Wormhole资产跨链项目代码解析
1. 引言
Wormhole支持基于Solana与多个链进行资产转移，开源代码为：
- https://github.com/certusone/wormhole/tree/main
实际部署配置信息参见：
- https://github.com/certusone/wormhole-networks
当前已上线V1，已支持：
未来V2将支持：
2. Wormhole V1
Connected chain contracts：
| Network | Bridge contract addresss |
|---|---|
| Ethereum Mainnet (Bridge) | 0xf92cD566Ea4864356C5491c177A430C222d7e678 (verified on Etherscan) |
| Ethereum Mainnet (Token) | 0x9A5e27995309a03f8B583feBdE7eF289FcCdC6Ae (verified on Etherscan) |
| Solana Mainnet Beta | WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC |
Guardian set with 19 decentralized guardians：
| Network | Guardian Set initialization |
|---|---|
| Solana | 3mQpDW2ofC3YpAsDzP4w5FNVzYRSmJjKoio4fcapL7xDAdaatvvKXCzrd2cfHiVNwYZs4hH1ePZ9Hep4zaasL27L |
| Ethereum | 0x833e7bec034d9904713d6a7dc13d197ec41af2d0611122603289a1e69ae72c43 |
19个Guardians采用PoA共识，不存在leader。Wormhole V1版本中的调用Solana合约的submitVAA()函数的手续费由Guardian承担。由于没有leader，会存在有多个同时提交的情况：
- https://explorer.solana.com/tx/67dyCCe2cb3UEab8J64p8gMTxc5WaiQww64JUXQddyjt53HfCzumgt1JhsKjG2qTo2phHS5e6rSTzWD8gupa8PgP 成功。
- https://explorer.solana.com/tx/TZKNGEK5bkd3kY92NKXDxAtA8ZTmiR4C3MvyyBgMT6P3drn5XhcUUdUPaL7WViZkN6wqRWCBRKvNzMuvwgredty 失败，Solana合约中报错：AlreadyExists。
- https://explorer.solana.com/tx/2nbGGDxyqRKb9edcraZK3EoPHVq8CGm5BQEy6iiVzipzDqoWD3Smx9bTvapWjDYUhVt8boQBn6GvdGQRdrdrBDJV 失败，Solana合约中报错：AlreadyExists。
- https://explorer.solana.com/tx/4d2KwDKRtifdq6NCNztF3wk6iZBD77fq7aRf7TSnAgeVPL9fRUj3PtkhNL2GJ9M5TQXeku6ffMLfdAF7C5dyzwgj 失败，Solana合约中报错：AlreadyExists。
- https://explorer.solana.com/tx/4q55JYoo5Cb8XaXpxsZVyBdXs1imHhv44ygdti6Lf49ZddFzy3gCknRNiAHr5ZQmhXd9wdBkUeZKubAZWHMQTNet 合约中报错：AlreadyExists。
Solana端合约日志为：
Program WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC invoke [1]
Instruction: VerifySignatures
Error: AlreadyExists
Program WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC consumed 50274 of 200000 compute units
Program WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC failed: custom program error: 0xb
Transaction failed: Error processing Instruction 1: Unknown instruction error
2.1 关键代码解析
支持的chain_id命名及支持的action类型有：
ActionGuardianSetUpdate Action = 0x01
ActionContractUpgrade Action = 0x02
ActionTransfer Action = 0x10
// ChainIDSolana is the ChainID of Solana
ChainIDSolana = 1
// ChainIDEthereum is the ChainID of Ethereum
ChainIDEthereum = 2
// ChainIDTerra is the ChainID of Terra
ChainIDTerra = 3
以 0x22557d54dfc8adb1a888478258f89abb4a11a7069c983e6db1bc14de6d6e7946 lockAssets交易为例：
