from public health workers.2 Particularly striking is a report from Global Preparedness Monitoring Board of the World Health Organization Global-Preparedness-Monitoring-Board (2019) as recent as September 2019, thatasserts directly that the world is imminent danger of a global pandemic and yet little or no preparation is being undertaken. According to Global-Preparedness-Monitoring-Board (2019), during 2011–2018, the World Health Organization tracked 1,483 epidemic events in 172 countries.
3. Impact of COVID-19 on banking and insurance
Banks of course by their nature are vulnerable in times of economic downturns, because of the likelihood of nonperforming loans and the possibility in extreme cases of bank runs. To this point, Leoni (2013) find the spread of HIV in developing countries is associated with large increases in deposit turnover. They attribute this to the need to pay for individual treatments forcing large‐scale withdrawals of deposits.
Lagoarde-Segot and Leoni (2013) develop a theoretical model that shows that the likelihood of a collapse of the banking industry of a developing country increases, as the joint prevalence of large pandemics increases. Much of the group lending of microfinance institutions and banks’ lending to the poor will be pressured during epidemics because all members of the group will be pressured by the aggregate shock (Skoufias, 2003). Rural financial institutions will be subject to bank runs during floods or crop failures (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). It remains to be seen how COVID-19 will change the practices of financial institutions.
More generally, how long will banks, all around the world, maintain a more conservative lending policy post COVID-19? Have there been studies on bank reactions to macroeconomic shocks (Bongini et al., 2019) that are of the magnitude of COVID-19?
Literature has considered whether “black swans” have a global impact (Wang et al., 2019). But COVID-19 is a globally impacting phenomenon. There is also the question of whether events of the magnitude of COVID-19 are insurable. Another question is whether COVID-19 should be regarded as a black swan, or an unforeseeable event with extreme consequences? The answer seems to be “no.” When you have a host of academic articles, discussed above, suggesting the possibility of pandemics and predicting enormous economic losses as a result of pandemics; as well as numerous real-world epidemics and health crises that could have become global pandemics, it should be regarded as something other than totally unexpected.
Clearly pandemics such as COVID-19 are foreseeable; and so it is highly beneficial such events are insurable. Tamura and Sawada (2009) discuss the possibility of such insurance in the context of avian flu epidemics in Vietnam. Of course, such insurance, at least at the private level, is generally only available to those that are financially included. The bottom of the pyramid will be likely left out. Sawada and Shimizutani (2008) note that in the aftermath of severe crises, those with personal collateral readily recover financially, while those without means of collateral do not.
