第三编 货币与银行
第十八章 信用媒介的兑换
概要
The confidence in a bank’s ability to redeem its fiduciary media is an all-or-nothing proposition: if a portion of the community panics and rushes to redeem their claims, then everyone does. By their very nature, fiduciary media cannot all be honored by the bank at once. Consequently, some writers suggest an outright prohibition on the practice. However, historically this requirement would have led to a much larger diversion of resources into the production of the precious metals as the demand for money increased.
对银行赎回其信用媒介能力的信心是一个“要么全有要么全无”的命题：如果一部分社区恐慌并急于赎回其债权，那么每个人都会这么做。就其本质而言，信用媒介不可能一次性全部被银行兑付。因此，一些作者建议彻底禁止这种做法。然而，从历史上看，随着对货币需求的增加，这种需求将导致更多的资源转向贵金属生产。
A bank operating in a competitive environment can only issue as much fiduciary media as its own customers wish to hold, for transactions among themselves. Whenever a bank’s customer seeks to do business with someone outside the clientele of the bank, the customer must convert his claims into money in the narrower sense, because the other person will not wish to accept the bank’s promises to pay.
在竞争激烈的环境中运作的银行只能发行自己客户愿意持有数量的信用媒介，以进行相互之间的交易。当一家银行的客户试图与并非这家银行客户的人做生意时，他必须将其债权转换成狭义货币，因为另一个人不愿意接受这家银行的付款承诺。
Solvency means that an institution (such as a bank) could shut down, sell off all of its assets, and raise at least enough money to pay off all of its creditors. Liquidity is a stronger condition, meaning that the institution’s assets deliver a cash flow allowing it to pay its liabilities on time. If a firm is liquid, it is solvent, but it might be solvent while illiquid. Banks issuing fiduciary media are always illiquid.
偿付能力是指一家机构（例如银行）可以关闭、出售其所有资产，并筹集至少足够偿还所有债权人的货币。流动性是一个更强的条件，意味着该机构的资产提供了现金流，使其能够按时偿还债务。如果一家公司是有流动性的，那么它是有偿付能力的，但它可能是有偿付能力而无流动性的。发行信用媒介的银行总是缺乏流动性的。
Sometimes legislation, but always public opinion, compels the banks to give preference to short-term rather than long-term loans. This is a quite valid preference, backed up by centuries of experience, simply because it limits a bank’s ability to issue fiduciary media.
有时是因为立法，但始终是因为公众舆论，银行被迫优先考虑短期贷款，而不是长期贷款。这是一个非常有效的偏好，并有数百年的经验作为支持，仅仅因为它限制了银行发行信用媒介的能力。
章节大纲
一、货币与货币替代品完全等价的必要性
So long as some people believe that a claim to money issued by a particular institution is absolutely reliable and can be redeemed upon demand, these people may pass such claims among themselves as if they were money. This is what makes them money substitutes. However, the issuing institution must always keep a reserve fund of money in the narrower sense to redeem the claims whenever they are presented, in order to maintain this trust. Such redemptions will be requested whenever the bank’s own clientele wish to use their claims to do business with someone outside the clientele, i.e., a person who does not consider the claim to be a substitute for money in the narrower sense.
只要有人相信某个机构发行的货币债权是绝对可靠的，并且可以应要求赎回，这些人就可以像使用货币一样让这种债权在相互之间流通。这就是使它们成为货币替代品的原因。但是，发行机构必须始终保留狭义货币作为准备金，以便随时应对客户的赎回要求，来维持这种信任。每当银行客户希望利用其债权与并非这家银行客户的人（即不认为其债权是狭义货币替代品的人）做生意时，都会要求进行此类赎回。
二、因持有者信心丧失导致信用媒介返还发行者
The confidence in a bank’s ability to redeem its fiduciary media is an all-or-nothing proposition: if a portion of the community panics and rushes to redeem their claims, then everyone does. By their very nature, fiduciary media cannot all be honored by the bank at once. No matter how wisely a bank manages its assets, it will not be able to pay out money in the narrower sense for all of its outstanding claims, if customers show up en masse and demand redemption—assuming the bank has been issuing fiduciary media.
