A Reminder:
提醒
In my letter of January 24, 1962 reporting on 1961, I inserted a section entitled. "And a Prediction." While I have no desire to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon my readers, nevertheless, a reprinting of that section, in its entirety, may be worthwhile:
在我1962年一月写的1961年股东信中，有一个章节是关于预测的。尽管有的读者已经看过，但是我还是觉得有必要将那一章节再原封不动地写在下面：
Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.
忠实的读者会觉得谈论未来不是我的风格。因此我一直回避预测并且以正常思维来思考。
I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.
我当然也无法预测未来一两年的股票市场或者公司业务的走势。
I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.
相信你们也肯定未来十年会有几年整体市场上涨20%或者25%也有几年有相似的跌幅，而大多数时间是在这个之间震荡。我对于他们发生的顺序毫无概念而且作为长期投资者这个并不重要。
Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.
长期来看，我相信道琼斯指数会带来5%-7%的收益率，这包括股利和股价的上涨。尽管有近年来市场上涨的经历，但任何市场还能涨更多的期望都会化为泡影。
Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.
我们的工作就是经年累月地累积超过道指的收益，并不在意某一年收益的绝对高低。我会觉得某一年道指下跌了25%而我们下跌15%的表现要优于两者都上涨了20%。我曾当面和我的合伙人们阐述这个观点并且看他们以不同程度的兴奋点头同意。对我来说你们赞同是最重要的，需要各位合伙人完全全身心的赞同！
For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
根据上文我叙述的投资方法，我们战胜道指的最佳时机就是在熊市或者市场平稳的时候。这时，我们所拥有的优势就会体现出来。也许有几年我们的基金会被道指超过，但是长期平均下来会高于10%，而我相信这是个不错的结果。
Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.
特别是如果市场在一年中下跌了35%-40%（我觉得这每十年会发生一次，只是没人知道是在哪一年），我们应该会有15%-20%的跌幅。在平稳的一年，我希望会有10%的涨幅。如果整体市场上涨了20%或者更多，我们只能争取与之持平。按照这个比率计算，长期下来如果道指有5%-7%的YOY，我们的涨幅应该在15%-17%。
The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!
上述预期听起来可能有些草率，但我相信计算无误，至于是在1965年还是1970年达到就不得而知了。也许我是错的，不过合伙人有权利知道我关于未来的看法，即便预测生意本来就会有很大偏差。任意一年的结果和预测差别都会很大，比如1961年，只不过这个偏差是好的方面。但事情不会总这么顺利的。
The First Half of 1962:
Between yearend 1961 and June 30, 1962 the Dow declined from 731.14 to 561.28. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately $11.00 would have been received so that overall a loss of 21.7% would have been the result of investing in the Dow. For the statistical minded, Appendix A gives the results of the Dow by years since formation of the predecessor partnerships.
从1961年底到1962年六月30日，道指从731.14降到561.28。 所以在这段时间持有道指的人，算上$11的股利，应该有21.7% 的回撤。所为统计目的，附录A给了合伙企业成立以来道琼斯指数每年的涨跌情况。
As stated above, a declining Dow gives us our chance to shine and pile up the percentage advantages which, coupled with only an average performance during advancing markets, will give us quite satisfactory long-term results. Our target is an approximately 1/2% decline for each 1% decline in the Dow and if achieved, means we have a considerably more conservative vehicle for investment in stocks than practically any alternative.
正如上文所述，道琼斯指数的下跌能够让我们实现超越并且通过在牛市和市场水平持平的情况下，累积长期战胜指数的资本。目标是在指数每下跌1%，我们只会有0.5%的回撤。如果达到这个目标足以证明我们的投资方法比任何其他的投资更稳健。
As outlined in Appendix B, showing combined predecessor partnership results, during the first half of 1962 we had one of the best periods in our history, achieving a minus 7.5% result before payments to partners, compared to the minus 21.7% overall result on the Dow. This 14.2 percentage points advantage can be expected to widen during the second half if the decline in the general market continues, but will probably narrow should the market turn upward. Please keep in mind my continuing admonition that six-months' or even one-year's results are not to be taken too seriously. Short periods of measurement exaggerate chance fluctuations in performance. While circumstances contributed to an unusually good first half, there are bound to be periods when we do relatively poorly. The figures for our performance involve no change in the valuation of our controlling interest in Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company, although developments in recent months point toward a probable higher realization.
