区块头有两段总计长达64位的0二进制位（其中区块时间64位），强力阻止了ASIC矿机的sha256运算的崩散效果, 使难度不会无限增长，并且家用电脑永远可挖。强力限制了矿池算力中心化。
对在1300深度以下的区块中，所有4个输出全部花完的交易（每个交易最多4个输出），进行了修剪（指同时清空输入输出，只保留交易数据的版本和nsequence）
分批次修剪，每批修剪250个，每从其他节点收到一个块，就会重构20个区块散文件，也就是说修剪5000个交易。并用特殊的机制，使得从不同高度的节点或者恶意节点同步数据不会出错。每年仅增长1G数据，如果人手一个节点，运行1000年也不过1T大小的数据。
区块大小是2M，tps为bitcoin2倍，每年仅增长1G数据，强力阻止了存储大量区块数据导致节点数变少。
同时4个输出限制了矿池的分发结算，强力阻止矿池中心化，如结算发给4000个矿工，需要交易1000次。
所有币都被锁定300块的成熟度（300块之后才能引用该输入），强力阻止了交易炒作的频率，阻止交易所砸盘，和交易所中心化。
这实现了“绝对去中心化”。
家用电脑可挖，目前高度仅有400，没有预挖。使用bitcoind的rpc，稳定可靠。没有使用隔离见证，但是用了多重签名。
用法 $ /下载目录/bitcoind -addnode=?.?.?.?（Ubuntu相同），bitcoin.conf配置文件也是一样, C++库boost1.6
详细原文介绍如下（文末有下载链接）：
Bitsupercoin: Peers‘ Counting and Clearing All-output-spent Transactions On The Disk In Batches Can Agree
Satoshi Nakamoto
For an 'all-output-spent' transaction(ispruned, not point to a coinbase), it should be pruned on the disk instead of being removed in coinsDB(Coinsviewcache). Hence the blocks are needed to be stored in the form of 'one file per block', to achieve 'Storage Decentralization'. Meanwhile, to solve the problem of 'mining pool centralization' and 'online exchange centralization', we have to launch a new spare decentralized currency. The original goal 'Reclaiming Disk Space' cannot be reached because of no big block all-txs-pruned existing. The transactions' hashes only exist in the memory while a lot of many-to-many transactions with dusts constantly being packaged.
Based on bitcoin-0.10.2, the insecure SegWit is not an adoption. The version of top 1000 blocks of the active chain always keeps 4, which means the transaction data is intact. The version of blocks below 1000 depth mostly keeps 3, which means the 'all-output-spent txs' had been being pruned to "IsNull" each time the block reaches having 250 all-output-spent transactions. The total number of non empty transactions in the version3 will be continuously pruned until it belows 250. Pruning changes the nversion of 'all-output-spent tx' to 0 so that the 'tx' does not serialize 'vin' and 'vout', and will be in 'IsNull' state after being unserialized from disk. The original number of non empty transactions is put into the block header to mine, and the version3 blocks from other peers join via a loose check, but pruning will not affect the block header.
In a presistent vector
Each new block received can make about 5000 old transactions become 'all-output-spent', so about 20 old blocks below 1300 depth will be reconstructed every time. The maturity of all outputs is 300. So the Merkle tree will change due to the pruning reconstruction but won't be checked in version3; The pruning results of peers with different heights are also naturally corrupt: For example, an entrant first download the blocks from a backward peer and then download the blocks from a higher, will find that the child transaction has been pruned to be empty before its parent transaction(source-tx), or conversely receive a block containing a child transaction with missing or wrong inputs. The correct source-txs may also be intentionally cleared and instead by the other fictional txs to keep the 'IsNull' txs number in block version3 is a multiple of 250). But this will not lead to double-spending and no-source-spending, because the mining peers have 1000 version4, which will be strictly verified when accepted, that ensures the security. Accepting to the top has to go via many conflicts, such as corrupt backward peers spreading blockchain virus, but the peers can repaire themselves by an ingenious mode.
