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看到一篇比较直观的解释了SElinux基本概念的文章，为了后面看不再费劲，翻译到下面，为了避免错误的翻译误导读者，所以采用中英文对照方式呈现，纯中文版在这里
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SELinux 直观操作指南
*all cartoons by Máirín Duffy
We are celebrating the SELinux 10th year anversary this year. Hard to believe it. SELinux was first introduced in Fedora Core 3 and later in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4. For those who have never used SELinux, or would like an explanation...
难以置信，到2013年，SELinux已经诞生10年了。起初是Fedora Core 3 引进了SELinux，随后又被Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4引进。值得写篇文章给想要了解SELinux的初学者来庆祝一下...
SELinux is a labeling system. Every process has a label. Every file/directory object in the operating system has a label. Even network ports, devices, and potentially hostnames have labels assigned to them. We write rules to control the access of a process label to an a object label like a file. We call this policy. The kernel enforces the rules. Sometimes this enforcement is called Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
SElinux是一个标签系统。系统中的每个进程、每个文件/目录对象，甚至每个网络端口、设备以及每个可能的主机名都会被打上一个标签。我们用编写标签相关的规则来控制带标签进程访问带标签的资源，比如一个文件。这个规则被称为“策略”。这些规则由kernel来强制执行。一般这种强制执行被称为MAC，即“强制访问控制”。
The owner of an object does not have discretion over the security attributes of a object. Standard Linux access control, owner/group + permission flags like rwx, is often called Discretionary Access Control (DAC). SELinux has no concept of UID or ownership of files. Everything is controlled by the labels. Meaning an SELinux system can be setup without an all powerful root process.
在SELinux中，用户甚至不能对其所拥有的对象自由访问。标准的Linux访问控制模型是基于用户/用户组 + 权限标记如rwx，一般被称为DAC，即“自主访问控制”。SELinux并没有标准Linux访问控制中的UID概念，或文件所属的用户/用户组概念，从而也没有了拥有一切权利的root进程的概念，而是所有操作都由标签控制。
Note: SELinux does not let you side step DAC Controls. SELinux is a parallel enforcement model. An application has to be allowed by BOTH SELinux and DAC to do certain activities. This can lead to confusion for administrators because the process gets Permission Denied. Administrators see Permission Denied means something is wrong with DAC, not SELinux labels.
Note: SELinux并不是要摒弃DAC控制模型。它是一种和DAC控制模型并存的强制执行模型。一个应用要进行操作，必须同时在DAC和MAC模型下取得权限。这种情况下进程操作遇到Permission Denied，可能会给管理员带来困惑，不过SELinux标签导致的问题，并不会出现Permission Denied情况，只有DAC模型下会遇到Permission Denied。
Type enforcement
Lets look a little further into the labels. The SELinux primary model or enforcement is called type enforcement. Basically this means we define the label on a process based on its type, and the label on a file system object based on its type.
基于类型的强制执行
下面来更详细的了解下标签。SELinux中最主要的强制执行模型是基于类型的强制执行模型。简单来说，给进程定义标签要基于这个进程的类型，给文件对象定义标签也要基于其类型。
Analogy
Imagine a system where we define types on objects like cats and dogs. A cat and dog are process types.
类比
想象一个这样的系统，系统中有猫和狗两种对象或称为活物，那么“cat”和“dog”就是这两种活物的类型(type)，在Linux中，就是进程的类型。
We have a class of objects that they want to interact with which we call food. And I want to add types to the food, cat_food and dog_food.
在这个系统中，还有另一种类别(class)的对象，这种对象是非活物，也就是被活物操作或者活物可以与之交互的东西，我们把它定义为“food”，这里的“food”并不是一个对象，而是对象的一个类别(class)。我们还想把这种类别的对象分成两个种类(types)：“cat_chow”和“dog_chow”（译注：原文可能有笔误）。
As a policy writer, I would say that a dog has permission to eat dog_chow food and a cat has permission to eat cat_chow food. In SELinux we would write this rule in policy.