对银行赎回其信用媒介能力的信心是一个“要么全有要么全无”的命题：如果一部分社区恐慌并急于赎回其债权，那么每个人都会这么做。就其本质而言，信用媒介不可能一次性全部被银行兑付。无论一家银行如何明智地管理其资产，如果客户成群结队地出现并要求赎回（假设该银行已经发行了信用媒介），它将无法为其所有未偿债权支付狭义货币。
三、反对发行信用媒介的论点
Because of the internal contradiction of the nature of fiduciary media—which renders every issuing institution liable to ruin—some writers suggest an outright prohibition on the practice. How- ever, historically this requirement would have led to a much larger diversion of resources into the production of the precious metals as the demand for money increased. The banks could survive even if they were legally required to maintain 100 percent reserves covering all note issues and deposits; it is not consideration for the practice of banking that led legislators to tolerate fiduciary media. Rather, it was the desire to avoid a large increase in the objective exchange value of money (i.e., a general fall in prices of goods and services).
由于信用媒介性质的内在矛盾，使得每一个发行机构都有破产的可能，一些著作者建议彻底禁止这种做法。然而，从历史上看，随着对货币需求的增加，这种需求将导致更多的资源转向贵金属生产。即使法律要求银行保持100%的准备金以覆盖所有的债券发行和存款，银行仍然可以生存。立法者之所以容忍信用媒介，并不是出于对银行业的关心，而是为了避免货币的客观交换价值大幅增加（即商品和服务的价格普遍下跌）。
四、兑现基金
A bank operating in a competitive environment—where its rivals may pursue different policies and where its own clientele is only a fraction of the whole community using the same money—can only issue as much fiduciary media as its own customers wish to hold, for transactions among themselves. Whenever a bank’s customer seeks to do business with someone outside the clientele of the bank, the customer must convert his claims (whether in the form of notes or a checkbook deposit) into money in the narrower sense, because the other person will not wish to accept the bank’s promises to pay.
在竞争环境中运营的银行，其竞争对手可能会采取不同的策略，而其客户仅占使用相同货币的整个社区中的一小部分，它只能发行自己客户愿意持有数量的信用媒介，以进行相互之间的交易。当一家银行的客户试图与并非这家银行客户的人做生意时，他必须将其债权（无论是票据或支票存款的形式）转换成狭义货币，因为另一个人不愿意接受这家银行的付款承诺。
五、信用媒介的所谓“银行业务”类型的准备
Solvency means that an institution (such as a bank) could shut down, sell off all of its assets, and raise at least enough money to pay off all of its creditors. Liquidity is a stronger condition, meaning that the institution’s assets deliver a cash flow allowing it to pay its liabilities on time. If a firm is liquid, it is solvent, but it might be solvent while illiquid.
偿付能力是指一家机构（例如银行）可以关闭、出售其所有资产，并筹集至少足够偿还所有债权人的货币。流动性是一个更强的条件，意味着该机构的资产提供了现金流，使其能够按时偿还债务。如果一家公司是有流动性的，那么它是有偿付能力的，但它可能是有偿付能力而无流动性的。发行信用媒介的银行总是缺乏流动性的。
Some writers suggest that “prudent” banks will invest in short-term assets, in order to remain liquid. Yet by their very nature, banks issuing fiduciary media are illiquid: their liabilities are immediately due if presented, while their assets are necessarily of longer duration. The best such banks can strive for is solvency.
一些著作者建议，“谨慎”的银行将投资于短期资产，以保持流动性。然而，就其本质而言，发行信用媒介的银行是流动性不足的：它们的负债一旦出现就立即到期，而其资产的存续期则必须更长。这些银行所能争取的最好目标是偿付能力。
六、短期准备的意义
Sometimes legislation, but always public opinion, compels the banks to give preference to short-term rather than long-term loans. This is a quite valid preference, backed up by centuries of experience. However, the explanation for its wisdom is not that it allows the banks to redeem fiduciary media in the event of a panic—the bank’s asset maturities are irrelevant if everyone shows up, demanding redemption. The actual benefit from focusing bank loans on short-term investments is simply that the constraint checks the bank’s ability to issue fiduciary media.
有时是因为立法，但始终是因为公众舆论，银行被迫优先考虑短期贷款，而不是长期贷款。这是一个非常有效的偏好，并有数百年的经验作为支持。然而，它之所以明智，并不是因为它可让银行在恐慌的情况下赎回信用媒介——如果每个人都出现并要求赎回的话，银行的资产期限就无关紧要了。将银行贷款集中于短期投资上的实际好处仅仅是这种约束限制了银行发行信用媒介的能力。
七、信用发行银行投资的保证
There is similar confusion when it comes to proposals seeking to guarantee the (eventual) redemption of all fiduciary media by means of reserve funds consisting of illiquid assets (such as mortgages). Even if the public is certain that they will be eventually paid in money (in the narrower sense) for the claims to money that they currently hold, even so, if there is any doubt about the immediacy of the payment, then the claims will no longer be money substitutes. Instead, the public will take into account the delay before receiving payment, and such claims will trade at a discount to the money itself. (Note that if the claims continue to circulate as generally accepted media of exchange, even though everyone knows that redemption at best will occur after some delay, then the claims will have become credit money.)