会将相应的token发送到black hole: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 中 burn掉：
if (isWrappedAsset[asset]) {
WrappedAsset(asset).burn(msg.sender, amount);
asset_chain = WrappedAsset(asset).assetChain();
asset_address = WrappedAsset(asset).assetAddress();
}
Solana端Wrapped Ether (Wormhole) token地址为：FeGn77dhg1KXRRFeSwwMiykZnZPw5JXW6naf2aQgZDQf
Solana端Wormhole合约中的mint交易为：https://solscan.io/tx/wwwFsn2cx69HPEg64iRErNHaUx4GbLt48vGSgFguAfgDBZtiYjFsXc6eH7CzEJuMv8RQ1UD41JZ1iMy5CYW5Hvr
以太坊端Wormhole:Solana Bridge合约地址为：
- https://etherscan.io/address/0xf92cd566ea4864356c5491c177a430c222d7e678
Solana端Wormhole合约地址为：
- WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC
以太坊端Wormhole:Solana Bridge合约关键函数有：
- （1）submitVAA()，若action为0x10，即ActionTransfer，则将Solana中的资产通过Wormhole:Solana Bridge合约转移出来，对应的target_chain应设置为以太坊，若资产为以太坊ERC20 token（即token_chain=2），则直接将Solana Bridge合约中的ERC20 token转移到指定账号即可；若资产为其他链上的值，则在以太坊上根据token_chain和token_address在以太坊上创建相应的wrapped合约，往该合约mint或burn。
if (token_chain != CHAIN_ID) {
bytes32 token_address = data.toBytes32(71);
bytes32 asset_id = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(token_chain, token_address));
// if yes: mint to address
// if no: create and mint
address wrapped_asset = wrappedAssets[asset_id];
if (wrapped_asset == address(0)) {
uint8 asset_decimals = data.toUint8(103);
wrapped_asset = deployWrappedAsset(asset_id, token_chain, token_address, asset_decimals);
}
WrappedAsset(wrapped_asset).mint(target_address, amount);
} else {
address token_address = data.toAddress(71 + 12);
uint8 decimals = ERC20(token_address).decimals();
// Readjust decimals if they've previously been truncated
if (decimals > 9) {
amount = amount.mul(10 ** uint256(decimals - 9));
}
IERC20(token_address).safeTransfer(target_address, amount);
}
- （2）LockAssets()，用于将以太坊上的资产转移至Solana。
if (isWrappedAsset[asset]) { //非以太坊上发行的token，通过wrapped合约销毁
WrappedAsset(asset).burn(msg.sender, amount);
asset_chain = WrappedAsset(asset).assetChain();
asset_address = WrappedAsset(asset).assetAddress();
} else { //以太坊上的ERC20 token，直接将相应金额转入本Solana Bridge合约。
uint256 balanceBefore = IERC20(asset).balanceOf(address(this));
IERC20(asset).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
uint256 balanceAfter = IERC20(asset).balanceOf(address(this));
// The amount that was transferred in is the delta between balance before and after the transfer.
// This is to properly handle tokens that charge a fee on transfer.