作为策略制定者，我会让一个dog对象（一条狗）有吃种类为“dog_chow” 、类型为“food”的对象（狗粮）的权限，让一个cat对象（一只猫）有吃种类为“cat_chow”、类型为“food”的对象（猫粮）的权限。在SELinux中，这个规则要这样写进“策略”中：
allow cat cat_chow:food eat;
allow dog dog_chow:food eat;
With these rules the kernel would allow the cat process to eat food labeled cat_chow and the dog to eat food labeled dog_chow.
有了上面的规则，kernel才会允许标签为“cat”的进程对带有“cat_chow”标签的“food”类型的对象执行“eat”操作，标签为“dog”的进程对带有“dog_chow”标签的“food”类型的对象执行“eat”操作。
But in an SELinux system everything is denied by default. This means that if the dog process tried to eat the cat_chow, the kernel would prevent it.
但是在SELinux系统中，所有操作默认都是不被允许的。这就意味着，“dog”进程想要去对“cat_chow”标签的“food”做“eat”操作，是会被kernel拒绝的。
Likewise cats would not be allowed to touch dog food.
类似的“cat”类型的进程也不能去对“dog_chow” “food”做“eat”操作。
Real world
We label Apache processes as httpd_t and we label Apache content as httpd_sys_content_t and httpd_sys_content_rw_t. Imagine we have credit card data stored in a mySQL database which is labeled msyqld_data_t. If an Apache process is hacked, the hacker could get control of the httpd_t process and would be allowed to read httpd_sys_content_t files and write to httpd_sys_content_rw_t. But the hacker would not be allowed to read the credit card data (mysqld_data_t) even if the process was running as root. In this case SELinux has mitigated the break in.
实际情况
我们赋予Apache进程httpd_t标签，Apache进程相关内容赋予httpd_sys_content_t和httpd_sys_content_rw_t标签。假设我们的信用卡信息储存在一个赋予msyqld_data_t标签的mySQL数据库中。如果一个Apache进程被入侵，黑客就可以控制httpd_t类型的进程，从而拥有了读取httpd_sys_content_t文件以及写入httpd_sys_content_rw_t文件的权限。但是即使Apache进程是root进程，黑客也无法获得读取信用卡数据(mysqld_data_t)的权限。这种情况下SELinux将黑客入侵的危害降到了最低。
MCS enforcement
Analogy
Above, we typed the dog process and cat process, but what happens if you have multiple dogs processes: Fido and Spot. You want to stop Fido from eating Spot's dog_chow.
MCS强制执行（MCS：多类别安全）
类比
之前，dog进程和cat进程被标签分类，但是如果有多个dog进程，例如Fido 和 Spot，我们要告诉kernel阻止Fido吃Spot的dog_chow又该怎么做呢？
One solution would be to create lots of new types, like Fido_dog and Fido_dog_chow. But, this will quickly become unruly because all dogs have pretty much the same permissions.
一种办法是定义更多新的类型，如定义新的进程类型Fido_dog，以及新的food种类 Fido_dog_chow。但是你很快会发现这样的方法可操作性太差，因为所有的dog类型都需要类似的权限。每个新的dog进程类型都定义一个新的food种类与之对应，是多么令人抓狂的事。
To handle this we developed a new form of enforcement, which we call Multi Category Security (MCS). In MCS, we add another section of the label which we can apply to the dog process and to the dog_chow food. Now we label the dog process as dog:random1 (Fido) and dog:random2 (Spot).
为了处理这种情况，SELinux中有一种新的强制控制模型，称为MCS (Multi Category Security)（多类别安全）。在MCS中，标签中增加了另外的字段，该字段可以同时赋予dog进程和dog_chow food对象。对于两个dog进程设置如下标签：dog:random1（Fido进程）和dog:random2（Spot进程）。
We label the dog chow as dog_chow:random1 (Fido) and dog_chow:random2 (Spot).
对于两个food对象设置如下标签：dog_chow:random1（Fido的food）和 dog_chow:random2（Spot的food）
MCS rules say that if the type enforcement rules are OK and the random MCS labels match exactly, then the access is allowed, if not it is denied.
