2017年浙江大学网络空间安全青年科学家论坛--12月20日会议简纪

数据安全与隐私前沿

1. When Security and AI Meet. -- Tao Xie [email protected] http://taoxie.cs.illinois.edu/

1.1 AI and Software Engineering 智能软件工程

(1) AI FOR Test Generation:
Microsoft Security Risk Detection : https://microsoft.com/en-us/security-risk-detection/
cloud-based-fuzz-testing

(2) 二进制码 based risk detection: Mayhem

(3) Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DART: Godefoid et.al OKDI'05)
遍历所有的路径和分支语句：

Explision of Search Space: 搜索空间太大

(4) Automated Software Testing:

Path Explision: DSN'09: fITNEX
Method SEQUENCE EXPLOSION oopsla'11: Seeker
Shipped in VS 2015/2017
Code Hunt :

(5) Android App Testing: WeChat

(6) Intelligent Software Testing?

Learning from others working on the same things
Learning from others working on similar things

(7) NLP for Security Policies

Access Control Vulnerabilities
Access Control Policies(ACP)
- A policy rule includes four elements:
  - Subject - HCP
  - Action - edit
  - Resource - patient's account
  - Effect - deny
Problems of ACP Practice
- ACPs: 自然语言并没有具体处理
- Example: A doctor can not modify the patient's account.
Overview of Text2Policy

(8) NLP for Mobile Security

Problems Statement:
Is Program Analysis sufficient?
- Caveat: what does the user expect?
  - GPS Tracker:
  - Phone-call recorder:
  - others are more subtle:
Vision
- 分析应用描述
- Straw man: Keyword Search
  - Confounding effects:
    - certain keywords such as 'contact' have a confounding meaning
  - Semantic Interference:
    - Sentences often decribe a sensitive operation such as reading contact without actually refferring to the keyword 'contact', e.g., "Also you can share the yoga exercise to your friends via Email and SMS."
- 抽取领域知识 Semantic-Graph Generator
- Semantic Engine

(9) ML for mobile security:

分析APK，区分善意与恶意软件
Context-based Mobile security
EnMobile: Entity-based Characterization and Analysis of Mobile Malware ICSE 2018

(10) Adversarial ML
杨俊峰哥伦比亚大学 SOSP 2017

2. 隐私保护：现状与挑战

差分隐私技术
全同态加密技术

2.1 数据云服务：安全隐私研究

实时协同编辑软件：Google Docs. ShareLatex, Etherpad等

github上的敏感数据泄露

2.2 Encrypted Search: Advances and Beyond 王聪--香港城市大学

加密数据搜索
Motivation
- sensitive data demands Encrypted storage
- Encrypted Search reduce risks of data breaches

2.3 大数据试验场数据安全与管控韩伟力

2.4 图数据隐私-- 纪守领

Application-aware privacy-preserving techiques

Deep Learning or ML based privacy preservation

CCS: 图片验证码：人很好识别、机器很难识别

3. Securing the Networking Foundation for Future Internet, Cloudand 5G Infrastructures -- 顾国飞：美国德州农工大学

3.0 Problems of Legacy Network Devices

Too Complicated:-- Control Plane
Closed platform -- Vendor specific
Hard to manage
Why we care?
- Datacenter / Cloud networking
- Telecommunication Networking
  - SDN/NVF is a foundation in 5G
  - High cost for feature insertion for new (value=added) services
  - Complext network management
- Enterprise networking
  - BYOD Challenges
  - too much reliance on vendors
- Home networking
  - increased devices (IoT) and complexity
  - why my network is not working? who can help?
SDN -- Three layer Application layer + control layer + infrastructure layer
Openflow Infrastructure
SDN Operation
Going Beyond
- The future is software defined
  - SDN
  - software defined storage
  - software defined radio
  - software defined infrastructure(VMs, NFV, Cloud, 5G)
- A new research direction: Software defined Programmable security(SDPS)

3.1 Security in the paradigam of SDN

3.2 Security in SDN -- Case Study :ConGuard

(1). Security Problems in SDN , 新的安全问题

SDN still in infant stage
The security of SDN itself is another major concern:
- Vulnerable/Malicious/buggy apps?
- Vulnerable controller? data plane? communication bettween data/control plane.

