唧唧堂：AER 美国经济评论2020年1月刊论文摘要
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解析文章首发于唧唧堂网站www.jijitang.com 解析作者 | 唧唧堂经济金融写作小组： 无名 ；审校编辑 | 悠悠1、将周期重新纳入商业周期分析
商业周期主要是指对持续的外来冲击的反应，还是体现出一种强大的内生机制，这种机制导致了周期性的繁荣——萧条现象？在本文中，我们提供了支持第二种解释的证据，并且强调了影响结果的关键因素。倾向于支持对商业周期第二种解释的因素是：（i）略微扩大了与商业周期现象相关的频率窗口；（ii）考虑到由于金融摩擦而产生的各个代理之间的战略互补，（iii）允许估计中存在局部不稳定的稳定状态。
Are business cycles mainly a response to persistent exogenous shocks, or do they instead reflect a strong endogenous mechanism which produces recurrent boom-bust phenomena? In this paper we present evidence in favor of the second interpretation and we highlight the set of key elements that influence our answer. The elements that tend to favor this type of interpretation of business cycles are (i) slightly extending the frequency window one associates with business cycle phenomena, (ii) allowing for strategic complementarities across agents that arise due to financial frictions, and (iii) allowing for a locally unstable steady state in estimation.
参考文献：Beaudry, Paul, Dana Galizia, and Franck Portier.2020.Putting the Cycle Back into Business Cycle Analysis. American Economic Review 110(1):1-47.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190789
2、估计人力资本的生产函数：基于哥伦比亚的一项随机对照试验的结果
我们在哥伦比亚的12个月至24个月大的贫困儿童中抽样调查，研究了对儿童进行随机早期干预导致认知和社会情感技能显著提高的渠道。我们评估了父母对孩子的物质投资和时间投资的决定因素，并评估了医疗水平对这些投资的影响，然后评估了认知和社会情感技能的生产函数。这个研究的效果可以通过增加父母投资来解释，从而强调父母在幼儿时期进行干预的重要性。
We examine the channels through which a randomized early childhood intervention in Colombia led to significant gains in cognitive and socio-emotional skills among a sample of disadvantaged children aged 12 to 24 months at baseline. We estimate the determinants of parents' material and time investments in these children and evaluate the impact of the treatment on such investments. We then estimate the production functions for cognitive and socio-emotional skills. The effects of the program can be explained by increases in parental investments, emphasizing the importance of parenting interventions at an early age.
参考文献：Attanasio, Orazio, Sarah Cattan, Emla Fitzsimons, Costas Meghir, and Marta Rubio-Codina. 2020. "Estimating the Production Function for Human Capital: Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Colombia." American Economic Review, 110 (1): 48-85.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20150183
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3、积极的长期资本税：重新考虑Chamley-Judd的研究结果
根据Chamley-Judd的研究结果，从长远来看，不应对资本征税。在本文中，我们推翻了这一结论，表明该结论并不适用于得出该结论的模型。对于Judd(1985)中的主要模型，我们发现当替代的跨期弹性小于1时，长期资本税具有显著正向影响。对于较高的弹性，税率会逐渐收敛至零，但在数百年的高税率的情况影响下，税率可能会以缓慢的速度收敛。Chamley（1986）的主要模型对资本税施加了上限。我们提供了可以永久约束的条件，这意味着长期征税具有正向作用。如果不是这种情况，则长期资本税可能为零。但是，如果偏好是递归的，并且折扣在本地是不固定的（例如，随着时间的推移不能额外分离），零长期资本税限额必须伴随着零私人财富或零劳动税。最后，我们解释了为什么将积极的资本税与不断增长的消费税等同起来并不能为反对资本税提供坚实的理由。
According to the Chamley-Judd result, capital should not be taxed in the long run. In this paper, we overturn this conclusion, showing that it does not follow from the very models used to derive it. For the main model in Judd (1985), we prove that the long-run tax on capital is positive and significant, whenever the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one. For higher elasticities, the tax converges to zero but may do so at a slow rate, after centuries of high tax rates. The main model in Chamley (1986) imposes an upper bound on capital taxes. We provide conditions under which these constraints bind forever, implying positive long-run taxes. When this is not the case, the long-run tax may be zero. However, if preferences are recursive and discounting is locally nonconstant (e.g., not additively separable over time), a zero long-run capital tax limit must be accompanied by zero private wealth (zero tax base) or by zero labor taxes (first-best). Finally, we explain why the equivalence of a positive capital tax with ever-increasing consumption taxes does not provide a firm rationale against capital taxation.