本文附录B中展示的是合伙企业所有往期的投资表现。1962年上半年是我们历史上表现最好的时期，-7.5%（支付合伙人股利前）VS 道琼斯21.7%的回撤。如果市场下半年持续下跌，这14.2%收益差距有可能在继续加大，但是也有可能伴随着反弹缩小。请谨记我不断所说的，不要太在意半年或者一年的投资表现。用短期的结果来衡量很容易夸大结果。虽然上半年的表现出乎意料地好，我们将来肯定会有做的相对差的时期。我们投资收益并未将控股公司Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company（DMMC）净值变化考虑进去，虽然这几个月努力让该公司更值钱了。
Investment Companies during the First Half:
上半年其他投资公司
Past letters have stressed our belief that the Dow is no pushover as a yardstick for investment performance. To the extent that funds are invested in common stocks, whether the manner of investment be through investment companies, investment counselors, bank trust departments, or do-it-yourself, our belief is that the overwhelming majority will achieve results roughly comparable to the Dow. Our opinion is that the deviations from the Dow are much more likely to be toward a poorer performance than a superior one.
之前的股东信已经让我们相信道琼斯指数可以作为衡量投资表现的标尺而且很难超越。只要是投资在股票市场，无论是通过投资公司，投资顾问，银行信托部门或者自己投资，我们相信总体的收益应该基本和道指持平。相信这些投资的表现大多要逊于道指。
To illustrate this point, we have continually measured the Dow and limited partners' results against the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) following a program of common stock investment and the two largest closed-end investment companies. The tabulation in Appendix C shows the five -years' results, and you will note the figures are extraordinarily close to those of the Dow. These companies have total assets of about $3.5 billion.
为了证明这个观点，将我们合伙公司，道指，最大的两家开放式投资股票的共同基金和两家最大的封闭式投资基金的组合收益进行横向对比。附录C展示了五年的投资收益对比，你会发现这个收益率和道指非常相近。这些公司的总资产将近35亿美金。
In the interest of getting this letter out promptly, we are mailing it before results are available for the closed-end companies. However, the two mutual funds both did poorer than the Dow, with Massachusetts Investors Trust having a minus 23% overall performance, and Investors Stock Fund realizing a minus 25.4%. This is not unusual as witness the lead article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL of June 13, 1962 headed "Funds vs. Market.” Of the 17 large common stock funds studied, everyone had a record poorer than the Dow from the peak on the Dow of 734, to the date of the article, although in some cases the margin of inferiority was minor. Particularly hard hit in the first half were the so-called “growth” funds which, almost without exception, were down considerably more than the Dow. The three large "growth" (the quotation marks are more applicable now) funds with the best record in the preceding few years, Fidelity Capital Fund, Putnam Growth Fund, and Wellington Equity Fund averaged an overall minus 32.3% for the first half. It is only fair to point out that because of their excellent records in 1959-61, their overall performance to date is still better than average, as it may well be in the future. Ironically, however, this earlier superior performance had caused such a rush of new investors to come to them that the poor performance this year was experienced by very many more holders than enjoyed the excellent performance of earlier years. This experience tends to confirm my hypothesis that investment performance must be judged over a period of time with such a period including both advancing and declining markets. There will continue to be both; a point perhaps better understood now than six months ago.