Since the number of 'IsNull' transactions in block version3 must be a multiple of 250, and the number of original transactions has been put into the block header, also every transaction‘s fee is fixed to 500 satoshi; then the non top counterfeiters can spread the virus by inv messages. They added transactions, and cleared equally, or cleared and added 250 or multiples of 250 transactions at a time. These transactions may be fictitious. The transaction of version3 block is either 'haveInputs' or 'IsNull', and with source-txs existing either or not, rather than from a wrong source-tx. Because this will cause download interruption. So the loose verification of the 'vtx' part of version3 block, allowing coins without source-tx to be updated into viewcache, but for the wrong source-tx (!IsAvailable || prevout IsNull) and wrong source-tx's value will find error, it will still not recognize. If the source-tx coin is missing, it is equivalent to that height had been pruned in advance. After reaching some height, the infected peer will recover and repair itself. If the fictitious source-tx is still mixed in old blocks, it is very difficult for the source-tx to be spent and recognized by other peers, and someday it will be buried. Because the counterfeiter doesn't know how many correct ledgers the other peers have and used to verify. The blockchain virus situation is always that: some correct source-tx is missing and a equal amount of fictitious source-tx is added, or reserve 'all-output-spent txs' and delete non-all-output-spent txs equally, to keep the number of empty transactions is a multiple of 250.
When the source-txs of the received block's 'vtx' cannot be found, the peer will change the block nVersion to 3 ('nVersion' won't serialize to be mined) in preliminary checks. Version3 can pass the loose check and be connected, can update coins, insert the transactions without source-tx into the view(pcionstip) cache. However, if there are no 1000 consecutive 4 version blocks, mining results are not sure to be accepted by honest peers. Once there are 300 version4 accepted, any new block from other peers that has been changed to version3 in preliminary check will be rejected. However, the infected peer can always accept the version3 block which has fictitious tx from the fictitious source-tx , that is to say, the infected peer will never have 300 consecutive version4 up to the tip. It will always change the new version4 received to 3, and then insert the transactions without the source-tx in coinscache. In this way, the virus will be covered automatically after infection. In the future, the infected peer will clear the infection of the missing source-tx, reach having 300 or even 1000 top version4 blocks. But there will still be unspent outputs from the dishonest peers left. The prevouts based on these coins sources will not be recognized by other mining peers unless a small group has been evolved out.
Due to the decentralization on storage, the net scale is very large, and every transaction has at most two inputs and four outputs. In this way, the probability of self-cleaning to cast off 'the version3 tips' is greatly increased. Malicious peers will conflict with each other, but they can not prevent the infected peers' self-recovery. Although mining peers may be corrupt, the fake 'tx' will not be received by a large group. Only the original correct version will be admitted and inserted into the coinscache piecewisely to cover and unify all kinds of infection.
The infected peer can relay the transactions it thinks are correct while listening. The counterfeiter can't affect the correct ledgers that are mining because they have 1000 version4 blocks. The counterfeiters can't participate in the mining either, they can't receive and confirm a corruct-source transaction, or he can only mine out the block composed of transactions with source-txs records from common intersection, which doesn't affect the community with huge amount of peers. Even if the counterfeiter continues to mine for empty blocks, it will only let the infected peers have more version4, so as to ban the other peers in advance, and then find their own missing parts.
Every block will be recognized as version3 or 4 by different peers. Finally, after receiving 300 consecutive version4, their infected state will be changed and no version3 block will be received. Fictitious transactions will not be spent, transactions from a missing source-tx(pruned in advance if honest) will repair themselves, and wrong transactions will not be mined undoubtedly. Even if the counterfeiters form clusters and mine according to fictitious transactions, it is only equivalent to persisting an infection, just as the DNA chain has forked and mutated, and the counterfeiting groups have formed a new small community. The final distribution results of all outputs in disk will only take up 10G space and the growth rate is getting lower and lower.
Undo file is still put in the chunk，the max block size is 2M, the block time is in 64 bits, and original non empty transaction number 'orignTx' will be put in block header to mine. The maturity of all outputs is 300, which can reduce the frequency of speculation, allow more peers to maintain their asset value, prevent a centralized online exchange appearing in the world, and limit the settlement delay of the mining pool. Meanwhile, the transaction's inputs number is at most 2, and the outputs number is at most 4, which limits the settlement scale of the mining pool, because the transactions from the mining pool to a quantity of people require many transaction fees. In this way, a centralized mining pool will be weakened eventually and it is easier for infected peers to repair themselves. Bitsupercoin's coinbase value has been being halved from 64, with an interval of 5 years. It still uses sha256, in order to be compatible with ASIC.
Storage centralization, online exchange centralization and mining-pool centralization are solved by a bold way, and the number of peers can increase continuously. And people are more willing to disperse their coins than stay a huge account, which is conducive to consumption and economic mobility. That is very close to the absolute decentralization.
Download(Mac&Ubuntu)
jianguoyun.com/p/DeBrwnIQoOyjCBi0sYcD
Reference
1.Satoshi Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System", November 2008.