Economist《经济学人》20220108封面文章
How to talk to Mr Putin
如何与普京先生对话
Russia’s aggression towardsUkraine has created a chance to enhance the security of Europe
俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略为加强欧洲的安全创造了机会
It is usually a bad sign if talks start with one side brandishing a gun. And so it may prove when Russian diplomats meet their North American and European peers next week, backed by 100,000 troops poised to invade Ukraine. At stake is the future of a country that increasingly sees itself as part of the West, as well as America’s role as the anchor of European security. As the crisis comes to a head, the risk of miscalculation is growing.
如果谈判开始时一方挥舞着枪，这通常是一个不好的信号。下周，俄罗斯外交官将在10万大军准备随时入侵乌克兰的支持下，会见北美和欧洲的同行，这一点将会得到证明。与这场会见利害攸关的是，这个越来越将自己视为西方一部分的国家（乌克兰）的未来，以及美国作为欧洲安全的支柱的角色。随着危机的临近，误判的风险越来越大。
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has already issued his demands for the talks,which will kick off between Russia and America in Geneva on January 10th, move to Brussels for the nato-Russia Council two days later and wrap up at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on January 13th. Mr Putin wants nato to forswear all further expansion—everywhere, and not just in Ukraine and Georgia, two former Soviet states. America must no longer protect its allies with tactical nuclear weapons and short and medium-range missiles. And Russia wants, in effect, a veto over troop deployments and exercises in the eastern parts of nato territory and over military cooperation with all former Soviet countries.
俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京已经提出了会谈的要求，会谈将于 1 月 10 日在日内瓦开始，先是俄罗斯和美国之间的会谈，两天后换到布鲁塞尔的北约-俄罗斯理事会，并于1月13日在欧洲安全与合作组织框架下结束。普京希望北约放弃所有进一步的扩张--在任何地方，而不仅仅是在乌克兰和格鲁吉亚这两个前苏联国家。 美国必须不再用战术核武器和中短程导弹保护其盟友。 实际上，俄罗斯想要在北约东部地区的军队部署和演习，以及北约与所有前苏联国家的军事合作等事项上拥有否决权。
Many of these demands are so extra-vagantand so detrimental to Europe’s security that they may really be an ultimatum drafted to be rejected,creating a pretext for another invasion of Ukraine. If Mr Putin is indeed bent on going to war, he will. However, robust
diplomacy could yet give him pause and help stop the long decay of relations between Russia and the West. Even if talks fail, nato could emerge stronger,more united and clearer about the threat it faces.
这些要求中的许多如此不切实际，对欧洲安全如此有害，以至于它们可能真的是被刻意炮制的用来被拒绝的最后通牒，作为再次入侵乌克兰借口。 如果普京先生真的一心要开战，他会的。 然而，强有力的外交仍然可以让他暂停下来，并有助于遏制俄罗斯与西方关系的长期衰退。 即使谈判失败，北约也可能变得更强大、更团结、更清楚它面临的威胁。
Be in no doubt that Mr Putin has
brought on this crisis. Perhaps he wants Ukraine to fail because, were it to
become a thriving democracy, it would stand as a rebuke to his claim that Western
values are unworkable in Orthodox, Slavic Russia. He may also intend to divide and
weaken nato as well as to create an enemy abroad so as to justify repression at
home—as with Memorial, a civil rights group, shut down just before the new year
on the trumped-up charge of being a “foreign agent”. And Mr Putin has come to
regret the security arrangements that Russia freely signed up to after the cold
war. Today, he believes, Russia is stronger and America is declining and
distracted by the challenge from China. For whatever reason, he seems in a hurry
to establish his legacy by renewing Russia’s sphere of influence.
毫无疑问，这场危机是普京一手造成的。也许他希望乌克兰失败，因为如果它成为一个繁荣的民主国家，这将成为对他所声称的西方价值观在正统的斯拉夫俄罗斯行不通的一种驳斥。他可能还打算分裂和削弱北约，同时在国外建立一个敌人，以证明国内的镇压是正当的——就像民权组织“纪念馆”(Memorial)一样，该组织在新年前因被捏造为“外国代理人”的指控而关闭。普京也开始对俄罗斯在冷战后慷慨签署的安全协议感到后悔。他认为，如今俄罗斯更强大了，而美国正在衰落，并被来自中国的挑战分散了注意力。不管出于什么原因，他似乎急于通过重塑俄罗斯的势力范围来确立自己的政治遗产。
Some things are in his favour. He has the aggressor’s advantage, controlling the timetable and the scope of an attack,should there be one. Everyone knows that Ukraine matters more to him than to any nato country, which means that the West will not send troops to defend it.
有些事情对他有利。他有侵略者的优势，如果需要的话，他可以控制进攻的时间和范围。每个人都知道乌克兰对他来说比任何一个北约国家都重要，这意味着西方不会派遣军队去保卫它。
But not everything is going his way. Ukraine is as populous as Iraq. Although Russia’s forces should be able to defeat it in battle,holding swathes of territory there could come at a high price, especially if the Ukrainians mounted an insurgency.And in Kazakhstan, on Russia’s southern border, Mr Putin is being asked to help crush a popular uprising—a distraction and awkward proof of his willingness to oppress. For these reasons, he may have to curb his ambitions and, say, seize enclaves around Donetsk that are already controlled by Russian backed irregulars, or establish a land bridge to Crimea, which he annexed in 2014. His doubts about how far to go can be exploited.