amount = balanceAfter.sub(balanceBefore);
// Decimal adjust amount - we keep the dust
if (decimals > 9) {
uint256 original_amount = amount;
amount = amount.div(10 ** uint256(decimals - 9));
if (refund_dust) {
IERC20(asset).safeTransfer(msg.sender, original_amount.mod(10 ** uint256(decimals - 9)));
}
decimals = 9;
}
require(balanceAfter.div(10 ** uint256(ERC20(asset).decimals() - 9)) <= MAX_UINT64, "bridge balance would exceed maximum");
asset_address = bytes32(uint256(asset));
}
以太坊Wormhole:Solana Bridge合约guardian set更新交易为：
0x833e7bec034d9904713d6a7dc13d197ec41af2d0611122603289a1e69ae72c43
更新Guardianset的submitVAA(bytes calldata vaa)调用数据为：0x01000000000100e799da27b55cff0f44b57b0d06065d573de679b0ba4ddd7d94c57e58cc31ea166c757a7dd034d7d6f3696a846a30d8aad6499254c71bdd3888147aaac092558d006019dfc2010000000113187727cdd17c8142fe9b29a066f577548423af0ee4276d2ef965b37a492c5f0f85e9a558f82895bd854e8be1ee471e70a152b3fbb093057efbb9e20f43f98818f1f0e93a921c2a74ed868213946a358079071c82011b4a542c7d67f290ef4181ce6b2b0f7580aa7e036dc199bf0e152c71004716ae0aa747e7af00e4b5f69b8e8e49adbe7b1a2b6bdd81f346c155a290149bb2f58332aba8dc31217df483501ef73c0e6f9a242b3564f9e65fbd94fcbc332a0deb1fca1307c7beef596f209cf393f3d50d41e4a0f9f51a742452e9c2b4bd131a934c10f97b80455669e0718fca4dc271f4ef43ff624a6b730a339ef1041bb88a04dda307bc4f5e97c4856c068d1a4182a85cf8ca288d9077160ff9d6583b63aa20eff40b7dde2e046412ebcc6563831aa7a9b2104e0c58b3514ed7abb1408f91058bfedac3caecb03f8ec22c1be3727bbc8342f631ec9a20d8a6fb44fe97c6dfcd9f09c8e49757486e98887b49373620290d963729e263fdfedf000121046578253312861e83f28bd5
2.2 Solana中HUSD转移至以太坊HUSD ERC20 token示例
{
"chainId": 101,
"address": "BybpSTBoZHsmKnfxYG47GDhVPKrnEKX31CScShbrzUhX",
"symbol": "wHUSD",
"name": "HUSD Stablecoin (Wormhole)",
"decimals": 8,
"logoURI": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/solana-labs/token-list/main/assets/mainnet/BybpSTBoZHsmKnfxYG47GDhVPKrnEKX31CScShbrzUhX/logo.png",
"tags": [
"wrapped",
"wormhole"
],
"extensions": {
"website": "https://www.stcoins.com/",
"address": "0xdf574c24545e5ffecb9a659c229253d4111d87e1",
"bridgeContract": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf92cD566Ea4864356C5491c177A430C222d7e678",
"assetContract": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xdf574c24545e5ffecb9a659c229253d4111d87e1",
"coingeckoId": "husd"
}
}
将Solana中的HUSD转移至以太坊中的HUSD ERC20 token示例为：
- 以太坊端的交易为：https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4e3a1f0ab7f6551ae6e50598ff3c89c8933d7fa6a233d9f509d7b93379b0c96b
- Solana端的交易为：https://explorer.solana.com/tx/5UapTG2W81XBUMTLEEcwKmqmwEoyww5ZvF4F3S2aLnkNyXRWvVF637rAEjyPVsEjXiPVNmHT7KPrExd2HXq2MBDt
以太坊接收地址为：0xe0b2026e3db1606ef0beb764ccdf7b3cee30db4a
Solana端发送地址为：EH4Ee8SikRZzWWujY88wwXSaAv2AosgdurgjEvS32P4K（Owner为：CaBptTpgdBjhiLfdPjJzz7rRWuwNhaZXhvygM8zxuuyk）
HUSD资产由Solana端转移出时，详细的流程为：
- 1）将相应的转出金额授权给Wormhole合约的账号：9zyPU1mjgzaVyQsYwKJJ7AhVz5bgx5uc1NPABvAcUXsT
- 2）由发起转出账号将手续费（0.02046048 SOL）发给Wormhole合约的账号
- 3）调用Wormhole合约的Transfer Assets Out函数，其中在Instruction Data中包含了接收资产的以太坊地址：
– 3.1）由转出账号创建相应的Wormhole合约账号：
– 3.2）将转出账号的相应资产由 1）中授权的账号 进行Burn销毁：
完整的log为：
Program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA invoke [1]
