Pangoal Institution
International Situation Monthly Report
March,2017 (Vol. 3)
Contributions by: JING Hua, AN Gang Senior Researchers at Pangoal Institution
朝鲜半岛之殇、特朗普执政态势与中美关系再出发——盘古智库国际形势月报2017年3月（总第3期）（英文版上）
天地人和 经世致用
Harmony Knowledge Solutions
Over the second half of 2016, Donald Trump repeatedly mentioned the Korean Peninsula during his election campaign. Since then, many scholars predicted that the North Korean nuclear issue might become the biggest hidden crisis threatening the security and stability in the Asian-Pacific region, thereby surpassing the East and South China Sea disputes. In February and March of this year, the situation on the Peninsula has been treacherous,which not only confirmed this prediction, but showed that it could grow even more dangerous and complicated than expected.
In regards to the situation on the Korean Peninsula in March,there were two themes which developed separately yet became entangled with eachother. One theme was the conflicts between the US and North Korea over the latter’s nuclear capabilities. When confronted with its new rival in President Trump,North Korea began testing missiles and threatening to conduct nuclear tests,while indicate its desire to send the senior official Choe Son Hui to the US atthe same time; however, neither tactic worked out. Trump once expressed duringthe election campaign that he and Kim Jong-un “should be eating a hamburger ona conference table”; but he then reneged on those words, publicly saying that“it may be very late,” and even denied a visa to Choe.
On March 1st, the US and South Korea kicked offthe Foal Eagle exercise, which was described as “unprecedented.” Another jointmilitary exercise, known as “Key Resolve,” was started on March 13th.During these exercises, the US and South Korean armed forces jointly executed apreemptive strike against North Korea. On March 17th, during his visit to South Korea, the US Secretary of State Rex Wayne Tillerson stated thatthe Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” towards North Korea had ended, and the US would, instead of considering any further negotiations with North Korea over the nuclear issue, take any necessary measures topressure the Kim Jong-un administration to dismantle its nuclear program. This might be the harshest warning ever delivered from any US administration to North Korea. Later, The National Interest,a prominent US journal, revealed that the US was updating its Operations Plan5015 (OPLAN 5015) against North Korea.
The other major event was the contest between China and South Korea over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system issue. On February 27th, South Korea’s Lotte Group approved a land swap with the South Korean military for the deployment of THAAD. Even though China vowed resolute opposition and voiced strong dissatisfaction against the decision, the US and South Korea have accelerated the deployment. South Korean media reported that a C-17 cargo plane would deliver the first components of the system to South Korea’s Osan Air Base on March 7th. The Ministry of National Defense of South Korea confirmed that, in another one to two months, the deployment of the new anti-missile system would be completed, around two months earlier than scheduled.
The two themes, as each other’s cause and effect, are closely entangled together. On the surface, the issues stem from the North Korean nuclear program; in reality, they reflect the further escalation of the tug-of-war between China and the US. Therefore, the North Korean nuclear issue has become the first touchstone for the possibility of positive interactions between China and the US during Trump’s presidency, and a momentous test of China’s diplomatic capabilities.
From the 1990s to Obama’s early years in office, China and the US had communicated smoothly over the North Korean nuclear issue. However,as the situation changes, the basis of the partnership between the two countries has gradually vanished, while misunderstandings are increasing. The US continually overestimates China’s capability to restrain North Korea, insisting that China has not done enough to stop the nuclear issue from worsening.Chinese scholars, however, believe that the difficulty in handling the issueand the worsening of the situation actually stems from the absence of sincerity in US-North Korea relations. North Korea, willfully choosing to defend itself, continues to develop its nuclear capabilities; meanwhile, the US repeatedly delays implementationof relevant agreements and makes no secret of its loathing for the Kim Jong-ungovernment.
As a close neighbor on the Korean Peninsula, China will be the first, besides North Korea, to bear the brunt should something happen; however,the US benefits from the ongoing deadlock, and it is the only party to receive such benefits. In this case, what should China do to break the deadlock, or ease it a little bit? As is the case in previous debates, Chinese scholars have reached little consensus in the latest round of discussion on the issue. The major schools of thought are presented below:
The most notable school of thought posits that the current situation, which harbors enormous risks of war, is the most detrimental to China. On the surface, China and North Korea are allies, while the US and Japan support South Korea against North Korea. Nevertheless, after decades of international contests and changes, North Korea has become a potential threat to China, yet South Korea has become a potential partner. Over 60 years into the diplomatic relationship between China and North Korea, great changes have happened in the special China-North Korea relationship. In this current situation,North Korea must, at all costs, maintain its nuclear strategy and consider itas the last resort. This, however, conflicts with China’s fundamental interestsin its pursuit of border stability. Different from North Korea, South Korea,without posing any threats to China’s security, can serve as a breakthrough for China to solve threats and stop the US from building a triangular alliance between the US, Japan, and South Korea.