参考文献：Straub, Ludwig, and Iván Werning. 2020. "Positive Long-Run Capital Taxation: Chamley-Judd Revisited." American Economic Review, 110 (1): 86-119.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20150210
4、质量不确定的创新监管：医疗设备中的信息、风险和可及性
我们研究了管制产品的准入和质量信息要求，对寡头均衡和消费者福利的影响。产品测试可以减少消费者的不确定性，但也增加了商家进入成本并使其延迟进入。利用欧盟和美国医疗器械法规之间的差异，我们从规定更严格的美国学习记录了有价值的模式。为了得出其对消费者福利的影响，我们将数据与供应、需求和测试规则相匹配。在我们的估计模型中，美国的政策使总盈余最大化，而欧盟可以从更多的测试中学习受益。“上市后监督”可能会进一步增加盈余。
We study the impact of regulating product entry and quality information requirements on an oligopoly equilibrium and consumer welfare. Product testing can reduce consumer uncertainty, but also increase entry costs and delay entry. Using variation between EU and US medical device regulations, we document patterns consistent with valuable learning from more stringent US requirements. To derive welfare implications, we pair the data with a model of supply, demand, and testing regulation. US policy is indistinguishable from the policy that maximizes total surplus in our estimated model, while the European Union could benefit from more testing. "Post-market surveillance" could further increase surplus.
参考文献：Grennan, Matthew, and Robert J. Town. 2020. "Regulating Innovation with Uncertain Quality: Information, Risk, and Access in Medical Devices." American Economic Review, 110 (1): 120-61.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20180946
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5、高效的育儿补贴
我们研究了私人市场生产率多样化时，最优福利问题中的托儿补贴的设计。最佳补贴规划在质量上与现有的美国规定相似；在效率上要求对正式的托儿费用进行补贴，向低收入者支付更高的补贴，并且根据托儿支出而有所不同。边际劳动所得税的税率设定若低于劳动税收楔子，则有可能产生负作用的边际税率。我们针对美国劳动力市场的特点对简单模型进行了校准，并重点关注孩子年龄在6岁以下的单身母亲。最优方案对补贴率很高的低收入者，提供了更强的补贴力度和更温和的边际激励，补贴率从非常高的水平开始随着收入的增加而降低的比美国迅速。
We study the design of child care subsidies in an optimal welfare problem with heterogeneous private market productivities. The optimal subsidy schedule is qualitatively similar to the existing US scheme. Efficiency mandates a subsidy on formal child care costs, with higher subsidies paid to lower income earners and a kink as a function of child care expenditure. Marginal labor income tax rates are set lower than the labor wedges, with the potential to generate negative marginal tax rates. We calibrate our simple model to features of the US labor market and focus on single mothers with children aged below 6. The optimal program provides stronger participation but milder intensive margin incentives for low-income earners with subsidy rates starting very high and decreasing with income more steeply than those in the United States.
参考文献：Ho, Christine, and Nicola Pavoni. 2020. "Efficient Child Care Subsidies." American Economic Review, 110 (1): 162-99.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20170581
6、陷入困境：适应印度农村地区的长期失水
不断恶化的环境状况有可能破坏农村脱贫的进展。然而，人们对农民适应这一威胁的前景知之甚少，特别是最近非农业活动带来的收入机会的多样化。我们利用准随机的、由地质决定的地下水获取差异来研究印度日益严重的水资源短缺所带来的影响。水井干涸导致了农业收入和财富的急剧持续下降，几乎没有证据表明农业适应了这种变化。然而，劳动力重新分配到非农岗位，这似乎在维持整体收入方面取得了成功，尤其是在制造业较为发达的地区。
Worsening environmental conditions threaten to undermine progress in reducing rural poverty. Little is known, however, about the prospects for farmer adaptations to mitigate this threat, in particular through opportunities for income diversification presented by recent non-agricultural growth. We study the effects of increasing water scarcity in India using quasi-random, geologically determined differences in access to groundwater. The drying up of wells results in a precipitous and persistent decline in farm income and wealth, with little evidence of agricultural adaptation. However, labor reallocation to off-farm employment appears successful in maintaining overall income, particularly in locations with a more developed manufacturing sector.