为了让各位合伙人尽快收到这封信，我们在封闭式基金公布他们收益之前寄出了这封信。然而，两只共同基金表现逊于道指，Massachusetts Investors Trust 总体收益是-23%，Investors Stock Fund 收益是-25.4%。正如在1962 年 6 月 13 日《华尔街日报》的头条文章标题为“基金与市场”中提到的，这并不罕见。文中研究的17家股票基金的收益表现（从道指创纪录地734高点截止到发文日），每一家的表现都创纪录地逊于道指（尽管在某些情况下劣势很小）。上半年所谓的“成长型”基金收到了重创，收益要远远逊于道指。三家最大的“成长”型基金（这里的引号似乎更加适用）在前几年拥有创纪录的收益，Fidelity Capital Fund, Putnam Growth Fund 和 Wellington Equity Fund 在上半年缩水了32.3%。需要公平地指出由于他们在1959年和1961年出色的收益，他们总体的收益仍好于平均水平。讽刺的是，正是之前的超额收益让更多投资新手对他们趋之若鹜。从而让今年的大幅回撤的受害者要远远多于享受到之前超额收益的人数。这个事实更加证明了我关于评价基金需要同时包含牛熊周期的假说。熊市牛市永远共存，相信这一点在要比六个月前更好理解。
In outlining the results of investment companies, I do so not because we operate in a manner comparable to them or because our investments are similar to theirs. It is done because such funds represent a public batting average of professional, highly-paid investment management handling a very significant $20 billion of securities. Such management, I believe, is typical of management handling even larger sums. As an alternative to an interest in the partnership, I believe it reasonable to assume that many partners would have investments managed similarly.
之所以我总结这些这些投资公司的收益，并不是因为我们运作的方法和他们具有可比性或者有相似的投资。这么做是因为这些共同基金很好地代表了那些专业，收取高额佣金的投资管理公司如何管理总量超过200亿美元的股票的。我相信即便资金再多，他们的管理方法应该也没有什么区别。作为投资我们合伙公司的其他选择，我相信有很多合伙人应该也有类似的投资。
Asset Values:
资产价值
The above calculations of results are before allocation to the General Partner and monthly payments to partners. Of course, whenever the overall results for the year are not plus 6% on a market value basis (with deficiencies carried forward) there is no allocation to the General Partner. Therefore, non-withdrawing partners have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first six months of 7.5% and partners who have withdrawn at the rate of 6% per annum have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first half of 10.5%. Should our results for the year be less than plus 6% (and unless there should be a material advance in the Dow, this is very probable) partners receiving monthly payments will have a decrease in their market value equity at December 31, 1962. This means that monthly payments at 6% on this new market equity next year will be on a proportionately reduced basis. For example, if our results were an overall minus 7% for the year, a partner receiving monthly payments who had a market value interest of 100,000 on January 1, 1962 would have an equity at December 31, 1962 of 87,000. This reduction would arise from the minus 7% result, or 7, 000 plus monthly payments of 500 for an additional 6,000. Thus, with 87,000 of market equity on January 1, 1963, monthly payments next year would be 435.00.
以上的计算结果都未计算给一般合伙人和月付合伙人的股利。当然，如果当年的总体收益没有超过6%，不会给一般合伙人发放股利。因此，对于未撤款的合伙人，上半年的收益是-7.5%；对于撤款的合伙人需要按照6%年利率缴纳管理费用，所以他们的回撤是7.5%+6%*0.5=10.5%。 如果我们今年的收益小于6%（很有可能，除非道指极速上涨），月付合伙人的资产总额在1962年12月31日会有所下降。这意味着明年每个月的股利也会随着总额的降低而缩水。比如当年我们的市值回撤7%，一位合伙人在1962年一月一日的资产总额是100,000, 那么在1962年12月31日他的资产总额将会变为87,000。这个数字来源于7%的亏损：7000加上每个月500的股利总共6000。 因此，来年的股利将以$87,000来计算，每个月的股利将变为435。
None of the above, of course, has any applicability to advance payments received during 1962 which do not participate in profits or losses, but earn a straight 6%.
当然，以上的计算完全不适用于在1962年收到的预付款，他们不会被计算损益而是直接获得6%的利息。
(1) 1957-61汇总了合并前所有合伙企业的收益，扣除了一切支出，但在未包含股利的支付；
(2) 1957-61年的收益基于前一栏计算，并应用了当前的合伙企业条款
(1) 盈利基于资产价值变化并将所有的股利发放计算在内
(2) 从1962年穆迪银行手册上摘录