在MCS规则下，进程要想有权限访问资源，必须首先符合类型强制控制的规则，其次随机的MCS标签要完全匹配，否则访问会被拒绝。
Real world
In computer systems we often have lots of processes all with the same access, but we want them separated from each other. We sometimes call this a multi-tenant environment. The best example of this is virtual machines. If I have a server running lots of virtual machines, and one of them gets hacked, I want to prevent it from attacking the other virtual machines and virtual machine images. But in a type enforcement system the KVM virtual machine is labeled svirt_t and the image is labeled svirt_image_t. We have rules that say svirt_t can read/write/delete content labeled svirt_image_t. With libvirt we implemented not only type enforcement separation, but also MCS separation. When libvirt is about to launch a virtual machine it picks out a random MCS label like s0:c1,c2, it then assigns the svirt_image_t:s0:c1,c2 label to all of the content that the virtual machine is going to need to manage. Finally, it launches the virtual machine as svirt_t:s0:c1,c2. Then, the SELinux kernel controls that svirt_t:s0:c1,c2 can not write to svirt_image_t:s0:c3,c4, even if the virtual machine is controled by a hacker and takes it over. Even if it is running as root.
实际情况：
在计算机系统中，经常有很多进程拥有相同的访问权限的情况，但是我们又想要让其彼此有互相独立的访问权限。这种情况通常被称为多租户环境。最好的例子就是虚拟机系统。例如一台服务器上运行着很多虚拟机，如果其中一个虚拟机被入侵，我们肯定希望其他的虚拟机及其镜像不受这次入侵的影响。但是在基于类型的强制访问系统中，KVM虚拟机是被赋予svirt_t标签的，其镜像被赋予标签svirt_image_t。对应的规则是svirt_t 可以 read/write/delete 有标签svirt_image_t的内容，这样是无法满足前面描述的安全需求的。不过libvirt不仅实现了基于类型的强制访问模型，还实现了MCS机制。当libvirt启动一个虚拟机进程时，该机制会随机生成一个类似于 s0:c1,c2的MCS标签，然后给这台虚拟机将要管理的内容都赋予标签svirt_t:s0:c1,c2标签。最后，该虚拟机进程被赋予了标签：svirt_t:s0:c1,c2。这样，即使拥有root权限的虚拟机（标签为svirt_t:s0:c1,c2）被黑客控制，SELinux kernel也可以拒绝svirt_t:s0:c1,c2标签的进程访问标签为svirt_image_t:s0:c3,c4的内容。
We use similar separation in OpenShift. Each gear (user/app process)runs with the same SELinux type (openshift_t). Policy defines the rules controlling the access of the gear type and a unique MCS label to make sure one gear can not interact with other gears.
Watch this short video on what would happen if an Openshift gear became root.
OpenShift中使用了类似的策略，每个gear（user/app/process）（译注：gear可以认为类似于Linux中的进程概念）以同一个SELinux类型openshift_t运行。策略定义了规则来控制gear类型的访问，并且每个gear都有唯一的MCS标签来保证不同的gear间不会互相发生访问。
这个短视频展示了如果一个Openshift gear变成root权限会发生什么。
MLS enforcement
Another form of SELinux enforcement, used much less frequently, is called Multi Level Security (MLS); it was developed back in the 60s and is used mainly in trusted operating systems like Trusted Solaris.
The main idea is to control processes based on the level of the data they will be using. A *secret *process can not read top secret data.
MLS is very similar to MCS, except it adds a concept of dominance to enforcement. Where MCS labels have to match exactly, one MLS label can dominate another MLS label and get access.
MLS 强制执行模型（多级别安全模型）
另一种SELinux强制执行模型用的比较少，称为MLS(Multi Level Security)强制执行模型；这种模型开发于60年代，主要用于可信操作系统例如Trusted Solaris。
主要思想是基于进程要访问数据的安全级别来进行控制。一个secret级别的进程不能读取top secret级别的数据。
MLS与MCS非常类似，区别主要是MLS中增加了对强制执行策略“支配”的概念。MCS中标签必须完全匹配才能授予权限，而MLS中一个高级别的标签可以支配低级别的标签并且能获得访问权限。
Analogy
Instead of talking about different dogs, we now look at different breeds. We might have a Greyhound and a Chihuahua.