在寻求通过由非流动资产（如抵押贷款）组成的准备基金担保所有信用媒介的（最终）赎回的提案中，也存在类似的困惑。即使公众确信他们目前持有的货币债权最终会以货币（狭义上）的方式获得兑付，即便如此，如果对付款的及时性有任何怀疑，那么这些债权将不再是货币替代品。相反，公众会考虑到在收到付款之前的延迟，这样的债权将以相对于货币本身有所折价的价格进行交易。（请注意，如果债权继续作为普遍接受的交换媒介流通，即使每个人都知道充其量赎回只会在延迟一段时间后发生，那么债权将成为信用货币。）
八、以外国汇票作为兑现基金的一部分
A bank cannot increase its issue of money substitutes (consisting of both money certificates and fiduciary media) beyond the demand of its own clientele, for use in their dealings with each other. However, to the extent that sometimes its clients need to exchange their money substitutes when dealing with foreign citizens, the bank has the option of keeping some of its reserve fund in the form of foreign money substitutes, as opposed to money in the narrower sense. (This is because the foreigners with whom the bank’s clients wish to do business, will accept money substitutes issued by institutions from their respective countries.) Yet this practice means that the original bank’s reserve fund has a smaller proportion of money in the narrower sense, and hence that its own money substitutes consist of a higher fraction of fiduciary media (versus money certificates).
银行不能超出其客户的需求来增发货币替代品（包括货币凭证和信用媒介），以供其客户在相互交易中使用。但是，由于客户在与外国公民打交道时有时需要兑换其货币替代品，银行可以选择以外国货币替代品而不是狭义货币的形式保留部分准备金。（这是因为银行客户希望与之开展业务的外国人愿意接受各自国家机构发行的货币替代品。）然而这一做法意味着，银行原始的准备金中狭义货币所占的比例较小，因此，它自己的货币替代品中包括更高比例的信用媒介（相对于货币证书）。
技术说明
In modern times, one of the major controversies within the Austrian School concerns the legitimacy of fractional reserve banking. Some Austrians follow Murray Rothbard who argued that bank issuance of fiduciary media leads to the boom-bust cycle and is inherently fraudulent—akin to a warehouse manager renting out the goods that were supposedly placed with him for safekeeping. Other Austrians such as George Selgin and Steve Horwitz call their position “free banking” and believe that there is no reason for banks to necessarily keep 100 percent reserves of money in the narrower sense, in order to fully cover all outstanding customer deposits. The free bankers argue that market forces will determine the proper ratio of money certificates to fiduciary media in a competitive banking system. (Virtually all modern Austrians agree that government-sponsored central banking and fiat currency are both economically destructive and morally illegitimate. The dispute concerns the proper practice of private banks operating in a laissez-faire environment.)
在现代，奥地利学派内部的一个重要争论是部分准备金银行的合法性。一些奥派成员追随默里·罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）的观点，他认为，银行发行信用媒介会导致经济繁荣与萧条的周期，而且本质上是欺诈性的，就像仓库经理把原本应该保管在他那里的货物出租一样。其他奥派成员，如乔治·塞尔金（George Selgin）和史蒂夫·霍维茨（Steve Horwitz）则将他们的立场称为“自由银行制度”，并认为银行没有必要保留100%狭义货币准备金，以完全覆盖所有未偿付的客户存款。自由银行派认为，在竞争激烈的银行体系中，市场力量将决定货币凭证与信用媒介的适当比例。（几乎所有现代奥派学者都认为，政府支持的中央银行和法定货币在经济上具有破坏性，在道德上也是不合法的。）这个争论涉及到私人银行在自由放任环境下运营的正确做法。）
Continuing with the above note, both groups point to passages in Mises’s writings to lend credence to their position. Even within this very chapter, Mises offers statements that—viewed in isolation—would seem to definitively side with one camp versus the other. (Two of these quotations are the opening selections for the study questions below.) Although Mises agrees with the Rothbardian, 100-percent-reserve camp that there is a paradox in the very nature of what fiduciary media claim to be, on the other hand he also agrees with the free bankers that the historical development of fiduciary media economized on resources (that would have otherwise gone into the socially wasteful production of more gold and silver for monetary purposes). Thus Mises does not clearly fall into one camp or the other. (Of course Mises’s own view wouldn’t settle the modern dispute: he could have been simply mistaken, regardless of his position.)