(2) Attacking the brain: races in the SDN control Plane

SDN Control plane = new Achilles' Heel
Research Questions
- ConGuard -- solution
- Detection of Harmful Race Conditions
- Exploitation of Harmful race conditions

3.3 SDN for security -- case study: Programmable BYOD Security

Killer applications of SDN?
- reducing energy in data center networks
- WAN VM Migration
- how about security?
  - Can SDN enable new capabilities to improve network security?
Exemplar SDN Security Apps
- Firewall
- DDoS Detection
- Scan Detection
- Reflector network
- Tarpit
- Dynamic quarantine
- and more...
App Store> Security as an Apps
- Security as a app
- Security as a service
Challenges and Our Contributions
- develop security apps is Hard
  - FRESCO: a new app development framework for modular, composable security services [NDSS'13]
- It is not convenient to install/use security devices/services for cloud tenants
  - CloudWatcher/NetSecVisor/BYOCVisor: a new security monitoring service model [Network security virtualization] based on SDN
- Leverage the advantages of SDN when no SDN data plane infrastructure
  - NDSS'16 work
NDSS'16 --Towards SDN-Defined Programmable BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) Security

4. 基于灵活策略的云网络资源控制 -- 陈焰浙江大学网络空间安全研究中心

SDNKeeper
- 运营商网络
- Cloud providers
- SDN落地部署的关键：网络资源安全
- SDNKeeper 系统架构

4.1 林晓东-- 加拿大劳瑞尔大学副教授

4.2 Ye Wu-- Privacy Protection based SMC applications--privcy leakage(DP SMC Forensics)

Privacy preserving correlation Analysis
- A Toy Example
Securing Master Key with SMC: solution Overview
Privacy Preserving Data Query
Privacy Preserving Maching Learning
Privacy Preserving Challenges
Data Security Scenario

4.3 Chunyi Peng-- Purdue University 移动网络安全 https://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/chunyi/

Mobile Network
- large-sale wireless network Infrastructure
Expected to be More Secure
- Internet: designed without embedded security features
- Mobile network
  - User authentication and key agreement(AKA)
  - User authorization (explicit/implicit)
  - Encryption(IPSEC)
  - Access control (from both UE and Internet)
    - Firewall, tenants
  - Closed System
IP Spoofing [CCS'14]
- ip assigned by the network, authentication for L2 data pipes
- But, Spoofing on L3 is possible
VoLTE abuse [CCS'15]
- VoLTE: IP packets for voice data and siganling
- But, exploited for norma data packet
SMS Sender-ID Spoofing [CSS'16]
- Authentication for the sender is required
- But, SMS Sender (in SIP header) can be spoofed
Why: Gap between security and the operations it intends to project
Change Factors & Security Implications
- Closed-> Open
  - Expose attack vectors to adversaries
  - E.g, IP
- Security states: isolated user
  - But requires a full-path security (creation, storage, use, verification)
- Missing Components
  - Monitor and detection (Security KPI)
  - Runtime traceback and mutual-authentication(not at the start only)
  - Provenance for troubleshooting (deterrence)
- 5G opportunity: NFV (flexible & extensible)

4.4 赵志峰-- 浙大 An intelligent software defined security architecture and collaborative defense testbed [[email protected]] OpenStack + OpenDaylight = testbed

An Intelligent Honeynet based on Software defined security [WCSP'17]
利用AI与attackers对话，
A Machine learning based Intrusion detection system. [IET Networks'17]
- K-means进行分流、随机森林做特征分类
Collaborative defense testbed [生成数据]

4.5 程越强 -- 百度资深安全科学家 Towards Trusted path establishment: from endpoints to cloud

Root of Trust(RoT) Candidates
- Trusted Hardware as RoT
- Hard Math Problems as RoT
Endpoint Trust establishment
- starting from root of Trust
- Extending trust chain in a layered system
Trusted Path applications
- Secure Element + trustZone
  - Fingerprint Protection
- Trusted Processor + Enclave
  - Efficient Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)
  - Efficient Verifiable Computation
Trusted Path in Baidu
- Trust chain upon Hardware RoT in layered System
  - Rust SGX Enclave - Verifiable and isolated execution environment
  - MesaLock Linux - memory safe user Space
- MesaLink Connecting all of them
  - Post-quatum cryptographic support
  - Memory safe language - without memory corruptions
Trusted Path Still Challenging
- Root key previsioning and management
- Complex hardware architecture
- Vulnerabilities in Implementation
- Side channel threat, e.g., for Intel SGX
Q/A
- 移动网络安全：3G 4G 5G安全，运营过程中的Gap，
- SGX 的成熟、WAPI WIFI Security

12月20日下午会议PPT--下载
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