Instruction: Approve
Program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA consumed 2297 of 200000 compute units
Program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA success
Program 11111111111111111111111111111111 invoke [1]
Program 11111111111111111111111111111111 success
Program WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC invoke [1]
Instruction: TransferOut
wrapped transfer out
deriving key
deploying contract
Program 11111111111111111111111111111111 invoke [2]
Program 11111111111111111111111111111111 success
Program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA invoke [2]
Instruction: Burn
Program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA consumed 2886 of 136268 compute units
Program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA success
Program WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC consumed 67592 of 200000 compute units
Program WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC success
- 4）Validator会监听3）中的Burn操作，详细代码见：
wormhole/bridge/pkg/solana/client.go：
accounts, err := rpcClient.GetProgramAccounts(rCtx, s.bridge, &rpc.GetProgramAccountsOpts{
Commitment: rpc.CommitmentMax, // TODO: deprecated, use Finalized
Filters: []rpc.RPCFilter{
{
DataSize: 1184, // Search for TransferOutProposal accounts
},
{
Memcmp: &rpc.RPCFilterMemcmp{
Offset: 1140, // Offset of VaaTime
Bytes: solana.Base58{0, 0, 0, 0}, // VAA time is 0 when no VAA is present
},
},
},
})
// 相应结果的proposal解析结果为：
lock := &common.ChainLock{
TxHash: txHash,
Timestamp: proposal.LockupTime,
Nonce: proposal.Nonce,
SourceAddress: proposal.SourceAddress,
TargetAddress: proposal.ForeignAddress,
SourceChain: vaa.ChainIDSolana,
TargetChain: proposal.ToChainID,
TokenChain: proposal.Asset.Chain,
TokenAddress: proposal.Asset.Address,
TokenDecimals: proposal.Asset.Decimals,
Amount: proposal.Amount,
}
Validator提交通过SubmitVAA提交Unlock Sig，详细交易见：https://explorer.solana.com/tx/5SKH9ppMdPQJn5EtvNdW9jztmzf5y3YZdxX25UXPaFU1yFcYCmUkmGuz4D32iaWBMMpSivg4zjzh3qkzHsUqXBjF，详细代码见：wormhole/solana/agent/src/main.rs中的post_vaa() 函数：
VAABody::Transfer(t) => {
if t.source_chain == CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
// Solana (any) -> Ethereum (any)
let transfer_key = Bridge::derive_transfer_id(
program_id,
&bridge_key,
t.asset.chain,
t.asset.address,
t.target_chain,
t.target_address,
t.source_address,
t.nonce,
)?;
accounts.push(AccountMeta::new(transfer_key, false))
}
......
}
5）用户Agent监听4）中的Unlock签名，然后Aggregates & Publish Signatures 向以太坊发起SubmitVAA()交易。详细代码见：wormhole/bridge/pkg/solana/submitter.go。
// handleObservation processes a remote VAA observation, verifies it, checks whether the VAA has met quorum,
// and assembles and submits a valid VAA if possible.
func (p *Processor) handleObservation(ctx context.Context, m *gossipv1.SignedObservation) {
// SECURITY: at this point, observations received from the p2p network are fully untrusted (all fields!)
//
// Note that observations are never tied to the (verified) p2p identity key - the p2p network
// identity is completely decoupled from the guardian identity, p2p is just transport.
.......