继续上面的说明，两派都引用米塞斯著作中的段落，以证明他们的立场是可信的。即使在这一章中，米塞斯所提供的陈述（孤立地看）似乎也肯定会支持一个阵营而反对另一个。（其中两段引文是下面研究问题的开篇选择。）尽管米塞斯同意罗斯巴德的观点，如100%准备金阵营认为的，信用媒介所宣称的性质本身存在悖论，但另一方面，他也同意自由银行阵营的观点，即历史上信用媒介的发展节约了资源（否则会浪费社会资源生产更多的黄金和白银用于货币目的）。因此，米塞斯并没有明显地落入一个阵营或另一个。（当然，米塞斯自己的观点并不能解决现代的争论：无论他的立场如何，他完全可能是错的。）
新术语
Free banking (among modern Austrians): The doctrine holding that a free market in banking will pick the optimal fraction of reserves, which may be below 100 percent. Free banking theorists do not believe that the issue of fiduciary media per se causes the business cycle, only that excess quantities of fiduciary media do, and that such an outcome is almost always associated with government-supported issues of fiduciary media.
自由银行制度（在现代奥地利学派中）：该理论认为，银行业内的的自由市场将选择最佳的准备金比例，该比例可能低于100％。自由银行理论家认为，信用媒介问题本身并不会导致商业周期，超额发行信用媒介才会导致商业周期，而这种结果几乎总是与政府支持下发行的信用媒介相关。Solvency: The situation in which the market value of an institution’s assets exceeds its liabilities.
偿付能力：指机构资产的市场价值超过其负债的情况。Liquidity: The situation in which an institution’s assets will deliver a cash flow allowing it to pay its liabilities on time. (All liquid enterprises are also solvent, but not necessarily vice versa.)
流动性：一家机构的资产能提供现金流，使其能够按时偿还债务的情况。（有流动性的企业必然偿付能力，但有偿付能力的企业未必有流动性。）Cash flow: The stream of money payments over time due to an asset or collection of assets.
现金流：一段时间内，由某项资产或资产组合而产生的货币支付流动。Hypothecary loans: Loans granted with an asset such as real estate serving as collateral.
抵押贷款：以房地产等资产作为抵押的贷款。
研究问题
Explain: “Thus there lies an irresolvable contradiction in the nature of fiduciary media. Their equivalence to money depends on the promise that they will at any time be converted into money at the demand of the person entitled to them and on the fact that proper precautions are taken to make this promise effective. But—and this is likewise involved in the nature of fiduciary media—what is promised is an impossibility in so far as the bank is never able to keep its loans perfectly liquid.” (p. 322)
解释：“因此，信用媒介的本质存在着无法解决的矛盾。它们是否等价于货币，取决于保证在有权享有者的要求下随时将其兑换为货币的承诺，以及采取适当的预防措施使这一承诺生效的事实。 但是，这也同样涉及信用媒介的性质，只要银行无法保持其贷款的完美流动性，就不可能做到这一点。”（英文版第322页）Explain: “The issue of fiduciary media has made it possible to avoid the convulsions that would be involved in an increase in the objective exchange value of money, and reduced the cost of the monetary apparatus.” (p. 323)
解释：“信用媒介的问题使人们能够避免因货币的客观交换价值增加而引起的动荡，并降低了货币工具的成本。”（英文版第323页）When Mises says of coins that their “smooth faces tell no tales of the methods by which they have been acquired,” is he making an argument for or against the possibility of customers paying banks for providing them with (fully-backed) deposit and checkbook services? (p. 324)
当米塞斯谈到硬币时，他说它们“光滑的表面并不能说明它们是通过什么方法获得的”，他是支持还是反对以下这种可能性：客户付款给银行，以获得银行为其提供（完全准备金的）存款和支票服务？（英文版第324页）Why does Mises say that a single bank with no competitors, or an industry of banks operating with uniform policies, would suffer no limitations on their ability to issue fiduciary media? (pp. 325–26)
为什么米塞斯说，一家没有竞争对手的银行，或实行统一政策的银行业，其发行信用媒介的能力不受任何限制？（英文版第325-326页）Explain: “Whether the assets of a credit-issuing bank consist of short-term bills or of hypothecary loans remains a matter of indifference in the case of a general run.” (p. 333)
解释：“在一般情况下，信贷发行银行的资产是由短期票据还是由抵押贷款构成的，仍然是一个无关紧要的问题。”（英文版第333页）