显摆显摆我的原稿昨儿翻译了一页纸，虽然感觉自己说的不是人话，但是，还是再练练吧，万一说说就变成人话了呢...
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Acquisitions
收购
There are four building blocks that add value to Berkshire: (1) sizable stand-alone acquisitions; (2) bolt-on acquisitions that fit with businesses we already own; (3) internal sales growth and margin improvement at our many and varied businesses; and (4) investment earnings from our huge portfolio of stocks and bonds. In this section, we will review 2017 acquisition activity.
有四个部分给伯克希尔增加了价值：
(1) 大规模的独立收购；
(2) 在已有生意上追加的合适的收购；
(3) 在多种生意上的内部销售的增加和利润率的提高；
(4) 债券和股票组合投资的投资获利。
这一部分，我们将回顾2017年度的收购活动。
In our search for new stand-alone businesses, the key qualities we seek are durable competitive strengths; able and high-grade management; good returns on the net tangible assets required to operate the business; opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns; and, finally, a sensible purchase price.
在寻找新的独立的业务时，我们关注的关键点是在长期的有竞争的优势；能够并且高级管理；运营业务时需要的好的回报的真实资产；在有吸引力的回报上的内部增长和合理的购买价格。
That last requirement proved a barrier to virtually all deals we reviewed in 2017, as prices for decent, but far from spectacular, businesses hit an all-time high. Indeed, price seemed almost irrelevant to an army of optimistic purchasers.
最后一点要求证明了我们在2017年回顾的所有虚拟交易的障碍，合理的价格，但是还不够惊人，不是历史最高纪录的业务。的确，价格似乎是乐观买家的不相干的敌人。
Why the purchasing frenzy? In part, it’s because the CEO job self-selects for “can-do” types. If Wall Street analysts or board members urge that brand of CEO to consider possible acquisitions, it’s a bit like telling your ripening teenager to be sure to have a normal sex life.
收购为何如此恐慌？在某一方面，是因为CEO工作本身的“能做”类型。如果华尔街分析或是董事会主张，那么这个类型的CEO就会考虑收购，有点像告诉你一个成熟的青年应该有一个正常的性生活一样。
Once a CEO hungers for a deal, he or she will never lack for forecasts that justify the purchase. Subordinates will be cheering, envisioning enlarged domains and the compensation levels that typically increase with corporate size. Investment bankers, smelling huge fees, will be applauding as well. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.) If the historical performance of the target falls short of validating its acquisition, large “synergies” will be forecast. Spreadsheets never disappoint.
一旦某个CEO急于某个交易，那么他或她将会缺乏关于调整收购的合理预判。下属将会欢呼，期待扩大地盘和修正补偿水平，这将会使公司规模扩大。投资银行家也看到了巨大的费用，并会鼓掌欢迎。（不要问理发师自己是否该理发了。）
如果目标的历史表现下滑未能验证它的收购，巨大的“协同”将会被预见。电子表格是不会让人失望的。
The ample availability of extraordinarily cheap debt in 2017 further fueled purchase activity. After all, even a high-priced deal will usually boost per-share earnings if it is debt-financed. At Berkshire, in contrast, we evaluate acquisitions on an all-equity basis, knowing that our taste for overall debt is very low and that to assign a large portion of our debt to any individual business would generally be fallacious (leaving aside certain exceptions, such as debt dedicated to Clayton’s lending portfolio or to the fixed-asset commitments at our regulated utilities). We also never factor in, nor do we often find, synergies.
在2017年的充足的可利用的出奇便宜的债券进一步推动了收购活动。毕竟，即使一个高价的交易通常也会提高每股的收益，如果它是财政债券的话。在伯克希尔，正相反，我们在一个全部权益基础之上评估收购，因为我们知道整体债务非常低并且分配一大部分我们的债务给任何一个个体的业务将会是非常荒谬的（抛开某些例外，例如克莱顿债务组合或是）。我们从不计算协同效应，也不经常发现协同效应。
Our aversion to leverage has dampened our returns over the years. But Charlie and I sleep well. Both of us believe it is insane to risk what you have and need in order to obtain what you don’t need. We held this view 50 years ago when we each ran an investment partnership, funded by a few friends and relatives who trusted us. We also hold it today after a million or so “partners” have joined us at Berkshire.
在过去这些年，由于我们厌恶举债经营，已经抑制了回报。但是克莱尔和我睡的很安心。我们两个都相信冒险获得你已经有却不需要的东西是愚蠢的。我们从50年前坚持这个观念，那时我们各自经营一个由一些朋友和相信我们的人创建的投资团体。在能够赚100亿或是有很多伙伴加入了伯克希尔的今天，我们依旧坚守着这个观点。
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