}
timeout, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 120*time.Second)
res, err := c.SubmitVAA(timeout, &agentv1.SubmitVAARequest{Vaa: vaaBytes, SkipPreflight: e.skipPreflight})
相应的submitVAA() data 解析为：
0x01
00000001
0d
00a89efafc639d6fdb746a2a858d7f532bce4bda1314ae34b6ff68a7862d9ef8dc351989a274709e9dc2b2db324a39b8a19fc69add9f42c2e96dd049571bc5452b01
0112dbc46c6a5585829600d4acaaea44dc9f66df32173c2b49f4700df88499a1db4960219683e96541c8f53660228f05d01a5c8cce8fd16e6a0b90cc3d913475b300
02558eef0c8813b7634a8a73955c404ea3c91826ecdbc1272635900ed0b0aee101570c7ab06d41c783c913906b8a553777914e3b783611f93095b3efc0afe67f6801
03445546203c8d9505cee405fdc62ddd4bf1f20ba9e482a373bc9889c885ea7627060d3c08a0b37b570ca14fc7aae8afdbbf022409b2835e63c71c16a154e852c701
04743d7d1e43db5efb32264bdaecd4cad4a1c7ef767b338543f768b083a7b2fc0b198bbaf96ac1c10b53b48f6bb9ed2b2421a49559931af214b6cf0a930f92589301
050dd0655fb879741c94247bb3cf96616f21b35db519f030568b29965add9c7fa23a59de432dcc3f45ecf56399a25ff9d5663816cefe77930450c6ec7f6625472300
076d748bf0fde5cfb93a0dd51cdf98b305c7e44aa9501bad1758061a68715fe35b445b1e94d9058dbd5564805d3a637bd938501027444e93f491e509d458ed7aec01
08b4861bdd15ae8127175c8fe899018ccb43800188af3db27008865e153ed7f9681227778b4cbec7be5a519240730672a44f3ee22b1cf63828299fca157787b50601
0a711a8b9e8201ba17b3072af956217245018f2c9f26fb68bd2aa4e41de405503c6e35d5d73140b38d7e25f9da6c9c05925cfe3c6b60de35edb3380c98aa7a210301
0b8372a1a3a528ccdcb68e5bc3219c474df1e5b78f58ea971b62a6f3b96e408ba67b88863dd9694f5778e4cbe3697c24e78b3b76213ecb60513230ad737c6b214b01
0d8677291bd7e1a8b67a44e5f886a6247d9331a96d46a815fae1781ea72196965234782191666e02016083456cf33573bfa305844a414a4b695fd0ce42f7106e4300
10a1426d82f020df651b1165c8eb165bf6daaeb81e081aeede1490cdf1563fa65e604826f1e6f820b891bccfb0be451afef9a9f62cc92c255a666c8c3251f1bf3f01
12fba1acf05bf2b79eb610d7b979b898234d119351a3b4d1b4ba6918e4926ac6081974799460485b2444ec2f3ddca95426a2f28790c1bed850daf188e6c7e5025301
61405447
10
00016ed6
01
02
c544e189fb7a9ec43914e407145ac395144d22445066411844fd356817b7ea80000000000000000000000000
e0b2026e3db1606ef0beb764ccdf7b3cee30db4a
02
000000000000000000000000df574c24545e5ffecb9a659c229253d4111d87e1
08
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001614b2224f700
有：
>>> hex(388450300000000)
'0x1614b2224f700'
2.3 以太坊HUSD ERC20 token转移至Solana中HUSD示例
以太坊端交易为：https://etherscan.io/tx/0xffb94e1578a44730baac95782bf8f436ca7bdc5d6ca28c7b0811eb139a45fd83，转出账号为：0x47ed57f375d3dddae2ded7a6de522c35bc9419af。
Solana端交易为：https://explorer.solana.com/tx/4pn6CxjXYuA4nRUdUjXTK5yivwxSRSgDJJ9Rg37KNo5tQnKq61RWfxVmsmsqroUdS18NnQ7R1mz3yZbNajamS8SZ，转入账号为：CUAqsZjcsoaHJPfQTPLLvJRHpQuegguBwEzKehdztovT。
详细流程为：
1）用户调用LockAssets()将以太坊ERC20 token转移至Wormhole: Solana Bridge合约。
2）Validator监听LogTokensLocked event，并对其进行签名。
LogTokensLocked (uint8 target_chain, uint8 token_chain, uint8 token_decimals, index_topic_1 bytes32 token, index_topic_2 bytes32 sender, bytes32 recipient, uint256 amount, uint32 nonce)View Source
具体值为：
target_chain :
1
token_chain :
2
token_decimals :
8
recipient :
AA665DFB6CDD379DACB27DCCABDB9888128F6B47709FDA8809E72F1CA300901C
amount :
1709034375
nonce :
1409
// handleLockup processes a lockup received from a chain and instantiates our deterministic copy of the VAA. A lockup
// event may be received multiple times until it has been successfully completed.
func (p *Processor) handleLockup(ctx context.Context, k *common.ChainLock) {
......