参考文献：Blakeslee, David, Ram Fishman, and Veena Srinivasan. 2020. "Way Down in the Hole: Adaptation to Long-Term Water Loss in Rural India." American Economic Review, 110 (1): 200-224.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20180976
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7、扩散游戏
行为和信息通常通过人与人之间的扩散来传播。本文重点介绍了扩散过程如何促进协调。我们研究了离散网络中贝叶斯参与者的传染问题。除了表征采用的程度和速率之外，我们还发现了一个新的效果：当在平衡中可能出现较大的级联时，曝光会传达有关玩家网络位置的信息。这种效果突显了营销活动设计中的一种新型权衡，表明在这种情况下，口碑营销相对更有效。将该模型推广到多类型网络，可以提出一种定向播种的新方法。
Behaviors and information often spread via person-to-person diffusion. This paper highlights how diffusion processes can facilitate coordination. I study contagion in a discrete network with Bayesian players. In addition to characterizing the extent and rate of adoption, we uncover a new effect: when large cascades are possible in equilibrium, exposure conveys information about a player's network position. This effect underscores a novel trade-off in the design of marketing campaigns, suggesting conditions under which word-of-mouth is relatively more effective. A generalization of the model to multi-type networks suggests a new approach to targeted seeding.
参考文献：Sadler, Evan. 2020. "Diffusion Games." American Economic Review, 110 (1): 225-70.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20180601
8、分散协调风险
在一个政权更迭的游戏中，私下知情的特工在不观察其他人之前的行动的情况下，依次决定是否攻击。为了阻止受到攻击，当权者采用了动态信息披露策略，并进行了频繁的生存能力测试。生存能力测试公开披露了该政权是否在先前的袭击中幸免。当这样的测试足够频繁时，在独特的截止平衡中，如果政权通过了最新的测试，则特工不管其私人信号如何都不会发起攻击。我们运用这一理论发现，借方可以通过在不同到期日之间充分分散展期的选择来消除慌乱还款。
In a regime change game, privately informed agents sequentially decide whether to attack without observing others' previous actions. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy, frequent viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the regime has survived the previous attacks. When such tests are sufficiently frequent, in the unique cutoff equilibrium, agents never attack if the regime passes the latest test, regardless of their private signals. We apply this theory to demonstrate that a borrower can eliminate panic-based runs by sufficiently diffusing the rollover choices across different maturity dates.
参考文献：Basak, Deepal, and Zhen Zhou. 2020. "Diffusing Coordination Risk." American Economic Review, 110 (1): 271-97.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20171034
9、行为代理人的最优税收
本文提出了一种行为主体的最优税收理论。我们使用的通用框架涵盖了广泛的误差，例如知觉错误和内在性。我们重新审视了最佳税收的三个支柱：Ramsey（线性商品税以增加收入和重新分配），Pigou（线性商品税以纠正外部性）和Mirrlees（非线性所得税）。我们将说明如何修改规范的最佳税收公式，并带来新颖的经济见解。我们还展示了如何将微调纳入最佳税收框架，并联合刻画最佳税收和微调。
This paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. We use a general framework that encompasses a wide range of biases such as misperceptions and internalities. We revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (linear commodity taxation to correct externalities) and Mirrlees (nonlinear income taxation). We show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to novel economic insights. We also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation framework, and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges.
参考文献：Farhi, Emmanuel, and Xavier Gabaix. 2020. "Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents." American Economic Review, 110 (1): 298-336.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20151079
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