Similar ideas can be applied to the issue of THAAD, the specific trigger of present conflicts. Scholars argue that the deployment of THAAD is a smart move undertaken by the US, signaling that South Korea has eventually fallen in with it after conducting “equidistant diplomacy” for aperiod. All these reactions, nevertheless, are rooted in North Korea’s determination to develop its nuclear capabilities. Though South Korea shall be punished for its wrongs, it is the culprits—the US and North Korea—that must bear the biggest brunt.
The second school of thought states that support should continue for North Korea. Their key argument is that, although the international situation has undergone enormous changes, the preconditions forspecial relations between China and North Korea are still there. China chose to establish a relationship with North Korea in 1949, mainly because the geopolitical landscape on the peninsula had become increasingly unfavorable for North Korea after the Cold War. By backing North Korea, China could not only maintain the relative balance of the peninsula’s geopolitical landscape, but also achieve the dual purpose of building economic ties with South Korea andoffsetting security pressures posed by US-South Korea relations. At present,the imbalance is still there and grows even worse. The US-South Korea security alliance, though once frayed, sees no essential change.
Recent events, including the THAAD deployment in South Korea and Trump’s decision to send the US Defense Secretary and Secretary of State to visit South Korea, all indicate that the US-South Korea relations are strengthening. It can thus be said that, even though the strategic environment witnesses dramatic changes, the preconditions encouraging China to maintain “special relations” with North Korea remain, and the “special relations” are conducive to peace and stability on the peninsula.
The third school of thought focuses on the three fundamentals in China’s policies towards North Korea: no nukes, no war, and no instability.Scholars of this school debate which of the three should be top priority.Although it is widely believed that “no nukes” shall be prioritized, they holdthat compared with “instability without control,” ”stability with nukes” isclearly more favorable for China. The stability in international situation will not be undermined after North Korea acquires nuclear capability, for the US is not able to launch military actions against North Korea; in other words, the so-called “preemptive” strategy will not work. For China, the biggest threat is not North Korea’s nuclear power, but “a unified and stronger Korean Peninsula under the US’s control,” and then “a nuclear and pro-US North Korea.”
Scholars in the fourth school of thought believe that it is better for the “doer” to undo what has been done. The persistence and escalation of North Korea issue has mostly resulted from distrust between the US and North Korea. Essentially, it is because the US always intends to createt ensions on the Korean Peninsula, so as to thwart China’s peaceful rise. Assuch, the key to solving the North Korean nuclear issue lies with the US.
Some scholars even suggest that the end of “strategic patience” towards North Korea means that the US is behaving increasingly like North Korea—assuming a tough stance by rejecting dialogues, threatening “super tough measures” (decapitation strike), and forcing its opponent to demean itself and make concessions. The strategic adjustments “put on the table” such as the option of forceful regime change in North Korea, and there is a transition in US goals in cooperating with China to urge North Korea to phaseout its nuclear power, and now to pressuring China to abandon support for North Korea, but this is definitely unacceptable for China. Toaddress the issue, the US should make adjustments as soon as possible, and respond to North Korea’s security worries and concerns with practical measures,such as signing a bilateral peace treaty.
Still, some argue that the situation can “drag on for changes.”This tactic, however, grows more and more difficult to sustain under current tensions. As North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities continue growing,the problem about what impacts such development may have on China’s vitalsecurity interests will become increasingly prominent.
Predictably, the situation in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia will remain volatile in the first half of this year. In the short run, there are several influential variables.
The first one is the upcoming meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Trump. The North Korean nuclear issue isapparently an unavoidable topic during such a meeting. The international community is waiting for answers from the two highly pragmatic leaders.
The second variable is the impending presidential election in South Korea. Which party will take office? How will the new administrationrespond to its relations with North Korea, the US, and China? How will they tackle the diplomatic problems left by Park Geun-hye after THAAD is deployed?
Thirdly, the Asia-Pacific policy team in the Trump administration has not yet been completely established. The direction that the team will take and how US policies towards China will change remains unknown.
Fourthly, how will North Korea evaluate its position in the new situation? If the previous nuclear tests are no more than deterrence strategies and chips for bargaining with other countries, and the trick does not work for Trump, how will North Korea employ nuclear weapons, the biggest and probably the only way to leverage it?
In order to ease tensions, China proposes to pursue the denuclearization of the peninsula and the establishment of a peace mechanism indual tracks, and achieve a suspension-for-suspension agreement. To be morespecific, North Korea would suspend its missile and nuclear activities inexchange for a halt of large-scale US-South Korea military exercises. Such anagreement could help end the current security dilemma and bring all parties back to the negotiating table. Then, the approach can achieve the dual goals mentioned above simultaneously, thus addressing all parties’ concerns in asynchronized and reciprocal manner, and finally reaching a fundamental solutionto lasting peace and stability on the peninsula.
This proposal gets to the crux of the matter. Faced with an unprecedentedly complicated situation, China should consider mediating the North Korean nuclear issue more proactively, help handle the landscape of the peninsula, and encourage all parties to trust and reassure each other.■
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