// All nodes will create the exact same VAA and sign its digest.
// Consensus is established on this digest.
v := &vaa.VAA{
Version: vaa.SupportedVAAVersion,
GuardianSetIndex: p.gs.Index,
Signatures: nil,
Timestamp: k.Timestamp,
Payload: &vaa.BodyTransfer{
Nonce: k.Nonce,
SourceChain: k.SourceChain,
TargetChain: k.TargetChain,
SourceAddress: k.SourceAddress,
TargetAddress: k.TargetAddress,
Asset: &vaa.AssetMeta{
Chain: k.TokenChain,
Address: k.TokenAddress,
Decimals: k.TokenDecimals,
},
Amount: k.Amount,
},
}
// Generate digest of the unsigned VAA.
digest, err := v.SigningMsg()
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
// Sign the digest using our node's guardian key.
s, err := crypto.Sign(digest.Bytes(), p.gk)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
......
p.broadcastSignature(v, s)
}
3）提交post_vaa()给Solana转账。
else {
// Foreign (native) -> Solana (wrapped)
let wrapped_key = Bridge::derive_wrapped_asset_id(
program_id,
&bridge_key,
t.asset.chain,
t.asset.decimals,
t.asset.address,
)?;
let wrapped_meta_key =
Bridge::derive_wrapped_meta_id(program_id, &bridge_key, &wrapped_key)?;
accounts.push(AccountMeta::new_readonly(spl_token::id(), false));
accounts.push(AccountMeta::new(wrapped_key, false));
accounts.push(AccountMeta::new(Pubkey::new(&t.target_address), false));
accounts.push(AccountMeta::new(wrapped_meta_key, false));
}
相应的log为：
Program WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC invoke [1]
Instruction: PostVAA
Program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA invoke [2]
Instruction: MintTo
Program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA consumed 2779 of 104301 compute units
Program TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA success
deriving key
deploying contract
Program 11111111111111111111111111111111 invoke [2]
Program 11111111111111111111111111111111 success
Program WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC consumed 124268 of 200000 compute units
Program WormT3McKhFJ2RkiGpdw9GKvNCrB2aB54gb2uV9MfQC success
3. Wormhole V2
Token Bridge 合约为：
| Network | Wormhole token bridge contract address |
|---|---|
| Ethereum Mainnet | 0x3ee18B2214AFF97000D974cf647E7C347E8fa585 |
| Solana Mainnet | wormDTUJ6AWPNvk59vGQbDvGJmqbDTdgWgAqcLBCgUb |
Connected chain contracts合约为：
| Network | Wormhole core contract address |
|---|---|
| Ethereum Mainnet (Core) | 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B |
| Ethereum Mainnet (Impl) | 0x736d2a394f7810c17b3c6fed017d5bc7d60c077d |
| Binance Smart Chain (Core) | 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B |
| Binance Smart Chain (Impl) | 0x736d2a394f7810c17b3c6fed017d5bc7d60c077d |
| Solana Mainnet | worm2ZoG2kUd4vFXhvjh93UUH596ayRfgQ2MgjNMTth |
| Terra Columbus-5 | terra1dq03ugtd40zu9hcgdzrsq6z2z4hwhc9tqk2uy5 |
Eth and BSC use the same deployer key, leading to identical addresses. This key has no privileges.
详细的Wormhole V2 token bridge流程参见：
https://blog.mercurial.finance/how-to-transfer-eth-assets-to-solana-using-wormhole-v2-514e728dc4fc
详细的Wormhole V2 NFT bridge流程参见：
https://decrypt.co/81764/ethereum-solana-wormhole-send-nfts-across-blockchains