类比
现在用不同种类的dog做类比，注意不是不同名字的dog。比如一个品种是Greyhount，另一个品种是Chihuahua。
We might want to allow the Greyhound to eat any dog food, but a Chihuahua could choke if it tried to eat Greyhound dog food.
我们想要让Greyhound可以吃任何dog food，但是一只Chihuahua dog不能去吃Greyhound dog food，因为这样可能会导致Chihuahua窒息而死。
We want to label the Greyhound as dog:Greyhound and his dog food as dog_chow:Greyhound, and label the Chihuahua as dog:Chihuahua and his food as dog_chow:Chihuahua.
我们给Greyhound赋予标签dog:Greyhound，对应的dog food 赋予标签dog_chow:Greyhound，赋予Chihuahua dog:Chihuahua标签，对应的dog food 赋予dog_chow:Chihuahua标签。
With the MLS policy, we would have the MLS Greyhound label dominate the Chihuahua label. This means dog:Greyhound is allowed to eat dog_chow:Greyhound and dog_chow:Chihuahua.
在MLS策略下，我们让MLS Greyhound 标签支配Chihuahua 标签。这意味着dog:Greyhound 允许吃dog_chow:Greyhound 和 dog_chow:Chihuahua。（译注：可以认为Greyhound的级别比Chihuahua的级别高）
But dog:Chihuahua is not allowed to eat dog_chow:Greyhound.
但是 dog:Chihuahua 却不能吃dog_chow:Greyhound。
Of course, dog:Greyhound and dog:Chihuahua are still prevented from eating cat_chow:Siamese by type enforcement, even if the MLS type Greyhound dominates Siamese.
当然，在基于类型的强制执行模型下，dog:Greyhound和dog:Chihuahua仍然不能去吃cat_chow:Siamese。
Real world
I could have two Apache servers: one running as httpd_t:TopSecret and another running as httpd_t:Secret. If the Apache process httpd_t:Secret were hacked, the hacker could read httpd_sys_content_t:Secret but would be prevented from reading httpd_sys_content_t:TopSecret.
实际情况
我可能有两个Apache服务：进程A以标签httpd_t:TopSecret运行，进程B以httpd_t:Secret运行。如果进程B被入侵，黑客可以读取标签为httpd_sys_content_t:Secret的数据，但是却不能读取标签为httpd_sys_content_t:TopSecret的数据。
However, if the Apache server running httpd_t:TopSecret was hacked, it could read httpd_sys_content_t:Secret data as well as httpd_sys_content_t:TopSecret.
然而，如果进程A被入侵，那么黑客就能同时获取httpd_sys_content_t:Secret和httpd_sys_content_t:TopSecret两种标签下的数据。
We use the MLS in military environments where a user might only be allowed to see secret data, but another user on the same system could read top secret data.
一般情况MLS机制被用于军用环境中，在这种环境中往往有这样的需求：一个用户可能只允许访问秘密级别的数据，但另一个用户在同一个系统中可以访问绝密级别的数据。
Conclusion
SELinux is a powerful labeling system, controlling access granted to individual processes by the kernel. The primary feature of this is type enforcement where rules define the access allowed to a process is allowed based on the labeled type of the process and the labeled type of the object. Two additional controls have been added to separate processes with the same type from each other called MCS, total separtion from each other, and MLS, allowing for process domination.
总结
SELinux是一个强大的标签化系统，由kernel来控制每一个进程对其他资源的访问权限。其中最主要的功能是基于类型的强制执行模型，这种模型由很多策略规则来授予进程的访问权限，其权限是基于进程的标签和进程访问对象的标签。另外还有两种控制模型来隔离相同类型的进程之间的交互，完全互相隔离的模型叫MCS（多类别安全模型），允许有支配关系的模型称为MLS（多级别安全模型）。
原文链接