译文：
新冠病毒和金融：未来研究的议程
1 简介
现在，新冠病毒使我们失去了无数同胞。我们都还担心这场危机对经济的最终影响，包括对金融市场的影响。在撰写本文时，这种大流行仍在进行中，灾难的最终规模仍然未知。但是，可以预见的是，在不久的将来，人们对大流行病在金融中的作用会产生极大的兴趣。
这篇简短的文章是有前瞻性的，概述了关于流行病和金融的很少研究，并提出了与其他更深入探讨的金融经济学研究领域的相似之处。最近的学术文章，以及对过去流行病和大流行病的影响的评估，也可以很好地预测COVID-19等大规模事件及其经济后果。通过参考各种文献，简要概述了COVID-19对金融市场和金融机构可能产生的影响的直接或间接影响。检查研究表明的是过去事件的影响，这些事件在某种程度上与COVID-19大致平行，同时考虑到COVID-19可能有何不同，为未来的研究提供了途径。
2 新冠病毒的影响
流行病影响金融系统的一个明显方法是其巨大的经济成本。有很多文章讨论了流行病的成本，无论是从以往流行病的成本，如艾滋病毒/艾滋病危机，还是对未来流行病的成本估算。关于这些成本的文章通常将事后大流行和流行病的成本考虑在内。例如，Haacker（2004）讨论了艾滋病毒/艾滋病大流行的经济成本，而Santaeulalia-Llopis (2008)专注于艾滋病毒大流行对发展的影响。Yach, Stuckler, and Brownell (2006)讨论了肥胖症和糖尿病在全球范围内的增长成本。
其他一些文章，与新冠危机更密切相关，已经警告我们要预见未来可能出现的大流行和流行病的经济代价。特别有先见的是Bloom, Cadarette和 Sevilla (2018).。它们密切描述了新冠所关注的经济问题：公共和私人卫生系统对感染者的医疗和疫情控制的费用；由于无法在暴发期间同时处理更多的常规卫生问题，给卫生系统带来了压力；丧失就业生产力；社会疏远扰乱了经济活动；旅游业的影响；对外国直接投资的影响。
这种关注得到了 Fan, Jamison, and Summers (2018)的回应。他们最近指出：“在应对重大流行病和大流行的防备上需要加大投资的需求尚未得到满足。”他们估计，大流行风险的预期年度损失约为每年5000亿美元，占全球收入的0.6％。鉴于COVID-19的成本，这笔看似很大的数字现在似乎被大大低估了。1 针对未来流行病的潜在可能性，其他强调经济风险管理需求的工作包括Bloom and Canning (2004); Lewis (2001); Madhav et al. (2017); Tam, Khan, and Legido-Quigley (2016);Yach, Stuckler, and Brownell (2006)和许多其他。
我们还应该注意一些文章，这些文章观察到了“亲密接触”的数量，其中发生了传染性疾病爆发，其爆发程度远低于其潜在爆发力。特别有趣的是Thomas (2018)，他描述了印度喀拉拉邦最近爆发的高度传染性呼吸道疾病Nipah的致命爆发。在这种情况下，公共卫生工作者的迅速反应避免了更大的全球卫生问题。世界卫生组织全球防范监测委员会的报告尤其令人震惊Global-Preparedness-Monitoring-Board (2019)早在2019年9月，就直接断言世界即将爆发全球大流行的危险，但几乎没有或没有进行任何准备。根据Global-Preparedness-Monitoring-Board (2019)在2011-2018年期间，世界卫生组织在172个国家中追踪了1,483次流行病事件。
3 新冠对银行业的影响
当然，在经济不景气的时候，由于其不良性质以及在极端情况下银行挤兑的可能性，银行在其性质上很容易受到伤害。至此，Leoni (2013)发现艾滋病毒在发展中国家的传播与存款周转量的大幅增加有关。他们将其归因于需要为强迫大规模提取存款的个别待遇付费。
Lagoarde-Segot and Leoni (2013)建立了一个理论模型，该模型表明随着大流行病的共同患病率增加，发展中国家银行业崩溃的可能性也会增加。在流行期间，小额信贷机构和银行向穷人提供的许多团体贷款将受到压力，因为该集团的所有成员都将受到总体冲击的压力(Skoufias, 2003)。农村金融机构将在洪水或农作物歉收期间遭受银行挤兑(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986)。 新冠如何改变金融机构的做法还有待观察。
更广泛地说，在COVID-19之后，全球各地的银行将维持更保守的贷款政策多长时间？有没有研究过银行对宏观经济冲击的反应(Bongini et al., 2019)的大小达到新冠？
文献已经考虑了“黑天鹅”是否具有全球影响力t (Wang et al., 2019).。但是，新冠是一种影响全球的现象。还有一个问题是，新冠大小的事件是否可以保险。另一个问题是，是否应将新冠视为黑天鹅，还是应引起严重后果的不可预见的事件？答案似乎是“不”。当您在上面讨论过许多学术文章时，提出了大流行的可能性，并预测了大流行可能造成的巨大经济损失；以及可能已经成为全球流行病的许多现实世界中的流行病和健康危机，应该将其视为完全出乎意料之外的事情。
显然，新冠的暴发是可以预测的这种可以担保的事是非常有益的。Tamura andSawada (2009)讨论了在越南禽流感流行的情况下这种保险的可能性。当然，这种保险，至少在私人一级，通常只适用于那些有经济能力的保险。金字塔的底部很可能会被忽略。Sawada and Shimizutani (2008)注意到，在发生严重危机之后，拥有个人抵押品的人很容易从经济上复苏，而没有抵押品的人则没有。
查找过程：
登录学校的图书馆网站，搜索内容限定为外文文献，对其进行时效性排序，然后下载自己感兴趣的内容，并对其进行翻译。
困惑：
1.哪怕使用了学校图书馆网址，阅览和下载外文文献还是要自己用梯子翻墙显得很不方便。
2.EBSCO网址上全是英文，阅读起来较慢。
3.翻译的文献太长，自己英文水平有限，导致没有耐心翻译下去，有很多晦涩难懂的学术名词和一大串一大串的人名经常影响自己的阅读进度。