但并非一切都如他所愿。乌克兰和伊拉克一样人口众多。虽然俄罗斯的军队应该能够在战斗中击败它，但在那里获得大片领土可能会付出高昂的代价，特别是如果乌克兰人发动叛乱。在俄罗斯南部边境的哈萨克斯坦，普京先生被要求帮助镇压一场民众起义--这是个意外的烦恼，以及他镇压意愿的尴尬证明。出于这些原因，他可能不得不遏制自己的野心，例如，夺取顿涅茨克周围已经由俄罗斯支持的非正规部队控制的飞地，或者建一座通往克里米亚的陆桥，后者于2014年被他吞并亚。他究竟想干到什么地步，这问题值得深思。
Mr Putin’s other problem is that his aggression has united nato and given it new purpose.His ultimatum, combined with his willingness to see prices of Russian gas surge in Europe in 2021, has cut the ground from under those arguing for closer ties to the Kremlin. America has helped galvanise Europeans, by sharing detailed intelligence about huge numbers of troops massing near the Ukrainian border.
普京的另一个问题是，他的侵略行为让北约团结起来，并赋予了它新的目标。他的最后通牒，加上他希望看到俄罗斯天然气价格在2021年在欧洲飙升的意愿，让那些主张与克里姆林宫建立更紧密关系的人毫无立足之地。美国通过共享大量关于集结在乌克兰边境的军队的详细情报，帮助刺激了欧洲人。
The West should have two objectives in next week’s talks: to deter war in Ukraine if possible, and to enhance European security. Stopping a Russian invasion involves the threat of severe economic sanctions, as well as aid and defensive weapons to help make Ukraine indigestible. At the same time, the West can seek to reassure Mr Putin by clearly stating that, although Russia has no formal veto over who joins nato, neither Ukraine nor Georgia is about to become a member.
西方在下周的会谈中应该有两个目标：如果可能的话，阻止乌克兰的战争，以及加强欧洲的安全。阻止俄罗斯入侵的办法包括威胁实施严厉的经济制裁，以及提供援助和防御性武器，以把乌克兰变得难以消化。同时，西方为了让普京先生放心，可以明确声明，虽然俄罗斯对谁加入北约没有正式的否决权，但乌克兰和格鲁吉亚都不会成为北约成员。
Done right, the second aim, of enhancing Europe’s security, can also lower tensions over Ukraine. Although some Russian demands would leave Europe vulnerable, others could be the basis for talks that benefit both sides.Consider a regional agreement about the deployment of missile forces or confidence-building measures to make exercises less threatening. There is no shortage of things to discuss, from the Arctic to cyber security, to new missile technologies. Negotiations would be drawnout,such is the mistrust between the two sides, but that might be no bad thing, because they could turn into a useful forum.
如果处理得当，第二个目标，即加强欧洲的安全，也可以降低乌克兰的紧张局势。虽然俄罗斯的一些要求会使欧洲变得脆弱，但其他要求可以成为有利于双方的谈判基础。可以考虑就导弹部队的部署或建立互信措施达成区域性协议，以减少演习的威胁性。从北极到网络安全，再到新的导弹技术，有许多可讨论的内容。谈判将是漫长的，因为双方之间存在不信任，但这可能不是坏事，因为它们可能变成一个有用的论坛。
The question is not whether such talks are possible—they are clearly in Russia’s interest—but whether Mr Putin really wants them.He has often behaved as if Russia’s security depends on making the West feel less safe. However, negotiations would enhance his status as a world leader. By circumscribing the domains of military competition, they might also help him cope with the fact that Russia cannot begin to match the combined resources of the West.
问题不在于这种会谈是否可能--它们显然符合俄罗斯的利益--而在于普京先生是否真的想要谈。他经常表现得好像俄罗斯的安全取决于让西方感到不那么安全。然而，谈判将提高他作为世界领袖的地位。通过限定军事竞争的领域，谈判也可能帮助他应对这样一个事实，即俄罗斯无法开始与西方的综合资源相匹敌。
The profound doubts about Mr Putin’s real intentions mean that, even if talks begin, nato needs to demonstrate that it is prepared to defend its members. The most vulnerable are the Baltic states. After Russia seized Crimea, nato’s western powers started to rotate more troops in the east. Because of Russia’s threats,credible preparations for enhancing those rotation sought to begin immediately. Even if Ukraine is not about to join nato, Russia is driving Sweden and Finland towards membership. The alliance should be ready to welcome them. Throughout, America should ensure that deals are never struck above European countries’ heads: that is Russia’s style.
对普京先生真正意图的深刻怀疑意味着，即使开始谈判，北约也需要证明它准备保卫其成员。最脆弱的是波罗的海国家。在俄罗斯夺取克里米亚之后，北约的西方大国开始在东部地区轮换更多的军队。由于俄罗斯的威胁，应该立即开始为加强这些轮调进行可靠的准备。即使乌克兰不打算加入北约，俄罗斯也在迫使瑞典和芬兰加入。联盟应该准备好欢迎他们。从始至终，美国应该确保交易永远不会在欧洲国家的头上达成：那是俄罗斯的风格。
Mr Putin says that his country is
threatened. It is not. nato is a defensive alliance. Even after Crimea, it has held back from putting permanent combat forces into eastern Europe. The real threatis Mr Putin. When he issues his demands down the barrel of a gun, it should stiffen the resolve both of the West and of the resilient Ukrainians to deter and resist him.
普京先生说，他的国家受到了威胁。实际并非如此。北约是一个防御性联盟。即使在克里米亚事件之后，它也没有向东欧投入永久性作战部队。真正的威胁是普京先生。当他用枪杆子提出要求时，西方国家和顽强的乌克兰人都应该下定决心阻止和抵制他。